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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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1.1. Sport hunting, conservation and development: a brief history 
Hunting has been a part of human history for millennia. Hunter-gatherers greatly depended on 
hunting for subsistence and fur, and it also played an important role in their rituals and for show 
of prowess. They mainly used rudimentary methods (e.g. slings, snares, spears, nets, dogs and 
often bows and arrows) to kill wild animals (Steinhart, 1989). This hunting had minimal impact 
on wildlife populations, as the world population was still low (Milner-Gulland et al., 2003; 
Willcox & Nambu, 2007). However, by the 1500s, when European settlers arrived into North 
America, hunting increased. Similarly, hunting increased in Africa by the 1800s when early 
explorers arrived and found a continent abundant with wildlife. Wealthy Europeans followed 
in their wake for hunting expeditions, particularly in Kenya (Adams, 2004; Adams & Hulme 
2001; Lindsey et al., 2007). Related, following the arrival of Arab traders in the 1700s, 
especially in the coastal areas (Stearman, 2000), Africa entered a new era of socio-economic 
development accompanied by technology changes in the hunting industry (Milner-Gulland et 
al., 2003). Hunting was no longer something people did mainly for subsistence, people now 
also hunted for commercial and leisure purposes (Stearman, 2000). The hunters started to use 
new weapons, such as guns, which enabled them to kill more animals (Milner-Gulland et al., 
2003). As Steinhart (1989:247) pointed out, ‘hunting during the colonial era was a major 
element in the struggle for survival, for development and for power among the various forces 
vying for control of […] resources of land, water and animals – wild and domesticated’.   
 
In order to sustain the European hunters’ expeditions in Africa, the colonial administrators 
decided to collaborate with the African kings and chiefs to reduce hunting by the local Africans. 
This was done through widespread demarcation of large areas of land in the name of wildlife 
protection (Adams, 2004; Dunlap, 1988; Lindsey et al., 2007). Furthermore, in order to secure 
the boundaries of the demarcated areas, rural Africans were forcefully removed from these 
areas, often to ‘waterless sites’ (Beinart & Coates, 1995; Jones, 2006), without any form of 
compensation. Several of these demarcated areas across Africa were named national parks in 
the early 1950s (e.g. Queen Elizabeth National Park, Murchison Falls National Park and 
Kidepo Valley National Park) purposely for the preservation of pristine environments with 
restricted access for the local people (cf. Jones, 2006). 
 
So, many of the state-led conservation areas and application of the concept of conservation in 
Africa owe their origin to the practice of hunting (Jones, 2006). In fact, most of the state 
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protected areas (including those in Uganda, see also section 1.5) that (were and) are still used 
for sport hunting were originally demarcated as either game reserves (GRs) or controlled 
hunting areas (CHAs). There is little in the conservation literature about hunting in Uganda, 
and this dissertation represents one of the first attempts to incorporate the issue of sport hunting 
in Uganda into international academic debates on hunting, development and conservation. 
Moreover, Uganda is the only Eastern African country apart from Tanzania that reintroduced 
sport hunting following its band in 1979. In this thesis, sport hunting (also known as safari 
hunting, trophy hunting and game hunting), is described as an activity where a tourist pays to 
hunt an animal with desired physical attributes (e.g. large horns, tusks, body size or skull 
length), usually in the company of a professional hunting guide (Cooney et al., 2017; Lindsey 
et al., 2007). The motivations for the hunt range from adventure, pleasure and attaining trophies 
to using tracking skills, being in remote bush areas and understanding the target species. Sport 
hunting became popular in most African countries during the colonial and post-independent 
periods (Ayorekire et al., 2011).   
 
The post-independent hunting mainly targeted big game such as Rhinoceros and buffalo 
Syncerus caffer for their horns, and elephant Loxodonta africana and hippopotamus 
Hippopotamus amphibious for their tusks. This was primarily driven by economic motives. 
This hunting by the Europeans, reinforced by the colonial status of wildlife protection, and 
coupled with hunting by the local people, eventually had negative ecological impacts on 
wildlife populations across the African continent. For example, Rhinoceros became extinct in 
Uganda (Ayorekire et al., 2011), as did the plains zebra quagga Equus quagga and the antelope 
blue buck Hippotragus leucophaeus in South Africa (Adams, 2004; Lindsey at a., 2007) and 
the bird species Nubian bustard Neotis nuba in Sahelian Africa (Loveridge et al., 2006). 
Overwhelmed by the declining wildlife numbers, some post-independent countries (e.g. Kenya, 
Botswana and later Uganda) banned sport hunting in order to avert the possible further 
extinction of species in Africa (cf. Adams, 2004). Subsequently sport hunting changed under 
the influence of shifting conservation discourses. 
 
1.2. From ‘fences and fines’ to participatory approaches 
Sport hunting in state protected areas historically has been inspired by conservation related 
movements and organisations that had emerged from within Europe, such as the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in 1891 (an initiative from two groups of women to fight 
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against trade in certain bird species thought to be nearing extinction). Similarly, the Convention 
for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa was signed in 1900 by European 
countries with their colonies in sub-Saharan Africa to protect species that were also facing 
extinction (see Jones, 2006). The RSPB and the Convention greatly supported the idea of 
preserving wildlife for its intrinsic value. They were backed by movements such as ‘the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English “enclosure” movement’ (see Büscher & Whande, 
2007; Igoe, 2004), and influenced by the early German concerns about forest conservation (see 
Büscher & Whande, 2007:25-26; Matose, 2001).  
 
The newly created national parks in Uganda (see also section 1.5), like elsewhere in Africa, 
were managed through the protectionist model, with a ‘fences and fines’ approach also known 
as the ‘fortress conservation’ model under state authority (Jones, 2006). Subsequently, the 
displaced local people were referred to as ‘encroachers’ or ‘poachers’ (Büscher & Dietz, 2005), 
thought to be ‘wasteful’ resource users, and were liable to harsh punishments. Sometimes they 
or were even shot at and killed by the protected areas’ rangers, armed with guns by the states 
to guard the demarcated pristine areas (Dunlap, 1988; Jones, 2006). Consequently, many rural 
Africans, especially those who lived next to the new protected areas, became vulnerable to 
animal attacks and crop damage. This fuelled local animosity towards wildlife and the 
protected areas in general (Jones, 2006).  
 
Around the late 1970s conservationists started to recognise that the protectionist model of 
‘fences and fines’ was facing challenges as it perpetuated exclusion of rural Africans from 
participating in decision-making concerning protected areas (Büscher & Whande, 2007). 
Protectors or managers of conservation areas had better treat neighbouring communities as 
‘partners’ in conservation (Adams & Hulme, 2001; Hulme & Murphree, 1999) as opposed to 
viewing them as ‘resource wasters’ and or ‘conservation enemies’ (Jones, 2006).  
 
The key driver of changes in the debates around the protectionist model was the need to 
promote a more inclusionary and participatory approach (Büscher & Whande, 2007). Thus, 
motivated by a strong desire to rectify the mistakes of the ‘fortress conservation approach’ 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001; Büscher & Whande, 2007; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Jones, 2006), 
the post-independent African governments were faced with the need to adopt an alternative 
approach that would ensure participation and participatory development (Jones, 2006). The 
 
 
5 
 
alternative approach would not only achieve local ownership and local management of natural 
resources, but also recognise the centrality of the formerly ‘excluded local people’ in the 
conservation debates (Büscher & Dietz, 2005) and derive benefits that were expected to be 
shared with the local people (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Subsequently, the ‘sustainable 
development’ agenda of the 1980s and 1990s was touted as one of the ways through which 
economic, environmental and social sustainability could be achieved together. 
 
Hence, the idea that a ‘conservation-development nexus’ was a possibility in Africa (Büscher 
& Dietz, 2005) was institutionalised in the African wildlife conservation arena with the 
implementation of ‘community-based conservation’ policies (CBCs) (Adams, 2004; Büscher 
& Dietz, 2005; Hulme & Murphree, 2001). These policies were meant to ‘allow people living 
near protected lands to participate in land-use policy and management decisions; give people 
proprietorship or ownership over wildlife resources; and give local people economic benefit 
from wildlife conservation’ (Hackle (1999: 727; see also Büscher & Dietz, 2005). Many 
African countries with donor support immediately adopted and operationalised CBCs in their 
conservation and development agenda thereby changing natural resource policies from the 
traditional ‘state-led’ or ‘fences and fines’ (Adams, 2004; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001) to a more participatory approach (Mariki, 2013) where both state actors and 
non-state actors are involved in environmental matters (Arts, 2006). Despite the CBCs’ wide 
application in Africa, various critics (e.g., Adams & Hulme, 2001; Brosius, 1998; Büscher & 
Dietz, 2005; Büscher & Whande, 2007; Duffy, 2000; Dressler, 2014; Dressler et al., 2010; 
Jones, 2006) view it as mere extension of colonial legacies driven by western agenda (Büscher 
& Whande, 2007). This is because in part CBC implementation has been overtaken by the large 
influx of the private sector (with profit motives), thereby hampering the potential of CBC to 
effectively attain the conservation-development nexus (cf. MacDonald, 2010). Nevertheless, 
for nearly four decades now, several forms of CBCs, including sport hunting, have been 
developed and implemented in Southern and Eastern Africa. These are assumed to have 
attained some level of ‘successes’ towards overcoming the conservation-development 
challenges. 
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1.3. From ‘old’ to ‘new’ sport hunting 
Against this backdrop, I make a distinction between the ‘old’ sport hunting and the ‘new’ sport 
hunting. The ‘old’1 sport hunting that was associated with ‘fortress conservation’, changed into 
a ‘new’ sport hunting approach, coupled to a changed discourse on conservation (Hutton et al., 
2005). The ‘new’ sport hunting is promoted within the context of market-based (McAfee, 1999) 
and community-based approaches (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Although market-based 
approaches are anchored in the idea of attributing monetary values to all wildlife to raise their 
conservation status, and community-based approaches in the idea of involving the formerly 
excluded communities in conservation activities, both approaches aim at deriving benefits from 
wildlife, and sharing these benefits with the protected areas neighbouring communities to win 
their support for conservation activities while at the same time stimulating the economic 
development of the poor communities (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). 
 
The ‘new’2 sport hunting was first experimented with in the 1970s and early 1980s in Southern 
Africa and later West Africa, then Central Africa and more recently Eastern Africa, to promote 
the conservation-development nexus. However, in Uganda it was particularly implemented to 
reduce human-wildlife conflicts. More generally, the new sport hunting is promoted as one of 
the ways of promoting participation and participatory development through the active 
involvement of both state and non-state actors in conservation, and the sharing of conservation 
and benefits. Thus, sport hunting implementation in most parts of Africa is allegedly driven by 
a strong desire to conserve wildlife while deriving (economic) benefits from it (Nelson et al., 
2013). It was widely implemented as part of integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDPs), community-based conservation (CBC) and community-based natural resources 
management (CBNRM) that highlighted the centrality of the local communities in conservation 
(Dressler et al., 2010). Namibia, for instance, integrated sport hunting in the management and 
governance of communal conservancies, in Zimbabwe it was part of the communal areas 
management programme for indigenous resources (CAMFIRE), South Africa allowed sport 
hunting in private game reserves (PGRs) and Tanzania did so in wildlife management areas 
(WMAs) (see Gibson, 1995; Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007; Van der Duim, 
                                                          
1 The notion ‘old’ sport hunting in this thesis refers to hunting that was conducted during the pre-historic times, 
colonial and the immediate post-independent period under ‘fortress conservation’ approach. 
2 The notion ‘new’ sport hunting in this thesis refers to sport hunting introduced coupled to a changed discourse 
on conservation and now widely practiced under community-based and market-based conservation approaches 
to simultaneously achieve conservation and development 
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2010, Van der Duim et al. 2011). Governments state that the continued practice of sport hunting 
in Africa is supporting conservation and development, but different scholars hold different 
perspectives regarding this practice in Africa. This study hopes to contribute to these debates. 
 
1.4. Debates on sport hunting 
Sport hunting has been and still is subject to a number of closely related debates. First, scholars 
have widely debated the extent to which sport hunting implementation purportedly can 
contribute to addressing the conservation and development challenges (Adams; 2004; Barrett 
et al., 2011; Berkes, 2004; Di Minin et al., 2016; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & Murphree, 
2001; Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007ab; Muposhi et al., 2016; Van der Duim, 
2010, Van der Duim et al. 2011). These debates are especially heated when they are about areas 
where wildlife conservation (or sport hunting) is in competition with human demand for arable 
land, settlement and commercialisation (Adams, 2004; Czech, 2000; Emerton, 1999; Kareiva 
et al., 2011; Pooley et al., 2015; Rands et al., 2010). The proponents of sport hunting argue that 
it is an important tourism segment for most Southern and Eastern African countries (Lewis & 
Alpert, 1997; Van der Duim et al., 2015) which attracts thousands of tourists, mainly from the 
United States and Europe (Lindsey et al., 2007), and potentially encourages local participation 
and sharing of benefits (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Di Minin et al., 2016; Lewis & 
Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007; 2013; Mariki, 2013; Muposhi et al., 2016). Although 
earlier studies estimated that sport hunting generated a total of about US$ 201 million of 
revenue annually continent-wide (see Booth, 2010; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007), in a study 
commissioned by Safari Club International (SCI) (although contested, see Murray, 2017), it is 
estimated that sport hunting contributes about US$ 426 million to the GDP of Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe put together 
(Southwick, 2015). Generally, sport hunting is promoted on the grounds that it creates 
incentives for local inhabitants and especially former poachers, who, for instance, could work 
as community wildlife scouts (Lindsey et al., 2007). However, others, such as Weaver et al. 
(2016) and IUCN/PACO (2009) claim that benefits from sport hunting are insufficient, 
especially when compared to traditional tourism (e.g. photographic tourism or ecotourism) 
which aims for the same benefits but without destroying the very resource on which it depends 
(Koens et al., 2009; Ormsby & Mannle, 2006; Snyman, 2017).  
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Second, but closely related, is the debate on market-based conservation approaches (Roth & 
Dressler 2012; Sullivan 2012). This is guided by neoliberal ideologies of a free market 
economy (Artuso & De Castro, 1996; Pirard, 2012; Roth & Dressler 2012; Sullivan, 2012). 
Market-based conservation is known for using economic instruments, referred to as market-
based-instruments (MBIs), to help raise money to advance conservation agendas (Anyango-
Van Zwieten et al., 2015; McAfee, 1999; Perrings, 1995; Pirard, 2012) while stimulating 
development (Fletcher, 2010). One of the promoters of this approach, McAfee (1999), 
introduced the concept of ‘green developmentalism’, which focuses on achieving development 
through environmentally sensitive approaches. According to McAfee (1999), when local nature 
is valued according to international market prices, it becomes more competitive and has higher 
chances of survival. Sport hunting is seen as one of those ways through which wildlife is valued 
at market prices. Although the MBIs and sport hunting may be different in focus, they all 
attribute monetary value to nature (Pirard, 2012). In the domain of sport hunting particularly, 
different governments attach different price tags to different wildlife species that tourists are 
expected to pay to gain permission to hunt. The sport hunting proponents argue that this 
revenue is used to protect the remaining animals from illegal hunters or poachers. Although 
MBIs (including sport hunting) have gained prominence in biodiversity conservation in Africa 
in the past decades (Anyango-Van Zwieten et al., 2015; Lindsey et al., 2007; McAfee, 1999; 
Pirard, 2012), other scholars are critical about its wide application. As argued by Pirard 
(2012:59), ‘MBIs cannot be said to be cost-efficient […] or capable of revealing information 
to reach a social optimum and better environmental management’. Breitling (2016) further 
argues that although ‘selling nature to save it’ (McAfee, 1999) may provide short-term 
solutions to biodiversity loss, it does not address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss, 
such as deforestation and degradation. Critical scholars (e.g. Büscher et al., 2012; Fletcher, 
2010) state that MBIs only work to weaken state control of biodiversity conservation as private 
individuals and organisations promote their neoliberal agenda – by paying to hunt wildlife, for 
example in Africa. 
 
Third, a relatively new line of argumentation has emerged in the sport hunting debate: the 
promotion of a ‘sustainable hunting model’ (Paulson, 2012; 2014). According to Paulson 
(2012), this model is a ‘paradox of conservation’, as the proponents tend to see themselves as 
conservationists on the one hand and as hunters on the other. This argument that individuals 
can be both hunters and conservationists is common in the current global conservation 
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advocacy, where more attention is paid to the intrinsic value of nature, rather than the social or 
economic benefits that most pro-sport hunting advocates present (Paulson, 2012). Many of the 
hunting proponents are also known to be philanthropists. They mobilise resources through 
campaigns to protect nature and make donations to conservation organisations around the 
world (Paulson, 2012; 2014). It is estimated that about 1.4 million km² of land in Africa is 
currently used for sport hunting (IUCN/PACO, 2009; Lindsey et al., 2007) and supported by 
its revenues. Moreover, some scholars (e.g. Hofer, 2002) have also argued that revenue 
generated from sport hunting is often used to directly finance conservation activities of the 
African government conservation agencies (Hofer, 2002). Others (e.g., Lindsey et al., 2007; 
Muposhi et al., 2016) furthermore argue that the local communities who usually receive sport 
hunting benefits are more likely to report poachers in their communities, and/or work as 
wildlife scouts themselves, thereby increasing the chances of wildlife survival in Africa. 
However, these arguments fall short of concrete evidence of how sport hunting or sport hunters 
have a direct impact on African conservation practices. The variety of financial data collected 
regarding sport hunting are typically not systematically collected, across different temporal and 
spatial scales (Naidoo et al., 2016). Moreover, the idea to devolve the governance of sport 
hunting areas (or general conservation) upon private entrepreneurs and organisations, and to 
include foreign sport hunters or organisations, is risky, as these can be inclined to serve their 
individual interests, not necessarily those of conservation, government agencies or the local 
communities (IUCN/PACO, 2009). 
 
Fourth, the implementation of sport hunting to achieve conservation and development 
objectives in Africa is opposed by animal rights advocates as well as animal welfare advocates. 
Rooted in different ideologies, the animal rights proponents are of the opinion that animals 
should not be used or killed for whatever purpose, while the animal welfare advocates are more 
concerned with the living conditions of animals. Both ideas are promoted by academics and 
practitioners (NGOs, citizens etc.). Animal rights advocates are broadly guided by animal and 
environmental ethics, arguing that people should be concerned about the intrinsic value of an 
individual animal as opposed to their instrumental value. As such, Regan (1983), the 
proclaimed father of animal rights, campaigned against the disregarding of the rights of 
individual animals in conservation efforts concerning species or ecosystems (Perry & Perry, 
2008). Other scholars, (e.g. Bekoff, 2013; Wallach et al., 2018) urge individuals and 
organisations involved with wildlife to have compassion. At the continental level, the Africa 
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Union recently adopted an animal welfare strategy that recognises animals (including wild 
animals, farm animals and animals used in research) as sentient beings (AU, 2017) following, 
among others, EU countries. Moreover, there have been (and still are) campaigns against 
linking sport hunting and conservation in Africa (see Batavia et al., 2018; Carpenter & 
Konisky, 2017; Lindsey et al., 2016). The intensity of these campaigns is exemplified by the 
international attention following one incident in July 2015 of the killing of a radio-collared 
Lion, named Cecil, by Dr. Walter Palmer, a trophy hunter in Zimbabwe (Batavia et al., 2018; 
Carpenter & Konisky, 2017; Lindsey et al., 2016). Related, Namibia’s minister of environment 
and tourism issued a public memo as of 3 July 2018 banning the posting or sharing of 
photographs of hunters posing with dead animals on pubic platforms, as the government 
considers such actions as unethical (MET, 2018). 
 
1.5. Sport hunting in Uganda 
The management and utilisation of wildlife in Uganda, like in many parts of Africa, was for a 
long time rooted in customary rules and practices, with the kings and chiefs acting as custodians 
of wildlife (NEMA & MTTI, 2008). With the arrival of colonial administrators in the late 
1800s, the wildlife management landscape changed to a protectionist model, institutionalised 
in the 1926 game ordinance, which prohibited unsanctioned forms of wildlife use. The game 
ordinance granted absolute wildlife management authority to the central administration on 
behalf of the people of Uganda. Consequently, the government created several game reserves 
and controlled hunting areas across the country, some of which later became national parks in 
the 1950s (e.g. Queen Elizabeth National Park, Murchison Falls National Park and Kidepo 
Valley National Park). However, the government continued to issue sport hunting permits for 
financial reasons, especially for big game such as rhinoceros, elephants and buffalos. For 
example, Uganda earned around £ 486,267 from the sale of game licenses and ivory in 1969 
(NEMA & MTTI, 2008; Ochieng, 2011) – an equivalent of US$ 638, 598 today. The continued 
(illegal) hunting decimated wildlife populations throughout the country, which prompted the 
1979 ban on all forms of hunting in Uganda (Ayorekire et al., 2011). 
 
Following the increased human population in Uganda, from 4.9 million people in 1948 to the 
recent 2018 population estimate of 44.3 million people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018), 
human-wildlife conflicts have been on the rise, as Uganda’s protected areas are encroached for 
arable land, settlement, grazing and extractive industries. Human-wildlife conﬂicts are 
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considered to be ‘conflicts which occur whenever an action by humans or wildlife has an 
adverse impact upon the other’ (Conover, 2002:8). Although different scholars have defined 
human-wildlife conflicts in various ways (see e.g., Conover, 2002; Duffy, 2000; Nyhus, 20016; 
Treves & Karanth, 2003; Woodroffe et al., 2005), these definitions invariably include the 
aspect of interaction (usually negative) between humans and wildlife. There are many forms of 
human-wildlife conflicts, for instance when animals are regarded as pests (Kagoro-Rugunda, 
2004) or nuisance (see chapter 4), when people poach wildlife (Duffy, 2000), or when large 
predators and herbivores injure or kill people and livestock (see Nyhus, 2016). In the case of 
Uganda, in order to reduce human-wildlife conflicts the government has experimented with 
and implemented several (alternative) CBC related approaches, including the 20% Tourism 
Revenue Sharing scheme3 (TRS) (see Ahebwa et al., 2008; 2012a; Archabald & Naughton-
Treves, 2001; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014). Although revenue sharing schemes were 
presented as a panacea for conservation challenges (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001), 
literature indicates that results were mixed (see Ahebwa et al., 2012a; Archabald & Naughton-
Treves, 2001; Schroeder, 2008; Spiteri & Nepalz, 2006; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014; 
Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012).  
 
In addition to TRS, sport hunting was reintroduced in 2001 to address human-wildlife conflicts. 
It was first (re)introduced on private land around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and later 
in and around other protected areas (see below and also Chapter 3). The reintroduction had the 
following objectives: (1) to positively change residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, and (2) 
reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by (3) providing 
incentives for local inhabitants, and (4) to provide lessons in developing guidelines and 
procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001). Sport hunting has since 
been practiced and its benefits have allegedly been shared with the local communities around 
Lake Mburo National Park (Ayorekire et al., 2011; Ochieng, 2011; Ochieng et al., 2015; 2017; 
Lamprey & Mugisha, 2009; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). It was extended to Kabwoya and 
Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKGMA) in 2006. Generally, sport hunting now 
covers 13 different areas in Uganda mainly classified as community-owned wildlife areas, such 
as Karenga community wildlife area, Amudat community wildlife area etc. Sport hunting is 
                                                          
3 Tourism Revenue Sharing scheme (TRS) was initiated by the Uganda Wildlife Authority in 1996 with the aim 
of sharing 20% of the total park entry fees paid by a single tourist to enter a protected area in Uganda with the 
neighbouring local communities to the protected areas. 
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also organised on private-owned land around Lake Mburo National park and the Kafu River 
basin; and government-owned wildlife reserves, such as Kabwoya wildlife reserve, Pian-Upe 
wildlife reserve etc. Sport hunting in all these areas is guided by the same objectives as around 
LMNP. 
 
1.6. Defining the research problem 
Uganda’s – and other African countries’ – current hunting policy is being implemented within 
the context of the market-based conservation approach (Artuso & De Castro, 1996; McAfee, 
1999) and the community-based conservation approach (Berkes, 2004; Hulme & Murphree, 
2001). The government, through the Uganda Wildlife Authority and in collaboration with civil 
society organisations, private hunting companies and the local communities around different 
protected areas, signed various agreements to implement it. The involvement of these actors 
implies adopting new management strategies that are collaborative in nature. 
  
Guided by institutional theory, in particular discursive institutionalism, regime theory and 
governance literature, I conceptualise the Ugandan sport hunting policy in this thesis as an 
arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but implemented at 
local levels, with both local and wider implications for development and wildlife conservation. 
I will deploy the policy arrangement approach (Arts et al., 2006; Arts & Tatenhove, 2004; Van 
der Zouwen, 2006) and the governance capacity approach (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Arts, 2001; 
Dang et al., 2015), together with the concepts of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 
2006) and effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) 
as a conceptual framework to analyse the Ugandan sport hunting policy implementation. I will 
use this same framework to analyse the impacts of this sport hunting policy, as well as the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of it, and its impacts at both national and local levels. This conceptual 
framework will be explicated in Chapter 2. 
  
Our knowledge of how these sport hunting policy arrangements in Africa, and in particular 
Uganda, have developed and evolved is limited, as is our knowledge of how national and local 
processes shape this evolution. Following the policy arrangement approach, the aim of this 
thesis is therefore to understand the relations between and among the policy arrangement 
dimensions (discourses, actors, rules and resources) of the sport hunting arrangement in 
Uganda, and how these relations influence policy stability or change as well as the policy’s 
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effectiveness. This study addresses this puzzle by analysing how Uganda’s sport hunting policy 
was developed and implemented, and how it evolved over the years. This, in turn, requires an 
analysis of the processes that influence actors’ relations at the national and the local level, and 
how these national and local discourses and processes shaped the policy evolution.  
 
With this analysis I will also contribute to the four debates introduced in section 1.4, especially 
by showing, analysing and discussing the ecological, social and economic impacts of sport 
hunting, including the extent to which poaching is reduced and the perceptions of local 
communities towards wildlife have changed, and how the income is used to provide social 
services and support social development projects around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) 
and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA).  
  
1.7. Research objective and questions 
To address the issues and knowledge gaps identified above, this thesis is aimed at analysing 
the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKGMA). The main objective of this 
research is therefore: 
To analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy 
arrangements in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development.  
In order to operationalise the objective of this thesis, the following research questions were 
formulated: 
1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda? 
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time and what have 
been the driving forces for this change?  
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy around Lake Mburo National Park and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of enhancing 
development, reducing poaching and changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife? 
 
1.8. Study sites and methods 
1.8.1. Study sites 
This research was conducted based on a comparative case-study approach (Yin, 2003; Stake, 
2008; Miles et al., 2014). A comparative case-study approach is particularly suited to analysing 
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commonalities and differences across study sites (Miles et al., 2014; Sheridan et al., 2014). It 
is used in this study to integrate diverse sources of information to build a deep understanding 
of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. The two case studies compared in this thesis are 
situated in Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game 
Management (KKTGMA) (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1: Location of the two case studies 
 
 
These case studies were chosen based on the fact that the government first introduced the ‘new’ 
sport hunting policy around LMNP in 2001 and later extended it to KKTGMA in 2006. Both 
areas have for a long time experienced human-wildlife conflicts. Nonetheless, the two areas 
are different: the LMNP is a national park but hunting is conducted on private-owned land 
around the national park and KKTGMA comprises both a formal game reserve and community-
owned land. The areas are therefore well suited to compare the sport hunting arrangements and 
their impacts. I briefly describe the two sites below. 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) 
Lake Mburo National Park lies in the southern savannah rangeland in Uganda: a wildlife 
migratory route from northern Tanzania to southern Sudan. The park is at about 1,210 meters 
above sea level, with local relief of 30-400 meters, and experiences a semi-arid savannah 
climate – with the minimum annual rainfall ranging from 400 mm in the south-east to 700 mm 
in the west. The mean maximum temperature is approximately 27.5oC and the mean minimum 
is 15oC. Relative humidity is rather high, averaging between 61-84 per cent (noon and midnight 
respectively) (Kamugisha et al., 1997). The Bahima (nomadic pastoralists and subsistence 
farmers) and a few other tribes, such as the Bakiga and Baganda (Emerton, 1999) used to 
inhabit most of this area. By the early 1900s, the area was infested with rinderpest, killing large 
numbers of cattle and forcing some nomads to migrate (Kamugisha et al., 1997).  
 
The (temporary) absence of pastoralists meant an increase in wildlife numbers, which 
eventually attracted local hunters (who were later referred to as poachers) from the 
neighbouring communities (from central and south-western Uganda). The large influx of 
(illegal) hunters forced the government to introduce restrictions on hunting. First, the 
government declared the 650 km2 area a strictly controlled hunting area (CHA) in 1958, and 
two years later a game reserve (Lake Mburo Game Reserve – LMGR), managed by the Game 
Department (GD), before eventually declaring it a national park in 1982. This declaration 
resulted in the mass eviction of (illegal) occupants (especially pastoralists and some local 
hunters who had temporarily settled in the park area) without compensation (Emerton, 1999). 
However, in 1987, the government instituted the Kanyanyeru Resettlement Scheme (KRS), 
that allocated over 8,000 ha of park land to 700 families (Ochieng, 2011), thus reducing the 
park area by about 60% (Emerton, 1999; Kagoro-Rugunda, 2004; Kamugisha, et al., 1997). 
Today, LMNP measures only 260 km2. In the meantime, wildlife continued to roam outside 
the park boundaries – on the land now owned by individual local residents – which perpetuated 
human-wildlife conflicts. Sport hunting was (re)introduced as a solution. 
  
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Areas (KKTGMA) 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Areas (KKTGMA) lies in the great Albertine 
Rift: the western branch of the East African Rift that runs through western Uganda and through 
parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. This 
area was declared a controlled hunting area (CHA) in 1963, covering a total area of 194 km2 
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(Plumptre et al., 2009). In the 1990s, the government decided to split it into Kabwoya Wildlife 
Reserve (KWR, a government controlled reserve situated on the western side) and Kaiso-Tonya 
Community Wildlife Area (KTCWA, a community-owned wildlife area situated on the eastern 
side (see Figure 1.1). It is currently co-managed by the Uganda Wildlife Authority and the local 
communities (UWP, 1999; 2004). As was the case around LMNP, an increasing number of 
people moved into KKTGMA, especially following invasions by nomadic pastoralists, settlers 
and (illegal) hunters. The Hoima district local government development plan 2015/2016–
2019/2020 indicates that the district population was at 573,903 people by 2014, with an annual 
growth rate of 4.2 per cent and over 90 per cent living in rural areas (Hoima district 
development plan, 2015). Sport hunting was introduced in KKTGMA in 2006 following a 
signed concession agreement between the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), a private sport 
hunting company (Lake Albert Safaris Limited), the local government, and the local 
communities. 
 
1.8.2. Research methods 
In this section, I briefly describe the methodological approaches used in this thesis. More 
details on the approaches used are presented in the methods sections of the empirical chapters 
(3-5). Fieldwork was done at both the national and the local level. Specifically, data collection 
for Chapter 3 was done at the national level, with examples from around LMNP used for the 
analysis. Fieldwork for Chapters 4 and 5 was done at both the national and local level. For 
LMNP, fieldwork covered four sub-counties (Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga 
Town Board (Kiruhura district), and for KKTGMA three sub-counties (Kabwoya, Buseruka, 
Kyangwali (Hoima district). The empirical chapters (3-5) focus on the development and 
implementation of sport hunting in the context of Uganda and show the social, ecological (in 
terms of reducing poaching) and economic impacts of hunting. These chapters furthermore 
describe how the different stakeholders in Uganda perceive these impacts, and also how these 
perceptions influence the continued policy implementation at the local level.  
 
Three methods of data collection were used in this thesis: literature and document review, 
qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. To analyse these various data, 
I used methods for validation (Kumar, 2012) and triangulation (Jennings, 2001). The use of a 
triangulation approach enabled an understanding of the different aspects of the empirical reality 
(Jennings, 2001) about sport hunting in its context-specific settings (Hoepfl, 1997), thus 
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respecting and staying close to the empirical domain of what was being researched. Different 
studies have affirmed the importance of combining different methods to collect and validate 
data on complex topics (see Ayana, 2014; Bose, 2012; Ochieng, 2017; Somorin, 2014). Below, 
I discuss the methods of data collection and analysis used.  
 
In-depth qualitative interviews 
Given the nature of the debates on sport hunting, it was inevitable to execute in-depth 
interviews to gain an understanding of the different perspectives. An in-depth qualitative 
interview approach was chosen because it allows the use of open-ended questions, it is 
discovery-oriented, and allows the interviewer to deeply explore the respondent’s feelings and 
perspectives on a subject (Guion et al., 2001). The interviews resulted in rich background 
information about sport hunting in Uganda. 
 
Interview participants were selected through judgemental (Kumar, 2012) and snowball 
sampling (Jennings, 2001) and were asked predesigned semi-structured interview questions 
(Piboonrungroj & Sorèze, 2009). During interviews, I asked questions and let the interviewees 
talk and express their opinions about sport hunting’s implementation, expected benefits and 
challenges, its rules, impacts of the policy, and changes in the arrangements over time and the 
reasons for these changes. Table 1.1 shows the categories of respondents interviewed for each 
empirical chapter. A total of 99 interviewees were contacted and interviewed: 65 of these were 
interviewed once, while 34 were interviewed more than once. In total, 121 interviews4 were 
conducted between 2013-2017. The majority of interviews were audio-recorded and later 
transcribed. Interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes and offices or restaurants, 
lasting 20-90 minutes. Three of the respondents agreed to be interviewed but declined to be 
recorded. Also, a total of 45 informal conversations took place with various officials; these 
were not recorded, only notes were taken. Data from the different sources, namely literature 
and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation, were 
systematically analysed. Specifically, I coded and categorised respondents’ responses based on 
                                                          
4 The total number of interviews mentioned here does not mean that 121 interviewees were contacted and 
interviewed. Since the interviews for the different chapters were collected at different times, it meant that some 
respondents were interviewed more than once. For example, the representatives of the two sport hunting 
companies were each interviewed for Chapters 4 and 5, and one of the representatives of Game trails (U) was 
interviewed for chapters 3-5.  
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the language used, to reveal similarities and discrepancies in views. These views were then 
interpreted and compared according to the theoretical concepts described in Chapter 2. 
 
Key informants for the national level interview included representatives of organisations such 
as the Uganda Wildlife Authority (headquarters), the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and 
Heritage (MTWH), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) office, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Nature Uganda 
(NU), World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), Fauna and Flora International (FFI), and 
representatives of tourism associations such as Uganda Tourism Association (UTA) and 
Uganda Safari Guides Association (USAGA).  
 
At the local level, the main interviewees were the district local government and sub-county 
officials, local residents who own and use land around LMNP and KKTGMA where hunting 
takes place. Others included people who are locally involved in conservation activities and 
development practitioners, representatives of the organisations mentioned in the above, 
community wildlife associations (CWAs) representatives and the private sector such as the 
sport hunting companies. 
 
Table 1.1: Category of research respondents 
Empirical 
chapter 
Category of research respondents and number of interviews 
Government: 
UWA 
Headquarters, 
Lake Mburo, 
Kabwoya 
Conservation 
NGOs 
Sport 
hunting 
companies 
District/sub-
county 
leaders 
Tourism 
associations 
Village 
leaders/ 
local 
communities 
Expert Total 
Chapter 3 6 4 1  4   15 
Chapter 4 19 6 3 4 1 26  59 
Chapter 5 6 1 2 4 2 31 1 47 
Total  31 11 6 8 7 57 1 121 
 
Literature and document review 
An extensive review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature and analysis of relevant 
documents was done to understand how and why sport hunting policy has been reintroduced 
and implemented. The documents reviewed included the professional hunting agreements, the 
internal (UWA, 2002) and the external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) sport hunting evaluation 
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reports, Uganda Wildlife Act 2000 and the Community Conservation Policy 2004. Other 
documents were for instance the Uganda Vision 2020 and 2040, The Uganda Wildlife 
Authority general management plan 2017-2018, Lake Mburo conservation area general 
management plan, Uganda Wildlife Policy 2004 etc., minutes of meetings, animal census data, 
records of hunted animals, revenue generated and number of arrested poachers. This helped in 
gaining an understanding of details of the sport hunting policy arrangement, including the 
formal policy goals. Subsequently, I was able to develop criteria and indicators for assessing 
the impacts of sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA (see Table 5.1, 
Chapter 5). To research the impacts of the national level sport hunting policy arrangements 
around LMNP and KKTGMA, I used the available quantitative data on animal census statistics, 
poaching seizure statistics, hunted animals, and generated revenue and distribution over the 
years. However, data on the number of wildlife species in the two areas, number of hunted 
animals over the years, number of arrested poachers or number of poached animals, amount of 
sport hunting revenue generated and distributed over the years were difficult to access. For this 
reason, I was unable to access data on the number of arrested poachers in KKTGMA. This was 
largely due to incapacity to collect and store credible data (see OAG, 2011). Moreover, no 
feedback mechanisms which translate local experiences in national polices are in place. As 
noted by Boonman-Berson et al. (2014), authentic data needs to be readily available, 
universally valid and/or accessible and unquestionable (see also Porter, 1995; Hinchliffe, 
2007). 
 
Non-participant observation 
Non-participant observation during fieldwork is increasingly applied in qualitative research 
(Myers, 1997). Its validity stems from the fact that it allows the researcher to collect data while 
actively observing field occurrences (Myers, 1997). This method is well enhanced by 
photography. Through field visits and observation, I was able to visit, take photographs and 
assess the state of the projects financed with the sport hunting revenues. Critical scholars argue 
that (non-) participant observation can be associated with ‘observer bias’ and ‘selective 
observation and interpretations’ (Jennings, 2001). In this study, this issue was addressed by 
also using other data-collection methods, namely qualitative in-depth interviews, and literature 
and document reviews. 
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1.9. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The three empirical chapters each address one of the 
three research questions highlighted in section 1.7 of this chapter. Two of the empirical 
chapters have been published as a book chapter and article in a peer-reviewed journal, and one 
of these has been submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning this research. It 
reflects on the different theories and concepts used to analyse the development and 
implementation of sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda.  
 
Chapter 3 answers research question 1 by analysing the development and implementation of 
sport hunting at the national level using examples from around Lake Mburo National Park. It 
highlights the different actors’ involved, legal framework and the views of the national actors 
about sport hunting in Uganda. 
 
Chapter 4 studies the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements and the factors that 
explain this evolution around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game 
Management Area, and thereby addresses research question 2. 
 
Chapter 5 answers research question 3 by focusing on the impacts of the sport hunting policy 
arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game 
Management Area, how these impacts are perceived by the different actors, and how these 
impacts influence the continued sport hunting implementation in Uganda. 
  
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this PhD-research and discusses the major 
findings on the development and implementation of sport hunting in Uganda. This chapter ends 
with suggestions for future research and several policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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2.1. Introduction 
In order to address the three research questions highlighted in Chapter 1, this Chapter 2 and 
this thesis overall is embedded in the governance literature, institutional theory, especially 
discursive institutionalism (DI), and regime theory. In the next section of this chapter, I will 
introduce these three bodies of literature as a theoretical foundation. Based on this, I will then 
introduce the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) and its dimensions, and the concept of 
governance capacity (GC, with a focus on the concepts of congruence and effectiveness) as a 
conceptual framework. Finally, I will discuss how this conceptual framework was 
operationalised in the context of Uganda’s sport hunting policy arrangements. 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework 
2.2.1. Governance            
Governance has become a ‘growth industry’ (Dang et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2005; Van 
Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). It has become popular across 
various disciplines and sectors, such as political science (policy study), international relations, 
public administration, development studies, natural resource management, water, forestry, 
conservation and tourism (see Agrawal, 2003; Arts, 2014; Arts, 2003; Arts & Goverde, 2006; 
Arnouts et al., 2012; Berkes, 2004; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Hufty, 2007; Lamers et al., 
2014; Nelson et al., 2013; Nthiga, 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Somorin, 2014; Stocker, 1998; 
Tenbensel, 2005; Van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). 
According to Van Kersbergen & van Waarden, the concept of governance can function as a 
‘bridge between these disciplines’ (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). Common among 
these disciplines is the focus on the increasing involvement of non-state actors in managing 
society, the ongoing complexity and changing nature of society, and the emergence of new 
tools and techniques employed to govern society (Somorin, 2014; Van Kersbergen & Van 
Waarden, 2004) and to address societal challenges, including environmental issues. The 
increasing involvement of non-state actors in managing and addressing societal challenges has 
been referred to by others (e.g. Rosenau, 1992; Rhodes, 1996; 1997; Stoker, 1998) as ‘a shift 
from government to governance’. Moreover, these scholars think the government is gradually 
losing its sovereign role in governing society (Baccaro & Mele, 2009; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009).  
   
However, among these disciplines there is a general lack of consensus on the definition and 
interpretation of governance (Arts, 2014; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-
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Hamakers, 2015; 2018). Despite this lack of consensus, Stoker (1998:17) states that governance 
can be defined as ‘creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action’, which is 
expected to lead to the achievement of certain policy goals. Thus, governance is considered as 
an ‘object’ or a ‘social fact’ (Hufty, 2007), that is considered to guide the interactions and 
relations between societal agents, social processes and nodal points (i.e. observation areas, in 
space or virtual terms) in a governance process (Hufty, 2007). In order to ensure effective 
governance processes and to achieve environmental goals, there is increasing demand for 
flexibility among governments by adopting new management styles (Arts & Goverde, 2006) 
that facilitate multi-stakeholder participation (Visseren-Hamakers, 2015), previously deemed 
to be lacking in the state-controlled systems (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Lockwood, 2010). From 
the foregoing, according to some authors a governance process is characterised by: an increased 
role for non-state agents in policy-making, increased decentralised decision-making authority, 
and an emergence of new tools and techniques to steer and guide society (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; 
Rhodes, 1997; Somorin, 2014; Stoker, 1998). 
   
Generally, governance looks at the role of different actors in making and implementing rules 
in a discursive process, and how these rules become institutionalised to guide, enable and/or 
constrain the behaviour of actors in a governance arrangement. Certainly, the concept of 
governance is broader than the concepts of institutions or regimes (see the next section). 
According to Schneider & Bauer (2007:10), ‘governance decomposes and deconstructs the 
institutional fabric and self-organization of modern societies into constellations of actors and 
rule regimes’. Similarly, Mayntz (2004) observes that governance is a hallmark of an 
institutional approach dealing with regulatory structures combining public and private, 
hierarchical and network forms of action coordination. Thus, the concept of governance 
encompasses the other concepts that guide this study, namely institutionalism and regimes (see 
below). Moreover, regimes or institutions can also be viewed as governance instruments to 
govern society and to address societal challenges whether at (inter)national levels or at local 
level (cf. Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). 
 
2.1.2. Institutionalism, regimes and environmental governance 
Institutional theory or old institutionalism (OI) is an approach that studies politics by focusing 
on the formal institutions of government (Rhodes, 2011). However, new or neo-institutionalist 
theory, which emerged as a critique to OI, is equally used in political science studies to offer 
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explanations for the existence of political institutions (i.e. the system of politics and 
government) and how they affect society (Schmidt, 2010). Thus, both OI and neo-
institutionalist theory (NI) highlight ‘the role of rule structures in determining individual 
behaviour and the outcome of social processes’ (Somorin, 2014:19; see also Arts & Buizer, 
2009). Nevertheless, NI is more concerned with societal actors acting and interacting within 
larger institutional frameworks (cf. Somorin, 2014; Van Wijk et al., 2011). Neo-
institutionalism also includes a focus on rules in use instead of rules on paper (as is the case in 
OI), and a focus on informal rules (including private and community rules) (cf. Samuels, 1990; 
Rutherford, 2001). Neo-institutionalist scholars are divided into three groups: rational 
institutionalists (RI), historical institutionalists (HI), and sociological institutionalists (SI) 
(Schmidt, 2008; 2010), which explain political institutions differently. RI posit that rational 
agents use institutions to pursue logically calculated political preferences. HI posit that the 
development of political institutions follows a logical path, which is regularised and routinized 
by the practices of political agents. SI posit that social agents, who make ‘logically appropriate 
choices’, act within the confines of socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms 
(Schmidt, 2010). SI thus defines institutions as ‘organized patterns of socially constructed 
norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviours of occupants of those roles, which are 
created and re-created over time’ (Goodine, 1998:19; see also Van Wijk et al., 2011).  
 
Because these three traditional perspectives view institutions as ‘given, static and constraining’ 
in nature (Schmidt, 2010), an alternative, fourth perspective of neo-institutionalism, emerged, 
namely discursive institutionalism (DI) (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; 2010). As such, 
DI emerged to provide an alternative approach to conceptualise (political) institutions as 
opposed to the older three institutional traditions (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). DI’s notion is that 
ideas and discourses are central elements in conceptualising, analysing and explaining 
institutional change. DI scholars study how new ideas and discourses become institutionalised 
into rules that enable, guide and constrain actors’ behaviour in society. Therefore, DI is 
preoccupied with understanding the role of ideas and discourses in explaining politics, policy-
making and institutional change (Ochieng, 2017; Schmidt, 2008), with institutional change 
referring to a scenario where an ‘institution may lose parts of its constituency and become 
contested’ (Van Wijk et al., 2011:6). This change is viewed as emerging from within the 
institutional structures itself, and not externally as assumed by the older three traditions 
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(Schmidt, 2002; 2010). Thus, DI aims to ‘…know about institutions and what makes them 
continue to change in regards to interests and norms’ over time (Schmidt, 2008:313).  
 
The concept of institutions, on the other hand, is used to study rules at all levels of governance, 
so from local to (inter-)national levels (Ochieng, 2017; Schmidt, 2008). Although there is no 
commonly agreed definition, institutions are synonymous to rules of the game (Ostrom et al., 
1994; Schmidt, 2008). However, rules have been given varying interpretations based on the 
old and new institutionalist perspectives of institutions, namely: the rules of the game in a 
society (Glaeser et al., 2004; Ostrom, 1990), rules in use (Ostrom et al., 1994; Cleaver, 2000), 
formal and informal rules, regulations and conventions that enable, guide and constrain human 
behaviour (North, 1990), sites where production, authority and obligation are contested and 
negotiated (Berry, 1989), and an interplay of knowledge and power (Mehta et al., 1999). As 
discussed under the rules section of the PAA dimensions (see section 2.3), institutions serve 
mainly to enable, guide and constrain (e.g. by incentives that structure, shape and frame) action 
of societal agents (Schmidt, 2008). 
  
Closely related to institutionalism is regime theory (Haggard & Simmons, 1987), which can be 
considered as a specialised part of institutional theory. The literatures on regimes and 
institutions recognise the commonality between the two concepts (see Giddens, 1984; Scott, 
2001) as both – in a nutshell – denote sets of (in)formal rules and norms (Arts & Buizer, 2009; 
Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; Wiering & Arts, 2006). New-institutionalist or neo-institutionalist 
scholars (e.g. Arts & Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; 2010) conceptualise institutions or regimes 
as societal instruments that shape, guide and constrain human action and agency (Arts, 2006; 
Ochieng, 2017; Scott, 2001). Although regimes and institutions are thought to be synonymous, 
the two concepts are usually used at different levels of governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018), 
with the concept of regimes usually referring to institutions at the international level. 
 
Regimes thus have been defined as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures...’ (Krasner, 1982:185) at the international level. Regimes theory originates 
from International Relations (IR) studies (see Puchala & Hopkins, 1982). The main 
preoccupation of regime theorists is to ‘conceptualise and explain the formation, persistence 
and transformation of international institutions’ (Ochieng, 2017:7), what ideas and discourses 
form institutions through which agents communicate, deliberate and persuade one another in 
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order to reach desired institutional outcomes. The literature on regimes has evolved from 
studying regime design and development to effectiveness, and institutional interaction, often 
with a focus on global environmental challenges (Visseren-Hamakers, 2013). With the 
emergence of new institutional approaches such as DI, the difference between institutionalism 
(including regimes) and governance is getting smaller – with a growing roles of non-state actors 
in addressing environmental issues (see Visseren-Hamakers, 2013). 
 
2.3. Conceptual framework: Discursive institutionalism and the Policy Arrangement 
Approach 
Against the backdrop of these three (related) bodies of knowledge I now will present the 
conceptual framework used to analyse Uganda’s sport hunting policy.  
 
As highlighted in the previous section, DI emerged to provide an alternative approach to 
conceptualise institutions, aiming to understand how (new) discourses become institutionalised 
into rules that guide, enable and constrain actors’ behaviour in society. To comprehensively 
conceptualise and analyse institutions and institutional change, and to be able to better explain 
the causes of the institutional changes that DI hints at, I adopt the Policy Arrangement 
Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 2006). The PAA offers further opportunities to conceptualise and 
analyse how multiple actors relate to each other within an institutional environment. 
  
The PAA has been widely applied in the social sciences, and especially within the European 
Union (EU). The book ‘Political Modernization and the Environment’ by Van Tatenhove et al. 
(2000b; also see Leroy & Van Tatenhove, 2000) marked the beginning of the wide application 
of the PAA as an analytical tool in policy studies (Arts et al., 2006; Van der Zouwen, 2006). It 
is now increasingly used within Southern and Eastern Africa (see e.g. Ahebwa et al., 2012ab; 
Ayorekire et al., 2011; Lamers et al., 2014; Majale-Liyala, 2013; Nthiga, 2014; Nthiga et al., 
2015; Ochieng, 2011; Ochieng, 2017; Ochieng et al., 2013; 2015; Van der Duim et al., 2011), 
and also Asia (see Dang et al., 2015) and South America (see Ochieng et al., 2013; 2015). A 
policy arrangement is defined as ‘…the temporary stabilization of the content and organization 
of a policy domain’ (Arts et al., 2006: 96), and incorporates four dimensions, namely 
discourses, actors, rules and resources. The temporary stabilisation is assumed because the 
arrangement is under constant pressure to change to accommodate (new) actors, rules, 
discourses and resources, or to (re)strategize to achieve policy goals (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Arts 
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& Tatenhove, 2004; Van Gussom et al., 2011; Van der Zouwen, 2006). Van der Zouwen (2006) 
points out that some of the new discourses, actors, rules and resources that find their way into 
an already existing policy arrangement may cause change within it. She further notes that these 
changes may result into ‘patterns’, where rules become stable or certain actions become 
routines, in other words, become institutionalised. It is important to note that the PAA 
dimensions (as discussed below) are intrinsically interwoven, with a change in any one 
dimension inducing changes in the others (Ahebwa, 2012a; Lamers et al., 2014; Liefferink, 
2006).  
 
2.3.1. Discourses 
In this thesis, discourses are defined as ‘narratives, sets of ideas, beliefs, concepts and story 
lines used to give meaning to a phenomenon in a real setting, produced and reproduced through 
sets of practices’ (Hajer, 1995: 60). Discourses are the substantive aspects of a policy domain 
(Wiering & Arts, 2006), and shape the way one views the world and the realities within it 
(Potter, 2003), and also influence the way these realities are debated and/or contested by 
stakeholders (Hajer, 1995; Hajer, 2003; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Policy 
arrangements – as assumed – ‘contain’ at least two discourses that differ and/or may compete 
(Arts & Buizer, 2009). The ‘difference and competition causes actors to group together in 
coalitions to enhance certain discourses and constrain others’ (Arts & Buizer, 2009:343). 
Moreover, discourses do not necessarily remain stable over time; they are fluid. They change 
relative to the context, participants, rules, resources et cetera (Hajer, 1995). It is only when a 
discourse maintains its ‘sameness’ (coherence) that we can state that its ‘(routine) practices’ 
have the capacity to produce and reproduce themselves within a specific context (Hajer, 1995). 
Thus, when new discourses become institutionalised into rules (another dimension of the PAA, 
see section 2.3.3 for explanation on rules) (Schmidt, 2008), such ‘discourses may undermine 
or reinforce existing institutions, thereby causing institutional change or stagnation’ (Ochieng 
(2017:9). However, discourses may not be ‘easily’ distinguishable. As such, discourse(s) are 
(‘better’) distinguished by analysts, since they may not be obvious to participants in any policy 
domain (Hajer, 2005; Hajer, 2006; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Overall, the analysis of discourses 
in this thesis helps to understand the changing ideas about sport hunting, and how these (may) 
influence its future development and implementation. 
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2.3.2. Actors 
Actors refer to individuals and organisations that are involved in a particular policy domain 
(Arts & Leroy 2006; Buizer, 2008; Leroy & Arts, 2006; Van der Zouwen, 2006; Wiering & 
Arts, 2006). Policy actors make policy decisions, resolve trade-offs, and provide a vision and 
direction (Van Gossum et al., 2011; Lebel et al., 2006; Boyle et al., 2001). The relations and 
interactions between actors in a policy arrangement provide key factors for the success of the 
arrangement (Van Gossum et al., 2011). These relations may be based on trust, information 
exchange et cetera (Van Gossum et al., 2011). Policy actors can be analysed based on ‘actor 
constellations’, ‘interaction patterns’ and ‘coalitions and oppositions’ (Buizer, 2008; Wiering 
& Arts, 2006). Actor coalitions are usually informed by particular beliefs or narratives, and 
aimed at achieving particular shared objective(s), ‘by allocating resources in a specific way, 
agreeing upon certain rules of the game or by employing specific storylines or other discursive 
notions in such a way as to further their objectives’ (Buizer, 2008:25). However, whether or 
not actors will support or oppose each other will largely depend on the set objectives (or actors’ 
interpretation of these objectives), rules in place and/or individual, and/or institutional 
preferences (Buizer, 2008). As such, it is important to analyse discourse coalitions to better 
understand how these coalitions affect the implementation of policy arrangements. 
 
2.3.3. Rules of the game  
Rules as used in the PAA refer to institutional and regime theory elaborated in the previous 
section. Rules define or shape (or influence) how issues are framed, agendas are set and 
communicated, how policies are formulated and decisions are made. Rules may be formal or 
informal in nature. Formal rules refer to legislation, agreements, and procedures (Giddens, 
1984; Wiering & Arts, 2006) shaping the domain of the policy arrangement. Legislation refers 
to ‘formalisation and transposition of policy discourses into binding laws’ (Wiering & Arts, 
2006: 329). Procedures refer to organisational aspects of rules (Wiering & Arts, 2006; also see 
Giddens, 1984), and also guide the allocation of resources and division of authority and 
competencies (Arts & Buizer 2009). Procedural rules are usually enforced by state authorities 
and may involve prosecution and legal sanctions. Informal rules refer to norms and political 
culture (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Wiering & Arts, 2006), and are usually enforced by social 
exclusion or other related forms, such as stigmatisation, blacklisting and boycotts (Van Wijk 
et al., 2011). The acceptance of rules by actors helps in measuring coherence between formal 
and informal rules (Van Gossum et al., 2011). Although rules have been given varying 
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interpretations (see section 2.3), following North (1990) I consider rules of the 
game/institutions as formal and informal regulations, legislation, agreements and conventions 
that enable, guide, shape and/or constraint human interactions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Mehta et 
al, 1999; North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994) to facilitate collective action and outcomes (Mehta 
et al, 1999; North, 1990).  
  
2.3.4. Resources 
Resources are assets that are owned or can be mobilised by policy actors, and include authority, 
knowledge, finances, land, technology and legitimacy (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004; Buizer, 
2008; Van Tatenhove et al., 2010; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Resource distribution is crucial in 
policy formation as it determines who has the (political) power to exert influence (Schmidt, 
2010; Wiering & Arts, 2006), and the ability of actors to form (discourse) coalitions. These 
coalitions usually mobilise resources or assets through interactions or relations in order to 
achieve certain outcomes in social systems (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Kuindersma et al., 2012), 
either through deliberations or (sometimes) through manipulation. Hence, resources are 
‘intrinsically linked to the concept of power’ (Arts & van Tatenhove, 2004: 343). The actor 
coalition that is capable of mobilising (more) assets is more likely to achieve or influence 
outcomes (Schmidt, 2010). These outcomes can eventually result in unequal power relations 
between the reigning coalition and the opposition (Wiering & Arts, 2006). Power itself is a 
social construct and resonates around issues of access to, control over, exercise of, and use of 
(natural) resources (Raik et al., 2008). 
 
2.4. The concept of governance capacity  
To enhance the application of PAA and its dimensions, this thesis also adopts the concept of 
governance capacity (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Dang et al., 2015) to analyse and explain the 
capacity of a policy arrangement to achieve its goals. Governance capacity can be defined as 
the ‘ability of societal actors to work together in order to solve collective problems’ (Dang et 
al., 2015:1155).  
 
Dang et al. (2015) propose a framework for analysing governance capacity. The approach has 
so far been successfully applied in studying Vietnam’s forestry reforms (see Dang et al., 2015), 
by paying close attention to both the indicative and performative capacity of a governance 
arrangement (Arts & Goverde, 2006), and also in water management in the Netherlands (Koop 
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et al., 2017; Koop & van Leeuwen, 2017). Whereas indicative governance capacity (IGC) is 
defined as ‘the extent to which new forms of governance have the potential to solve societal or 
administrative problems that are legitimately recognized by the stakeholders’, performative 
governance capacity (PGC) is defined as ‘the performance of the (new) modes of governance 
in those practices that are meant to solve these societal or administrative problems’ (Arts & 
Goverde, 2006:75-76). 
  
Indicative governance capacity  
In order to analyse indicative governance capacity, the conceptual framework deploys the PAA 
and its dimensions together with the concept of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 
2006). Congruence refers to the extent to which different policies or policy dimensions, 
organisations and individuals aim for the same objectives (Lundin, 2007). Thus, congruence is 
part of the thinking of the PAA. In this thesis, the concept of congruence is used to explain the 
(in)consistencies in the policy dimensions, and how this causes changes in a policy 
arrangement over time. 
  
Congruence is comprised of strategic, structural-internal and structural-external congruence 
(Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 2006). First, strategic congruence refers to the extent to 
which policy actors share policy discourses and common interests when deploying their 
strategic actions (Arts & Goverde, 2006). Second, structural-internal congruence is the extent 
to which the four dimensions of a policy arrangement ‘match’ to achieve the ‘agreed upon’ 
goals (Arts & Goverde, 2006). This might include backing up certain policy goals with 
adequate resources and/or appropriate rules. Third, structural-external congruence is the extent 
to which an arrangement potentially works along with other arrangements to achieve its own 
and wider societal goals (Arts & Goverde, 2006). Sufficient congruence in the three types thus 
means: ‘1) coherence in the policy views of the actors, 2) coherence in the four dimensions of 
the policy arrangement, and 3) coherence in the policy arrangement and its wider institutional 
context’ (Arts & Goverder, 2006: 80). As proposed by Arts & Goverde (2006: 80), ‘a certain 
level of congruence – strategic and structurally, internally as well as externally – is needed for 
a policy arrangement to perform. A failure to realise this certain level of congruence will imply 
a possible governance failure’.  
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Performative governance capacity   
In order to analyse performative governance capacity, the conceptual framework includes the 
concept of effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Mitchell, 2003). The concept of 
effectiveness has been defined, discussed and operationalised in various literatures, including 
literature on regimes (Mitchell, 2003), and in particular international environmental regimes 
(Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; see also section 2.2, this chapter); institutions (Giddens, 1984); and 
policy evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018).  
 
Policy evaluation literature is inspired by several traditions, namely, rational-instrumental ex-
post and ex-ante evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006) and interpretative policy analysis (Arts, 2012; 
Arts & Babili, 2013; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 1999). The former 
asks the evaluator to identify particular variables (goals) of the policy. The policy evaluator 
then uses these variables to analyse the impacts of a particular policy arrangement. Hence, the 
evaluator concludes whether or not the goal is achieved as an intended consequence of the 
concerned policy intervention or not (Arts & Goverde, 2006). However, because evaluation of 
policy success differs among actors (Arts & Goverde, 2006), it is advisable that certain criteria 
for evaluation are developed in relation to the stakeholders’ different perceptions (or storylines) 
of the problems (Arts & Goverde, 2006). The latter tradition (interpretative policy analysis and 
evaluation) fills this gap. Interpretative policy analysis scholars (e.g., Fischer & Forester, 1993; 
Myers, 1997; Yanow, 1999), consider policies as ‘systems of meaning that constitute multi-
interpretable realities of problems, solutions and evaluations’ (Arts & Babili, 2013:112). Thus, 
policies are re-negotiated and reshaped ‘‘on the ground’, and evaluation is a performative act 
(Arts & Babili, 2013: 120). Therefore, policy ‘successes or failures’ are neither considered as 
‘given’ nor ‘discovered’, but actively performed by the evaluator(s) based on their theoretical 
lens (Arts & Babili, 2013; Mosse, 2005, Van Assche et al., 2011). Thus, the two traditions (i.e. 
rational-instrumental and interpretative policy analysis), as used in this thesis, are expected to 
overcome the shortcomings and the assumptions associated with rational-instrumental 
approaches (Arts & Goverde, 2006). 
 
2.5. A framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport hunting 
policy arrangements and their impacts 
In chapter 1 I showed how sport hunting and conservation governance have evolved over the 
years: from customary norms to formal legislations that institutionalised ‘fortress 
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conservation’, to community-based conservation (CBC), and now market-based conservation 
(MBC). The new sport hunting analysed in the empirical Chapters 3-5 is implemented applying 
both CBC and MBC approaches. The text below provides a summary of how I conceptualised 
Uganda’s national sport hunting policy, transposed and implemented as local level sport 
hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA, using the PAA and the concept of 
governance capacity. I operationalised the concept of governance capacity by using the 
concepts of congruence (to analyse indicative governance capacity) and effectiveness (to 
analyse performative governance capacity).  
 
With this, the thesis is firmly positioned in the regime, institutional and governance literatures, 
and DI more specifically. Together, these theories and concepts enabled the analysis and 
evaluation of the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements, 
explaining their evolution over the years and evaluating their impacts. The analysis was based 
on the argument that a low indicative and/or performative governance capacity might cause 
changes in an arrangement, in terms of deployment of (new) actors, rules of the game, resources 
and/or discourses. Such an evolution of a policy arrangement could over time lead to the 
realisation of the policy goals (see Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: A framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport 
hunting policy arrangements and their impacts 
 
Following Figure 2.1, I situate the development and implementation of the national sport 
hunting policy in the left box. This is where Chapter 3 (which is the first empirical chapter) is 
situated. In this chapter I broadly analyse the introduced hunting policy at the national level 
and draw examples from around LMNP. The analysis is only loosely inspired by the Policy 
Arrangement Approach and its dimensions. Contrary to Chapter 4, where I will, following the 
PAA, conceptualise and analyse the national sport hunting policy as a multi-actor arrangement 
implemented at the local level (and encompassing the interwoven policy discourses, rules, 
actors and resources). 
 
Chapter 4 then focuses on the left and the middle boxes including arrow 1 that joins the left 
and middle boxes in the framework, by analysing the development and implementation of two 
local sport hunting policy arrangements, that is, the translation of the national policy to the 
local context around LMNP and KKTGMA. It concentrates on the indicative governance 
capacity of these two policy arrangements including how the national policy has shaped the 
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local policy arrangements. Thus, in Chapter 4, I analyse and explain the potential of the policy 
to achieve its goals by using the Policy Arrangement Approach together with the concept of 
congruence to provide a better understanding of the causes of the temporary stability and/or 
change experienced in the arrangements over the years. Here I will focus on the internal 
congruence as well as on how it affects and/or is affected by the institutional context. This is 
represented by arrow 4, which joins the middle box to the feedback loop arrow 3. External 
congruence (represented by arrow 5, which joins the middle box to the wider institutional 
context) will only briefly be dealt with in the three empirical chapters and the concluding 
chapter, and is therefore not explicitly included in the research questions. This study is not the 
first to analyse only the internal dynamics of a policy arrangement dimensions, Arts & Buizer 
(2009) also analysed only the internal dynamics of global forest policy arrangement. The other 
external aspects were considered as part of political modernization (Arts & Buizer, 2009).   
 
Chapter 5 is situated in the right box and includes a discussion of arrow 2 (joining the middle 
and right boxes) so as to understand how, and the extent to which, congruence influences 
performance. The focus in this chapter is on the analysis of the performative governance 
capacity of the sport hunting policy arrangements and to understand how congruence (or the 
lack of it) influences the performance of the arrangements. I specifically analyse the social and 
economic impacts of the policy at the local level, but also analyse impacts in terms of the 
number of hunted animals and number of arrested poachers, since the policy was introduced to 
address local challenges, applying both rational-instrumental and interpretative approaches to 
policy evaluation. The aim is to determine the impacts of the policy in terms of reducing 
human-wildlife conflicts (especially by addressing poaching and retaliatory killing) by 
distributing benefits to the local communities with a view to improve local attitudes towards 
wildlife. Also, the arrows 3 and 4 with the institutional context and arrow 5 with wider 
institutional context are partially discussed in chapter 5 by reflecting on the different policies 
(e.g. sport hunting, oil exploration or even agriculture etc.), which contrarily have different 
aims and objectives. For example, the translocation of animals from around LMNP to Katonga 
wildlife reserve which was not really done for conservation purposes but for the benefit of sport 
hunting – as sport hunting is also practiced in the area. I also pay attention to how the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the sport hunting policy arrangements influence their interactions, 
and how these interactions shape the continued sport hunting policy implementation. The main 
aim is to evaluate the three objectives of the national sport hunting policy to understand how – 
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through the feedback loop (represented by arrow 3) – the policy impacts influence the policy 
re(design). 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I focus on the framework as a whole, including all the arrows, to 
understand how congruence influences the performance of the arrangements and how the direct 
institutional context is of influence, since the policy impacts are expected to have an effect on 
the policy (re)design and its continued implementation. The analysis also loosely includes the 
wider institutional context. This is expected to provide an understanding of how policy 
outcomes lead to a shift or stability in any of the policy arrangement dimensions (on the 
national as well as on the local level), and whether or not this can lead to a new state in the 
arrangement all together, by attracting new actors. In case new actors do enter the arena, they 
can potentially bring new discourses with them that could lead to the adjustment of certain 
rules in order to institutionalise their interests and preferences as well as to enable them to 
mobilise resources to achieve certain policy outcomes in society. 
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CHAPTER 3: HUNTING FOR CONSERVATION? THE RE-
INTRODUCTION OF SPORT HUNTING IN UGANDA EXAMINED 
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Abstract 
Uganda reintroduced sport hunting in 2001. The policy was piloted around Lake Mburo 
National Park and later replicated around other protected areas. This chapter analyses the 
development, implementation and impact of sport hunting policy in Uganda. We do so through 
literature review, document analysis, and by analysing the different actors’ perspectives on the 
policy. Our analysis indicates that the sport hunting policy has undergone a dynamic 
development over time and is highly contested. The policy is implemented with rather varying 
rules across Uganda, on both public and privately-owned land. The government is of the 
opinion that the policy contributes to sustainable development, while other actors, such as 
NGOs, question the policy’s impacts and ethics. The extent to which the policy is meant to 
contribute to conservation goals, and its impacts on conservation on-the ground, remain 
unclear. 
 
Keywords: Sport hunting, Conservation, Development, Lake Mburo National 
Park, Uganda 
  
 
 
39 
 
3.1. Sport hunting: a contested practice  
Sport hunting involves chasing and killing animals for pleasure (Loveridge et al., 2006). The 
practice started in the nineteenth century when colonial governments, traditional kings and 
chiefs in Africa designated areas abundant with wildlife to hunt for pleasure, show of prowess 
and attain trophies (Ayorekire et al., 2011). Currently, sport hunting in Africa mainly involves 
tourists paying to hunt, with some of the proceeds ﬂowing to communities (Lindsey et al., 
2006; 2007). Proponents consider sport hunting as a market-based conservation and 
development approach, and argue that it is one of the ways through which wildlife can be used 
to provide economic incentives to rural communities and subsequently bridge the conservation-
development divide. McAfee (1999: 134), for example, points out that ‘nature, if offered an 
opportunity, can earn its own right to survive in the world market economy’. She therefore 
argues for commercialization of nature and the granting of concessions to rent-seekers to 
manage nature on behalf of, or sometimes with, governments. The income could then provide 
incentives for conservation and development, potentially empowering formerly excluded 
residents. This would require that individuals invest in sport hunting and selling game products 
(Fischer et al., 2013), and that hunting would be controlled, e.g. through a limited number of 
off-take per year (Baker, 1997; Hurt & Ravn, 2000). Critics, however, argue that this market-
based approach advances neoliberal ideologies, i.e. linking nature to capital, thereby 
disenfranchising local residents and national governments, and weakens social relations and 
environmental outcomes (Büscher et al., 2012; Fletcher, 2010). They also argue that sport 
hunting hampers animal regeneration as it interferes with animal grazing patterns and mating 
seasons. Others raise ethical concerns. Loveridge et al. (2006), for example, are critical of 
killing wild animals just for hunters’ entertainment. It is argued that the form of stress, distress 
and death caused by hunting, can cause damage to and extinction of wildlife (Gamborg et al., 
2012; Fischer et al., 2013), and violates the moral principle of the sanctity of life. In their study 
on the morality of hunting in Europe and eastern Africa, Fischer et al. (2013) reveal that hunting 
is only generally accepted if it is done for subsistence. Otherwise, commercial hunting is seen 
as an act of taking away life, which should be prohibited. These critics thus question whether 
sport hunting indeed enhances effective conservation and development, and critique the idea 
of killing wildlife for conservation and development purposes.  In the early twentieth century, 
the colonial administrators in Uganda, together with reigning kings and chiefs, declared areas 
abundant in wildlife so-called ‘Controlled Hunting Areas’ (CHAs) (Ochieng, 2011). With this, 
the creation of CHAs marked the beginning of hunting as a sport in the country. CHAs were 
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created to minimize impact by local inhabitants on wildlife populations, and to provide grounds 
for colonial governments, traditional kings and chiefs to, among others, hunt for pleasure and 
attain trophies for rituals (Ayorekire et al., 2011). In Uganda, CHAs were gazetted in the 1920s, 
as legitimized by the 1926 Game Ordinance that cemented the central government’s control 
over CHAs (Lamprey & Mugisha, 2009). 
 
The Game Ordinance thereby provided for the creation of many CHAs across the country, 
including the Ankole controlled hunting area (today’s Lake Mburo National Park – LMNP), 
Semeliki controlled hunting area (today’s Semeliki Wildlife Reserve), and Karamoja hunting 
areas (areas around Kidepo Valley NP). It is this type of hunting that dates back to the colonial 
era that we refer to as the ‘old’ sport hunting. This ‘old’ sport hunting was conducted only in 
government- controlled reserves, and it mainly targeted big game, such as rhinos and elephants, 
that were thought to fetch large sums of money for the government. The local communities 
neither participated in the design of its guiding principles nor directly shared in the accrued 
beneﬁts (Ochieng, 2011). As such, the ‘old’ sport hunting model fuelled persistent human-
wildlife conﬂicts and resistance in Uganda. Local residents continually encroached on hunting 
grounds, and illegally hunted small game, like deer and duikers, for subsistence use. They also 
burned and cleared forested areas for cultivation, and poisoned and killed wildlife, especially 
on land privately owned by the communities, since the animals caused damage to crops, 
competed for pasture and water, and spread diseases (Ayorekire et al., 2011). This ‘old’ hunting 
in Uganda, combined with the illegal hunting and the national political unrest throughout the 
1970s, greatly affected wildlife populations, with some species, such as the white rhinoceros 
and lion, becoming extinct in some ecosystems (Kamugisha et al., 1997). This led to a 
ministerial decree that banned all forms of hunting in Uganda in 1979 to allow for wildlife 
regeneration (Ayorekire et al., 2011). Since then, the increase in the human population has 
resulted in increasing demand for land for settlement and agriculture. This implies that today, 
wildlife faces greater risk of extinction than ever before. Moreover, wildlife does not recognize 
the boundaries of the remaining ‘islands’ of conservation areas and spends most of the time 
grazing and roaming on privately-owned community land (Ayorekire et al., 2011). According 
to estimates by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), over 65 % of wildlife lives and/or feeds 
outside protected areas (UWA ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). This exposes them to the 
risk of illegal hunting, and intensiﬁes human-wildlife conﬂicts. In order to address these issues, 
the government extended conservation efforts outside protected areas (PAs), which led to the 
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enactment of the Wildlife User Rights (WURs) by UWA in 2000 (Ayorekire et al., 2011). One 
of the key elements of these WURs is the reintroduction of sport hunting, here referred to as 
the ‘new’ sport hunting. The introduction of the ‘new’ sport hunting started as a pilot project 
in 2001 around LMNP (UWA, 2005). It was meant to address the conservation and 
development challenges in the area. The government, through UWA, reintroduced sport 
hunting, with the ﬁnancial, technical, and supervisory support from NGOs (Former UWA 
ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). UWA also worked in cooperation with local governments 
(LGs), the Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs), and Community Protected Areas 
Institutions (CPIs). This chapter examines the development and implementation of the ‘new’ 
sport hunting. To achieve this, the chapter answers the following research questions: (1) How 
was sport hunting reintroduced and how has it been implemented; and (2) What are the impacts 
of the policy? The ﬁrst question will be answered by analysing the development of the policy, 
the policy framework, the actors involved, and the revenue-sharing arrangements. For the 
second question we will review existing evaluations of the policy, and present the views of the 
different stakeholders on the policy’s impacts. The analysis draws on views expressed in policy 
documents, and views of policy makers and stakeholders on its implementation and impacts. 
The chapter is based on interviews that were conducted with sport hunting policy stakeholders 
at the national level in Uganda between June-October 2013. A total of 15 in-depth interviews 
plus over 15 informal conversations were held with different actors, including ofﬁcials from 
government agencies, including UWA and the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage; 
NGOs, such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Fauna and Flora International (FFI) 
and Nature Uganda (NU); and sport hunting companies and tourism associations, including 
Uganda Tourism Association (UTA), Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO) and 
Uganda Safari Guides Association (USAGA). These interviews were supplemented by an 
extensive review of secondary data, such as policy documents, evaluation reports, newspaper 
articles, and (un)published (academic) articles and reports. The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 3.2 answers the two research questions by presenting the development and 
implementation of the ‘new’ sport hunting. The last section discusses our results and makes 
some ﬁnal conclusions.  
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3.2. The development and implementation of the ‘new’ sport hunting  
In this section, we discuss and explain the development and implementation of the ‘new’ sport 
hunting at the national level, with illustrative examples from LMNP.  Table 3.1 shows that the 
‘new’ sport hunting has developed through different phases. It was ﬁrst introduced in 
Rurambiira parish in 2001 as a pilot, with some policy makers, such as UWA, CPI and the 
local government being positive about the results. The pilot was then replicated to more 
parishes around LMNP, such as Nyakahita and Rwakanombe parishes between 2003 and 2005 
(UWA, 2005), when the company Game Trails Uganda Limited (GTL) was granted a hunting 
concession and quota for the three parishes. In 2008, UWA commissioned an independent 
external evaluation. The policy evaluation outcomes were positive in terms of social impacts: 
the communities received direct revenue and beneﬁtted from infrastructural development such 
as roads, dams, schools and health centres (see Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). This motivated 
UWA to replicate it to other protected areas between 2008 and 2012. Currently, ﬁve hunting 
companies are licensed across Uganda (see Table 3.5), with different hunting concessions and 
hunting quotas (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Also, different types of actors are involved in the 
various regions, causing different typologies of the local arrangements. 
Table 3.1:  Phases in the development and implementation of sport hunting in Uganda   
 
 Period 
 2001 2002 2003-2007 2008-2012 
Levels National Policy 
documents 
developed  
  
  
1st evaluation   Implementation and 
coordination of the 
different policy 
documents 
External evaluation 
around LMNP (2008), 
decision to replicate 
sport hunting across 
Uganda, drafting of 
national sport hunting 
policy 
 Local  Pilot sport 
hunting in 
Rurambiira 
parish 
(LMNP) 
Continued 
implementation 
in Rurambiira 
Implementation in new 
parishes, including 
Nyahahita and 
Rwakanombe; new 
hunting agreements; 
changes in revenue 
percentages; and new 
actors emerging, e.g. 
landowners  
 
Implementation in new 
areas around Uganda; 
different revenue sharing 
agreements; new hunting 
quotas, hunting 
agreements, more actors, 
resources, and hunting 
companies licensed and 
hunting fees revised 
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3.2.1. The sport hunting typologies in the different locations  
The ‘new’ sport hunting is being implemented in different locations under diverse 
circumstances (see Table 3.2). While around some protected areas (e.g. Kafu river basin 
ranches, Nakaseke, Masindi, Kiboga districts) it is practiced purely on privately-owned land, 
in other cases it is practiced on both private land and government- owned reserves (e.g. around 
LMNP). In other areas, it is practiced only in government reserves (e.g. Kabwoya Wildlife 
Reserve) and community-owned wildlife areas (e.g. Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area). 
Overall, the ‘new’ sport hunting is managed by both governmental and non-governmental 
actors, who jointly formulate its guiding principles, stipulated in the sport hunting agreements. 
These principles include, for example, rules regarding which animals to hunt, e.g. only mature 
males, penalties for (accidentally) injuring an animal unintended for hunting, and monitoring 
of hunting.  
 
3.2.2. The policy framework  
The implementation of the ‘new’ sport hunting was guided by the Uganda Wildlife Policy 
(MTTI  1999:  12), that states ‘…government will encourage a range of participatory 
approaches such as empowering the people to participate in the conservation and management 
of the country’s natural resources…’.  
 
Table 3.2: Typologies and examples of sport hunting areas in Uganda 
 
Typology  Examples 
Community-owned wildlife areas 1. Karenga CWA – adjacent to Kidepo Valley 
National Park 
2. Amudat CWA – an extensive arid area in eastern 
Karamoja, and a buffer zone between the Pia, 
Karimojong and the Pokot communities 
3. Iriri CWA – Bokora Corridor wildlife reserve 
(WR) 
4. Rwengara CWA – on the southern shores of Lake 
Albert and part of the wildlife corridor between the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Toro 
Semliki WR 
Privately-owned lands 1. Ranches in Kafu River basin – i.e. the southern 
‘cattle corridor’ of the central rangelands of 
Luwero, Nakasongola, Nakaseke, Kiboga and 
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Masindi Districts, and the private ranches around 
LMNP 
2. Ranches in Aswa-Lolim – found in the open 
rangelands north of Murchison Falls NP, e.g. 
degazetted Aswa-Lolim Game Reserve and Kilak 
CHA, in Gulu and Amuru Districts 
3. Ssesse Islands – the Ssesse Islands comprise a 
cluster of some 35 islands in Lake Victoria, most of 
which are part of forest reserves 
4. Ngenge plains in Kapchorwa – This lies south of 
Karamoja, formerly Sebei CHA 
Government-owned wildlife reserves 1. Pian-Upe wildlife reserve in Karamoja 
2. Bokora-Matheniko wildlife reserve in Karamoja 
3. Ajai wildife reserve in Arua 
4. Ngenge plains in Kapchorwa 
5. Ssesse Islands (wildlife reserves) 
6. Rwengara CWA 
 
Also, the Community Conservation Policy (UWA, 2004: 6) echoes UWA’s mission statement 
in this regard: ‘…to conserve and sustainably manage wildlife and protected areas in Uganda 
in partnership with the neighbouring communities and stakeholders for the beneﬁt of the people 
of Uganda and the global community’. These documents recognize that a vast number of wild 
animals is found outside protected areas and must be protected. Section 29 of the Uganda 
Wildlife Act 2000 (Cap. 200) provides for six Wildlife User Right (WUR) classes for the 
general public to beneﬁt from wildlife. These include: sport hunting, farming, ranching, trade, 
research and education, and resource access. The WUR classiﬁcation was meant to combat 
illegal hunting, as changing land uses and degradation of wildlife habitats had raised a lot of 
concern, especially about ensuring the survival of wildlife outside PAs. At this time, the attitude 
of communities towards wildlife was not conducive for conservation, leading to drastic decline 
of wildlife (UWA undated). Local residents saw wildlife as useless and destructive (UWA 
undated), and according to UWA this attitude encouraged illegal hunting. Hence, the WUR 
classiﬁcation was envisaged as an incentive to promote wildlife conservation and combat the 
negative perceptions of communities, who regarded wildlife as government property and of 
beneﬁt only to foreign tourists (UWA undated).  
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Table 3.3: The 2012 provisional quota allocation for the LMNP area  
   
NO Scientific name Common 
name 
Quota Animal Fees (US 
$) 
Remarks 
1 Aepyceros melampus Impala 80 350  
2 Damaliscus lunatus Topi 10 700  
3 Equus burchelli boehmi Zebra 100 500  
4 Hippopotamus amphibius Hippos 5 600 Only ‘problem 
animals’ 
5 Kobus ellipsiprymus defassa Waterbuck 20 800  
6 Ourebia ourebi Oribi 5 300  
7 Panthera pardus Leopard 4 5,000 Only ‘problem 
animals’ 
8 Papio anubis Baboon 20 20 Vermin5 
9 Phacochoerus aethiopicus Warthog 20 350  
10 Potamochoerus porcus Bushpig 30 150 Vermin 
11 Redunca redunca Bohor 
Reedbuck 
10 400  
12 Sylivicapra grimma Duiker 10 200  
13 Syncerus caffer Buffalo 30 1,500  
14 Tragelaphus oryx Eland 10 1,500  
15 Tragelaphus scriptus Bushbuck 25 600  
16 Tragelaphus spekii Sitatunga 2 2,000  
17 Crocuta crocuta Hayena 2 300 Only ‘problem 
animals’ 
Source: UWA, 2012a 
 
Table 3.4: The 2012 provisional quota allocation for Kabwoya wildlife reserve and 
Kaiso-Tonya community wildlife area  
 
No Scientific  name Common name Quota Animal Fees (US $) Remarks 
1 Kobus kob Uganda Kob 25 450  
2 Ourebia ourebia Oribi 15 300  
3 Papioa nubis Baboon 15 20 Vermin 
4 Phacochoerus aethiopicus Warthog 10 350  
5 Potamochoerus porcus Bushpig 15 150 Vermin 
6 Sylivicaprag rimmia Duiker 15 200  
7 Syncerus caffer Buffalo 2 1,500  
8 Tragelaphus scriptus Bushbuck 15 600  
Source: UWA, 2012a 
 
The policy was guided by the overall objective of promoting sustainable extractive wildlife 
utilization, by facilitating the involvement of landowners and users in managing wildlife 
outside PAs, through the provision of incentives from wildlife.  Further, several national 
policies, including the Uganda Land Act Cap 227 1998, the National Environment Act 1995, 
                                                          
5Pests or nuisance animals, especially those that are viewed to threaten human society by spreading diseases or 
destroying crops and livestock. 
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the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003, the National Environment Management 
Policy 1994, the Environmental 
 
Table 3.5:  Sport hunting companies in Uganda  
 
Number Sport hunting company Operational areas 
1 Game Trails (U) Ltd Ranches outside Lake Mburo National Park 
(Kiruhura District), Katonga wildlife reserve 
2 Lake Albert Safaris Ltd Kalangala District, Kabwoya and East Madi 
Wildlife Reserves, and Kaiso-Tonya 
Community Wildlife Area 
3 Karamoja Safaris Ltd Bokora-Matheniko Wildlife Reserve, Karenga 
and Iriri Community Wildlife Area 
4 Uganda wildlife Safaris Ltd Ajai Wildlife Reserve and Luwero, Nakaseke, 
Nakasongola, and Amuru Districts 
5 Karamojong Overlander Safaris Ltd Pian-Upe Wildlife Reserve and Amudati 
Community Wildlife Area 
Source:  UWA, 2012b   
 
Impact Assessment Regulations 1998, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 
2000, and the National Development Plan 2015, vest all rights of ownership of wildlife with 
the government of Uganda. They grant limited provisions for individuals to own wildlife, upon 
lawful acquisition, and share beneﬁts that may accrue from it for social development. 
Furthermore, the Uganda Wildlife Statute 1995; 1999 and 2004 and Uganda Wildlife Act 1996 
stipulate which wildlife can be hunted, and include rules that guide the allocation of hunting 
quota and hunting blocks, i.e. ‘any area of land…demarcated as a block managed by an 
association for professional … hunting’ (UWA, 2001:1). At the local level, the new sport 
hunting is guided by the Local Government Act 1997, the CPI Policy 2000, the CWAs 
constitutions, and the community norms, which vary from community to community. The local 
government authorities and CWAs are meant to work hand in hand with UWA to monitor the 
utilization of annual hunting quotas in the different areas. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show different 
annual hunting quotas and fees around LMNP and KWR. These quotas are allocated based on 
the number of species in a PA. The animal fee means the amount to be paid per animal killed.  
  
3.2.3. Actors involved in the ‘new’ sport hunting  
Several different types of actors are involved in the ‘new’ sport hunting arrangement, either as 
policy developer, implementer or beneﬁciary, while others are only consulted. These different 
manners in which various actors are involved results in very diverse understandings of the 
policy, and different presentations of the rationale behind it. The key actor controlling and 
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implementing the policy is UWA, which introduced the ‘new’ sport hunting, meant as a tool to 
bridge the conservation- development divide in and around PAs. This was guided by the 
market-based discourse of ‘selling nature to save it’ (McAfee, 1999). UWA advanced sport 
hunting as an instrument that could minimise illegal hunting outside PAs, provide an incentive 
for local communities to control their off-take of wildlife, and promote rational use and 
conservation of wildlife. In the process, UWA involved civil society, the private sector, local 
communities and donors. Currently, USAID, WWF and GTZ are in the process of informing 
communities about the potential beneﬁts of sport hunting, through ﬁnancing workshops and 
familiarisation tours to southern and other eastern African countries, to learn from their 
experiences (UWA ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). These organisations are also working on 
sensitizing the local communities on the values of wildlife, aimed at making communities 
appreciate wildlife as ‘assets’ that can lead to development, and not as a ‘burden’ to them, since 
they currently receive direct beneﬁts, and are being ‘freed of’ ‘problem animals6’  (e.g. 
baboons). ‘… NGOs like WCS, AWF and USAID are supporting communities by building the 
associations’ capacity to manage resources around them’ (UWA ofﬁcial, Research Interview 
2013). Communities are also undergoing training in business management, bookkeeping, and 
monitoring and supervision of sport hunting projects (see Ochieng, 2011).  UWA and the local 
communities, especially the beneﬁciaries from the parishes around LMNP, claim that 
development can be realized through the ‘new’ sport hunting, by referring to schools, health 
centres, roads, and animal watering points that have been constructed for the communities 
(Ayorekire et al., 2011). The Ministry of Tourism Wildlife and Heritage also asserts that animal 
populations have increased and local communities’ attitudes towards wildlife have improved 
(MTWH ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). According to UWA, this is because certain conditions were 
met before sport hunting was introduced, including sufﬁcient numbers of animals to hunt, 
support by communities and the local government, capable private partners, and signed 
agreements between the parties involved (UWA ofﬁcial, Interview 2013).  The sport hunting 
companies are also of the opinion that sport hunting could be used for conservation and 
development, with one interviewee stating that ‘…if sport hunting worked well among the 
southern African countries, then it should work for Uganda’ (GTL ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). 
Since the initiation and rolling out of sport hunting across Uganda in 2008, UWA has licensed 
                                                          
6 Any protected animals that cause or may cause material damage to any land, crop, domestic animal, building, 
equipment or other property (UWA, 2004). 
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ﬁve professional companies. The company Game Trails Uganda Limited (GTL) was ﬁrst 
licenced for hunting around LMNP in 2001 by UWA, based on the provisions of the Uganda 
Wildlife Act 2000. The licence has been renewed on an annual basis. All companies are 
working closely with different types of stakeholders to implement sport hunting in the different 
areas in Uganda (see Table 3.5). The number and relevance of the different stakeholders across 
Uganda have changed over time. In the beginning, mainly UWA, CWAs, LG, CPI and GTL 
were involved (see Ochieng, 2011). Currently, landowners, CWAs and UWA are the most 
relevant stakeholders around LMNP, with CPI and LG losing their relevance (see Table 3.6 for 
a full overview of actors’ responsibilities and activities).  
  
Table 3.6:  Actors involved in sport hunting 
 
Actor Responsibilities and activities 
UWA Grant use-rights and licenses to professional hunting 
companies 
Monitor the hunting activities and advise companies 
Determine the animal and area booking fees in consultation 
with the hunting company and the CWA 
Conduct wildlife management training for CWA members 
together with the hunting company 
Control illegal hunting in the project area 
Build capacity among stakeholders to monitor and evaluate 
project operations 
Local government (Local Councils and Sub-
County Administration) 
Facilitate registration and legalization of CWAs 
Provide guidance and support to the project to ensure 
sustainable utilization of wildlife 
Assist in policing and monitoring illegal activities in the 
project area 
Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs) Ensure protection of wildlife within the hunting blocks 
against illegal hunting through participating in policing 
and monitoring of project activities 
Report instances of poaching, ensure land use practices are 
consistent with promotion of wildlife conservation 
Secure protection of sport hunters and employees of 
professional hunting companies while within their hunting 
block 
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Work together with local authorities, keep proper books 
and accounts and granting UWA access thereto 
Provide information to the hunting company and UWA on 
the status and distribution of wildlife within the hunting 
blocks 
Community Protected Area Institutions (CPIs) Ensure project activities are integrated into local 
government development plans 
Facilitate dialogue and conﬂict resolution 
Represent local community interests and concerns with 
regard to wildlife conservation 
Mobilize local people to support project implementation 
Sport hunting companies Carry out professional hunting in the project area 
Record hunting activities on daily basis and submit the data 
to UWA for quarterly analysis 
Provide quarterly operational reports, enforce wildlife laws 
among clients and ensure personnel abides by the law 
Ensure that animals wounded by clients are humanely 
handled and accounted for 
Maintain appropriate camping facilities for clients in the 
hunting blocks, where necessary 
Conservation NGOs and Tourism Associations Advocate for the rights of the communities and the animals 
Fund local conservation and development projects 
Monitor sport hunting impacts on the communities 
Provide technical guidance 
Advise UWA, CWAs and local communities on the 
implementation of conservation and development projects 
Organise discussion fora 
Campaign against sport hunting activities in Uganda 
 
 
Table 3.7 shows the animal fees over time. The fact that these have been adjusted since 2001 
is an indication of the changes during the policy’s implementation and the value that hunters 
attach to different species. For example, species like buffalos, leopards, elands and sitatunga 
attracted a higher market value in the last 4 years. This is explained by the fact that they are 
threatened, although hunting is allowed on condition that it is a ‘problem animal’ (UWA 
ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). Charging high rates is thus meant to prevent a high off-take. Species 
like baboons, bushpig, oribi, and warthogs maintained or declined in market value. Interviews 
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with UWA ofﬁcials and document review revealed that the animal fee for baboons was reduced 
to USD 20 from USD 90, because other countries in the region allow hunting of baboons 
without charge. Moreover, baboons are considered vermin that need to be controlled. New 
species have also been included on the animal fee list since 2012. This could be explained by 
the increased number of hunting blocks, hunting companies and diverse hunters’ interests. In 
this case, UWA has adjusted the fees to match the market demand. 
 
Table 3.7: Animal fees  
  
 
Animal  
Animal Fees in US$ 
2001 2006 2008 2010 2012 
1 Baboon 90 90 90 90 20 
2 Buffalo 600 650 900 900 1,500 
3 Bushbuck 250 300 500 500 600 
4 Bushpig 150 150 150 150 150 
5 Duiker 130 150 200 200 200 
6 Eland 600 650 800 800 1,000 
7 Hippo 500 500 600 600 600 
8 Impala 250 300 350 350 350 
9 Leopard - - 3,500 5,000 5,000 
10 Oribi 150 150 300 300 300 
11 Reedbuck 250 300 400 400 400 
12 Topi 350 400 650 650 650 
13 Warthog 250 300 350 350 350 
14 Waterbuck 500 550 600 600 1,000 
15 Zebra 500 500 550 550 550 
16 Sitatunga - - - 1,500 2,000 
17 Crocodile  - - - - 1,000 
18 Dik-Dik - - - - 200 
29 Hartebeest - - - - 1,000 
20 Hyena - - - - 100 
21 Jackal  - - - - 200 
22 Klipspringer - - - - 700 
23 Red Hartebeest - - - - 1,000 
24 Uganda Kob - - - - 450 
Source: UWA, 2012a 
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Table 3.8: Revenue sharing percentages around LMNP  
 
Stakeholders 
 
Percentage (%) share 
2001 2003 2008 2012 
 CWAs 65 
 
65 45 40 
UWA 25 
 
15 15 10 
Landowner  
 
0 10 30 50 
CPI 
 
5 5 5 0 
Local Government (Sub-county) 
 
5 5 5 0 
 Source: UWA, 2012a 
 
Among the different species around LMNP, buffalo was the most hunted animal between 2001 
and 2007, with a total of 85 animals hunted out of 85 animals that were on the quota. This was 
followed by waterbuck with 65 out 83 animals hunted, and bushbuck with 66 out of 72 animals 
hunted. This implies that buffalo was the only animal with 100 % quota utilization between 
2001 and 2007 (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). This is because hunters prefer savannah buffalo 
to Cape buffalo (UWA ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). Table 3.8 shows that over the years 
the revenue sharing arrangement around LMNP has been revised three times. With this, sport 
hunting revenue distribution among stakeholders has been dynamic, with landowners earning 
more and CWAs around LMNP earning less over time. Previously, landowners were also 
excluded from direct beneﬁt-sharing schemes, on the assumption that they would beneﬁt 
through their CWAs. Due to this arrangement, landowners have advocated for transfer of all 
animals into the park and fencing of the park, and have continuously encouraged illegal hunting 
on private land. However, landowners have now been included in the revenue arrangement, 
since beneﬁts that accrue through the CWAs are spent in communal projects (Ayorekire et al., 
2011) and enjoyed by everyone, and yet, when animals damage crops in individual farms, the 
landowner solely bears the burden. To ‘compensate’ landowners around LMNP, it was agreed 
that a landowner, on whose farm an animal is killed, receives a direct share of 50% of the 
particular animal fee, and also indirectly beneﬁts from the 40 % that goes to the CWAs. UWA 
retains the 10% for administrative costs. ‘In addition to what the landowner receives, the 
landowner is also entitled to beneﬁt from the general community fund. The community fund is 
used for the community projects like roads, bridges, water points etc.’ (UWA ofﬁcial, Research 
Interview 2013). The current arrangement is thus meant to make landowners better appreciate 
 
 
52 
 
the value of animals on their land. As a result, landowners now play a central role in the 
arrangement. Sport hunting around LMNP generated a total of USD 323,086 from the animal 
fees and other fees between 2001 and 2007, which was shared among stakeholders as follows: 
CWAs USD 199,170; UWA USD 68,110; landowners USD 26,566; CPI USD 14,120; and 
sub-counties USD 14,120 (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). However, local governments and 
CPIs around LMNP, which no longer receive revenue from animal fees, receive a daily 
community development fee of USD 20 and USD 20, respectively, which is paid by sport 
hunters and observers7  (UWA, 2012). This money is payable around all PAs where hunting is 
taking place. The money is shared by LG and CPIs as 35 % and 65 % respectively (UWA, 
2012), and is supposed to be invested in community infrastructure, implying that the 
community development fee ﬂows back to community institutions. Furthermore, the hunter 
and observer each pay a daily conservation fee of USD 200 to the CWA revenue pool. This 
money is meant solely for CWAs activities (see Table 3.9). 
 
Table 3.9: Fees payable for community development and conservation around LMNP  
  
 Type of fee paid by different actors Rate (USD) 
1 Community development fee-hunter (per day) 20 
2 Community development fee-observer (per day) 20 
3 Conservation fee-hunter (per day) 200 
4 Conservation fee-observer (per day) 200 
5 Animal fees (See Table 7) 
6 Hunting Permit (per year) 600 
7 Trophy handling (per animal) 300 
8 Daily fees (charged per hunter) Various 
9 Anti-Poaching fees 20% of animal fees 
Source: UWA, 2012a 
 
3.2.4. Impact of the ‘new’ sport hunting  
In piloting the ‘new’ sport hunting, UWA developed the following objectives: to reduce 
human-wildlife conﬂicts, to provide incentives for local inhabitants to manage and protect 
wildlife, to positively change residents’ attitudes towards conservation, and to provide lessons 
in developing guidelines and procedures for its further implementation (Lamprey et al., 2003). 
These policy objectives are mainly oriented towards local communities, and only indirectly 
                                                          
7 An observer is a person(s) who travel(s) with a sport hunter to observe the hunting. 
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target conservation goals. Since 2001, UWA has commissioned two evaluations to assess the 
impact of the ‘new’ sport hunting, which were both overseen by UWA, MTWH and CWAs 
executives. First, UWA conducted an internal evaluation in 2002, after the ﬁrst pilot, to 
establish community response to the project, and how the revenue was being used. UWA again 
commissioned an external evaluation in 2008 (see Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) to assess 
ecological and social impacts of the project, establish community attitudes towards wildlife, 
and assess impacts of the project and recommend remedies. The evaluators mainly interviewed 
ofﬁcials from UWA, MTWH, GTL, CPI and local government, association executives and 
project beneﬁciaries around LMNP. It therefore largely ignored the views of ‘other’ community 
members, especially those that were considered non-landowners or immigrants. 
 
In the evaluations, the ‘new’ sport hunting around LMNP is reported to have registered some 
positive impacts in terms of community development. Both evaluations (UWA undated; UWA, 
2011; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009), indicate that communities received direct revenue and 
beneﬁtted from infrastructural development such as roads, dams, schools, and health centers. 
UWA also claims that the number of wild animals outside PAs has increased over the years 
(UWA undated).  Our interviews show an extremely varied evaluation of the ‘new’ sport 
hunting among the different actors involved. According to UWA, MTWH, CPI and local 
government ofﬁcials, this policy has been vital in changing community attitudes towards 
wildlife (Former MTWH ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). Also the built schools provide 
formal education to their children, making them appreciate the value of wildlife (Ochieng, 
2011).  However, these ‘success stories’ are not shared by all actors. Nationally, and in other 
regions, stakeholders critique the policy and its impacts, and different actors have joined and 
formed, often opposing, coalitions. Some NGOs, such as NU, and trade associations, such as 
UTA, AUTO and USAGA, and regional bodies like Wildlife-Direct argue that Uganda does 
not have enough wildlife to sustain the practice (USAGA ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). 
These organisations do not support sport hunting for conservation and development, they 
believe in the protectionist model of conservation, in which nature is preserved for its intrinsic 
value. NU, Wildlife Direct (WD) and USAGA also argue that ‘… sport hunting will lead to a 
drastic decline in wildlife populations… there is no sufﬁcient data on wildlife populations 
across Uganda to support it’ (USAGA ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). Others, such as 
IFAW, critique the gruesome nature of killing wildlife under the pretext of sport hunting. They 
also accuse UWA of manipulating ﬁgures to portray that wildlife populations have increased 
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(NU ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). ‘Someone was giving a fake ﬁgure that we have many 
leopards in Uganda… we don’t see them during non-hunting game drives, you spend 3, 4, 5 
days without seeing any leopard, and now you start hunting them…they are not enough’ (UTA 
ofﬁcial, Research Interview 2013). These practices seem to contradict the CCP which 
advocates for ‘applying scientiﬁc criteria to wildlife utilisation” especially where there are 
‘rare, high risk and endangered species’ (UWA, 2004:11). Also, some communities around 
LMNP criticize UWA for assuming that increasing animal populations outside PAs is a result 
of sport hunting (NU ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). To them, more animals could be moving out of 
the park in search for pasture due to competition with cattle from ‘illegal grazers’, and maybe 
prey animals are ﬂeeing from predators. Others, like FFI, are also pessimistic about sport 
hunting, and are especially concerned that the implementers seem to be diverting from its 
original objective of bridging the conservation-development gap. ‘[S]port hunting could be a 
good tool to achieve conservation objectives,… if very well managed… Things are changing 
on the ground, people are no longer interested and they want to get rid of wild animals… I am 
not sure that sport hunting has a future…’ (FFI ofﬁcial, Interview 2013).  
 
However, UTA and some representatives of local communities are of the opinion that sport 
hunting can lead to development. ‘… sport hunting can lead to sustainable development when 
it is proven that wildlife populations are beyond sustainable levels … and if game ranching8  is 
ﬁrst introduced’ (UTA ofﬁcial, Interview 2013). They think that once communities are in full 
charge of the animals, they will be able to determine how much a hunter can pay them, and 
monitor off-take, unlike in the present arrangement, where UWA sets the quotas and price, and 
monitors hunting. Further, NGOs, like WWF and AWF, also believe that sport hunting could 
lead to community development only if it is well managed. They argue that UWA sets the 
quotas and prices for the different animal species, without directly involving the local 
communities, who are supposed to monitor and ensure constant ﬂow of direct beneﬁts from the 
program. This raises questions in terms of transparency and accountability. The communities 
do not know how many animals are actually hunted in a season, as some information, which is 
regarded as ‘classiﬁed information’, is kept at management levels, leaving the communities to 
wait for whatever revenue is shared with them. The current sport hunting arrangements also 
encounter other operational challenges. For example, Ochieng (2011) reports accusations and 
                                                          
8Granting local communities permission to own and rear wildlife on their land. 
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counter accusations among community members, association executives, and between UWA 
and community members. For instance, association executives and community members 
accuse GTL of frequently hunting on government ranches and land of inﬂuential individuals, 
and leaving animals to destroy crops, especially of less inﬂuential local residents. This is noted 
to be common in cases where a hunting agreement is meant for both private and government 
land, e.g. around LMNP. Further, the communities also claim that the distribution of project 
revenue is inequitable, and only beneﬁted the sport hunting companies and UWA (Muhimbura 
& Namara, 2009). This potentially creates disparities in the amount of revenue that ﬂows to 
CWAs and landowners. To date, it is not clear to what extent the policy has achieved its goals. 
Whereas policy makers like UWA and MTWH see it as leading to positive changes, 
communities and non-governmental actors largely remain sceptical. Our research thus shows 
that the impact of this policy is contested. Moreover, there also seem to be differences between 
the policy on paper and policy on ground. UWA, together with MTWH, allocates and approves 
annual quotas, and in some cases allocates additional hunting quota to the hunting companies, 
which are not usually formally approved. There has also been a delay in the review process of 
the hunting license for GTL around LMNP, and the company has continued to hunt, by having 
its clients cleared on a day-by-day basis for over a year (as of October 2013). This makes 
monitoring the company’s activities highly problematic, especially in the absence of a legally 
binding contract.  Finally, the policy guiding the ‘new’ sport hunting is still considered a draft 
regulation (a so-called ‘Draft zero’9). Furthermore, the ﬁve hunting companies in Uganda are 
operating under different agreements, making a generalization of the impact of the policy at 
the national level difﬁcult to determine.  
 
3.3. Discussion and conclusion  
Uganda reintroduced sport hunting as a national policy for conservation and development. The 
sport hunting policy in Uganda changed over time. The policy was ﬁrst introduced as a pilot 
project around LMNP in 2001, and has been replicated to new areas. The policy framework 
has changed over time to meet the interests of various stakeholders in the arrangement. 
Thereby, the policy is now guided by rather varying rules across Uganda, including new 
agreements signed regarding beneﬁt sharing, and varying hunting quotas developed for 
                                                          
9 Proposal has been developed by a civil servant, awaiting to be discussed and approved by the responsible 
minister  
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different areas. This has created different forms of sport hunting across the country, with 
variable interpretations of the objectives and impact of the policy.  The implementation of the 
policy has attracted a myriad of stakeholders, who perform various roles in the implementation. 
Nonetheless, on many occasions, landowners have claimed a more central position in steering 
the ‘new’ sport hunting. This is, among others, reﬂected by the inclusion of landowners among 
beneﬁciaries of sport hunting. However, UWA still maintains a central position by setting 
hunting quotas, fees, carrying out animal census, registering and issuing hunting licences and 
guidelines, and monitoring the operations of hunting companies and CWAs. UWA is also 
mandated by the Uganda Wildlife Act 2000 to conserve and manage all wildlife for the beneﬁt 
of the communities. The impact of the ‘new’ sport hunting policy is highly contested. Whereas 
the government is convinced that sport hunting is an appropriate instrument for sustainable 
development, other stakeholders, including UTA, USAGA, AUTO, NU and Wildlife Direct, 
challenge the manner in which sport hunting is being practiced. However, they do not have 
enough inﬂuence to change current sport hunting practices. The contribution of sport hunting 
to conservation especially remains highly contested. Moreover, the more fundamental ethical 
questions of applying hunting for conservation have to date hardly been discussed in Uganda.      
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CHAPTER 4: THE BATTLE OVER THE BENEFITS: ANALYSING TWO 
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Abstract 
 In 2001 sport hunting was reintroduced in Uganda around Lake Mburo National Park, and in 
2008 at Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, to derive economic benefits for 
communities and thus reduce human–wildlife conflict and change communities’ attitudes 
towards wildlife. We used the policy arrangement approach to analyse and compare the 
development of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. Through interviews and document 
review we learned that the arrangement at Lake Mburo changed considerably over time, 
whereas that at Kabwoya remained relatively stable. The two policy arrangements started with 
small constellations of actors but turned out to be complex arenas, mainly involving 
disagreement regarding the benefits. Land ownership proved to be a crucial factor in explaining 
the differences between the arrangements. Our results also show that benefits do not change 
communities’ attitudes towards conservation, thus questioning incentive-based policies for 
conservation. We argue for a careful analysis of the complex social, cultural and political 
contexts in which conservation and development policies are implemented, to better understand 
their outcomes. 
 
Keywords: Human–wildlife conflict, incentive-based approach, market-based conservation, 
policy arrangement approach, sport hunting, Uganda 
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4.1. Introduction 
Conservation organizations in Africa have struggled to develop new, more participatory forms 
of wildlife conservation and management, recognizing that residents living adjacent to 
conservation areas suffer from crop loss and pasture depletion, competition for saltlicks and 
water between wildlife and cattle, and exposure to diseases carried by wildlife (Ochieng, 2011). 
This necessitates developing new policies to ensure that conservation links with and contributes 
to human welfare and development. 
 
In terms of human development, advocates have implemented sport hunting as a market- and 
community-based approach (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Sport hunting involves hunters (often 
tourists) paying to chase and kill an animal for pleasure (Loveridge et al., 2006). It is practised 
in diverse forms in c. 23 African countries (Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Van der Duim et al., 2015), 
with >18,500 clients (Lindsey et al., 2007) generating revenue of c. USD 200 million annually 
(Booth, 2010). 
 
The debate on sport hunting hinges on fundamental concerns (Hutton & Leader-Williams, 
2003; Yasuda, 2012). Proponents (e.g. Hutton & Leader-Williams, 2003; Nelson et al., 2013) 
argue that people will actively support and practise conservation if they derive tangible benefits 
from wildlife. Critics argue that sport hunting causes stress and distress among animals, and 
can lead to extinction of species (Fischer et al., 2013). Büscher et al. (2012) and Fletcher (2010) 
contend that the neoliberal tendencies associated with sport hunting disenfranchise local 
residents and national governments, and hamper their participation and ability to derive 
benefits from conservation. Consequently, it is argued that the contributions of sport hunting 
benefits in southern and eastern Africa are inadequate to improve human welfare (Booth, 
2010). 
 
In Uganda, sport hunting started in the 1900s to meet the demands of the colonial 
administrators, and African kings and chiefs (Ayorekire et al., 2011) and rural communities 
also practised small-scale hunting for consumption. The practice was legalized in 1926 through 
the Game Ordinance (Ochieng et al., 2015). This regime of hunting lasted until 1979, when a 
ministerial ban was issued because of decreasing wildlife populations (Ayorekire et al., 2011). 
In 2001 the Uganda Wildlife Authority (the government authority responsible for managing 
wildlife in Uganda, hereafter the government) reintroduced sport hunting around Lake Mburo 
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National Park (hereafter Lake Mburo; Figure 4.1), and in 2008 at the Kabwoya and Kaiso-
Tonya Game Management Area (hereafter Kabwoya; Figure 4.2), with the formal goals of 
reducing poaching by local communities, providing incentives for local inhabitants to manage 
and protect wildlife, improving residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, and providing lessons in 
developing guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 
2001). The main species hunted include the zebra Equus burchelli boehmi, impala Aepyceros 
melampus, buffalo Syncerus caffer and bushbuck Tragelaphus scriptus, and to a lesser extent 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Location of Lake Mburo National Park in Uganda 
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Figure 4.2: Location of Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in Uganda 
 
the hippopotamus Hippopotamus amphibius, leopard Panthera pardus and hyaena Crocuta 
crocuta (Ochieng et al., 2015). There is little in the conservation literature about hunting in 
Uganda, and this chapter represents one of the first attempts to incorporate the issue of sport 
hunting in Uganda into international academic debates on hunting, development and 
conservation. 
 
Our aim was to analyse the development of hunting policy in Uganda by focusing on two sites 
where sport hunting has been reintroduced. We employed the policy arrangement approach and 
the concept of congruence to answer the following research questions: (1) how did the sport 
hunting policy arrangements at Lake Mburo and Kabwoya evolve over time? and (2) what have 
been the driving force(s) for change?  
 
4.2. Theoretical framework 
We used the policy arrangement approach and the concept of congruence as a conceptual lens. 
Arts et al. (2006: 96) defined a policy arrangement as ‘the temporary stabilization of the content 
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and organization of a policy domain.’ Policy arrangements stabilize only provisionally, as they 
are under constant pressure to accommodate new actors, rules, discourses and resources, or to 
(re)strategize to achieve goals (Van Gossum et al., 2011). 
 
The policy arrangement approach was chosen because: it has already been used successfully to 
study tourism and conservation policies in Africa (e.g. Ahebwa et al., 2012b; Lamers et al., 
2014), and in many other policy fields, including forest and nature policy (Van der Zouwen, 
2006); it considers the organization of policies in terms of various actors and their resources, 
as well as the content in terms of rules and discourses; it can be used to understand the changes 
in the arrangement over time; and it builds on multi-actor network models (Rhodes, 1997), 
paying specific attention to the institutional contexts in which policy actors operate (Van 
Gossum et al., 2011). 
 
The policy arrangement approach includes the following four dimensions: discourses, actors, 
rules and resources. Discourses are defined as narratives, sets of ideas, beliefs, concepts and 
stories used to give meaning to a phenomenon in a real setting, produced and reproduced 
through sets of practices (Hajer, 1995: 60). Actors are individuals and organizations involved 
in a particular policy domain (Arts et al., 2006). Actors with relatively similar opinions 
tendentiously converge into coalitions to oppose or support particular discourses or rules (Van 
der Zouwen, 2006; Arts & Buizer, 2009). Formal and informal rules consist of ‘legislation’, 
‘procedures’ and ‘political culture’ (Wiering & Arts, 2006) that ‘guide and constrain the 
behaviour of actors’ (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004: 342). Resources are assets such as 
authority, knowledge, finances, land and legitimacy, mobilized by policy actors (Wiering & 
Arts, 2006), and are ‘intrinsically linked to the concept of power’ (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 
2004: 343). Although power remains a contested concept (Kuindersma et al., 2012), we 
consider it to be a relational concept: the ability of actors to mobilize resources to achieve or 
influence outcomes within a policy domain (Giddens, 1984) through deliberation or even 
coercion. We used these four dimensions of the policy arrangement approach to analyse the 
change over time of the content and organization of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. 
 
We also adopted the concept of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) to explain the changes in 
the arrangements over time. Although congruence can include both internal and external 
aspects, we focused on the internal congruence of the two arrangements, which we regard as 
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the extent to which the policy dimensions (discourses, rules, actors and resources) are internally 
consistent. A key underlying assumption is that ‘a certain level of congruence…is needed for 
any policy arrangement to perform. A failure to realize this certain level of congruence will 
imply a governance failure’ (Arts & Goverde, 2006: 80). 
 
4.3. Methods 
We focus on two cases (Yin, 2003): Lake Mburo and Kabwoya. Data sources include 
documents, observation notes and interviews. Interviews were conducted in two phases: 
October 2010−January 2011 and February−August 2014. For Lake Mburo, fieldwork covered 
four sub-counties (Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga Town Board (Kiruhura 
district)), and for Kabwoya three sub-counties (Kabwoya, Buseruka, Kyangwali (Hoima 
district)). Most interviewees were selected using snowball sampling. NGO representatives and 
government officials were purposively selected (Kumar, 2012) because of their relative 
importance. Fifty-nine in-depth interviews were conducted: four (R1, R,2, R3, R46) with 
national and local governmental conservation organizations, six (R39−R44) with conservation 
NGOs, three (R47, R48, R52) with sport hunting companies, four (R16−R18, R55) with district 
local leaders, one (R45) with a tourism association, nine (R19−R27) with village leaders, 15 
(R4−R15, R49, R58, R59) with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (Lake Mburo, Kabwoya), and 
19 (R28−R38, R50 to R57) with local communities.  
 
Interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes, offices and restaurants, lasted 20–90 
minutes and were recorded. Three respondents agreed to be interviewed but declined to be 
recorded. Circa 20 informal conversations took place with various officials. Five respondents 
were interviewed twice. All recordings were transcribed. Interview transcripts, observation 
notes and documents were analysed thematically, implying ‘a form of pattern recognition 
within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis’ (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006: 4). Quotes from interviews are presented as evidence of respondents’ 
perceptions of the policy arrangements, and are coded to anonymize respondents. The 
trustworthiness (cf. Decrop, 2004) of this research approach was established by the intense 
engagement of AO with the two cases, credibility was enhanced by systematic and transparent 
data analysis with tangible products (transcripts, codebook, coded transcripts), and joint 
analysis of the various data sources (interviews, documents and observation notes) provided 
validation by triangulation. 
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4.4. Evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements 
 
4.4.1 Lake Mburo National Park 
The Lake Mburo sport hunting policy arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement, including 
four main periods, characterized by struggles over benefits.  
 
2001–2003 
In this period the sport hunting policy was developed and implemented. Actors were sensitized 
and rules were set, including about the distribution of benefits, based on the expectation that 
the policy would reduce human–wildlife conflict. 
 
Sport hunting around Lake Mburo started with a small group of actors. The national 
government involved the local government at both district and sub-county levels (hereafter 
local government, responsible for enforcing government programmes, including wildlife 
management) and Community Protected Area institutions (hereafter institutions). These 
institutions were formed by the government in 1997 to harmonize community–protected area 
interactions in Uganda, including coordination of the disbursement of the 20% of tourism 
national park revenue fees funding community-based development projects (Ahebwa et al., 
2012a). At Lake Mburo the government implements two tourism models: traditional tourism, 
implemented within the Park, with the community receiving 20% of the tourist entry fees, and 
sport hunting outside the Park to raise funds to reduce poaching. The company Game Trails 
Uganda Limited was licensed by the government to organize sport hunting. 
 
The government’s policy mission was ‘...to conserve and sustainably manage wildlife...in 
partnership with neighbouring communities and other stakeholders for the benefit of Ugandans 
and the global community’ (UWP, 2004: 2). Therefore, it was necessary for the government to 
find ways of incentivizing the communities to convince them to support sport hunting, and to 
reduce human−wildlife conflict. The communities include three groups of residents: rich and 
influential individuals who own large parcels of land, residents who own smaller parcels of 
land, and squatters who don’t own land. 
 
To bring the communities on board, the government sponsored a familiarization trip to southern 
Africa and Tanzania to show institution members, the local government and some village 
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opinion leaders how sport hunting was implemented there, and to learn how to run Community 
Wildlife Associations (R31). These are community-based organizations that manage sport 
hunting benefits and implement community development projects. After the familiarization 
trip, meetings were held to sensitize the communities in Rurambiira parish (the lowest 
administrative unit in Uganda), where pilot hunting was to be implemented. Some respondents 
(R3, R4, R35) revealed that the meetings had mixed results; residents approved of sport hunting 
and agreed to form the Rurambiira Wildlife Association, but also hoped that the policy 
implementation would ultimately reduce the presence of wildlife on their land (R6). 
 
The meetings and discussions were followed by the formulation of rules, based on the Wildlife 
Use Rights Policy of 2000. The policy stipulates the categories under which individuals and 
organizations can own, use and benefit from wildlife. They include sport hunting, farming, 
ranching, trade, research and education, and general extraction (WUR, 2000). 
 
Under sport hunting, individuals are licensed to hunt designated wildlife in or outside protected 
areas. Other legal documents that support the policy include the Uganda Wildlife Policy 1999, 
of which section 3.4.1 aims to create a facilitating environment for community and private 
sector participation in sustainable wildlife utilization, and the Uganda Wildlife Act (Cap 200 
of 2000), section 29(1a) of which affirms wildlife use rights. These documents recognize that 
wildlife belongs to the government of Uganda, for its people. The rules for implementing sport 
hunting included revenue-sharing rules and other operational rules (e.g. quota allocation, 
hunting fees, and monitoring), including the 2001 professional hunting agreement signed by 
the government, the hunting company and the association. 
 
According to the hunting agreement the benefit-sharing rules specified the following 
beneficiaries: the association would receive 65% of the fee, the government 25%, institutions 
5% and the sub-county 5% (see Table 4.1). These were the same actors the government 
consulted to convince the Rurambiira residents to support sport hunting. In 2002 the 
government conducted an internal evaluation among the beneficiaries, and the results revealed 
that the policy provided substantial benefits to the communities (R3). 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Table 4. 1: The revenue-sharing percentages of various actors benefiting from sport 
hunting around Lake Mburo National Park (Figure 4.1) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya 
Game Management Area (Figure 4.2). 
 
Actor  % revenue sharing 
2001 2003 2008 2012 
Lake Mburo National Park 
Associations 65 65 45 40 
Government 25 15 15 10 
Landowner 0 10 30 50 
Institution 5 5 5 0 
Local Government (sub-county) 5 5 5 0 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
Government   50  
Association   20  
District local government   15  
Kabwoya parish(sub-county)   7.5  
Buseruka parish(sub-county)   7.5  
Source:  UWA, 2012 
It was on this basis that the government opted to continue trialling sport hunting in Rurambiira 
parish. The communities soon became involved in the debates about sport hunting and 
demanded some rules to be changed, to include residents who owned land as direct 
beneficiaries (Table 4.1), reflecting incongruence between rules and resources. Although the 
residents owned the land where hunting was conducted, the 2001 revenue-sharing rules did not 
recognize them as beneficiaries. 
 
2003-2008 
In this second period landowners started to challenge the policy arrangement, based on which 
the 2001 revenue-sharing rules were revised in 2003. However, contrasting discourses and 
discontentment with the benefit-sharing rules remained, leading to the first battles over the 
benefits. 
 
The battles over the benefits resulted from (and were clearly reflected in) competing discourses. 
Whereas the government, institutions and hunting company perceived sport hunting as a means 
to derive benefits from wildlife for local residents, to change their attitudes towards wildlife 
and reduce human−wildlife conflict, for the residents sport hunting was a means to derive 
financial benefits but they also remained interested in reducing wildlife numbers, as wildlife 
competed with cattle for pasture, water and salt-licks, and destroyed crops. 
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The residents criticized sport hunting for perpetuating wildlife on their land. One interviewee 
(R32) stated, ‘...we have seen an increase in invasions of wildlife on private land...sport hunting 
declared poaching illegal.’ In response to this claim, a park official (R6) argued that the 
residents wrongly perceived that hunting would reduce wildlife on private land. He reaffirmed 
the policy’s formal goals: ‘...sport hunting was to reduce illegal hunting by the communities, 
while delivering benefits and to change their negative attitudes towards wildlife on private 
land.’ 
 
However, most landowners argued that ‘they accommodate wildlife on their land and suffer 
wildlife damages’ (R32). Consequently, the coalition of landowners and the association began 
to challenge openly the revenue-sharing rules and the government’s hegemonic discourse, and 
advocated to be recognized as landowners. As they controlled the land, a key resource for 
policy implementation, they were able to overturn the 2001 revenue-sharing agreement in 
2003, to 65% for the association, 15% for the government, 10% for landowners, 5% for 
institutions and 5% for the sub-county (Table 4.1). Although the association’s situation did not 
change, landowners gained 10% and together they became powerful actors in the arrangement, 
influencing debates and gaining more resources. Subsequently other new actors joined 
(residents of Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe parishes), who envied the benefits received by 
Rurambiira residents (R23, R33, R36). The government permitted the same company to hunt 
in these parishes. Two new associations were founded, in Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe 
parishes, bringing the number of associations to three, all working with the same principles. 
 
2008-2012 
The third period was characterized by intense battles over the benefits, continued conflict 
between the government and the communities, further changes in the revenue-sharing rules and 
some incongruence between rules and resources. 
 
In 2008 the government commissioned Enviro Consultancy League to evaluate the impacts of 
sport hunting in the three parishes. The outcomes were allegedly positive in terms of 
community development projects financed through hunting revenue. The consultant 
recommended the policy be extended to other areas, including Kabwoya (Muhimbura & 
Namara, 2009). The post-evaluation period was characterized by negotiations leading to 
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changes in the 2003 revenue-sharing rules in 2008. The associations lost a significant 
percentage of revenue to landowners, while the percentages allocated to other actors remained 
as before (Table 4.1). However, landowners remained dissatisfied with the rules for benefit 
sharing because they received only 30% of the total revenue. They demanded to be granted at 
least 90% of the revenue to sustain meaningful livelihoods (R35). 
 
Meanwhile it was claimed that some community members who resided in the capital, Kampala 
(hereafter the Kampala group), tried to hijack the sport hunting benefits in 2010. The elite 
Kampala group comprised larger landowners. They held several meetings in Kampala and 
invited some village residents to attend. Their intention was to ‘improve community 
involvement in sport hunting, deliver more benefits to landowners, and to convince the 
government to fence the Park to settle human−wildlife conflicts’ (R31, R45). The group 
founded a new association, the Lake Mburo Landowners Wildlife Association, which granted 
them absolute power over the benefits (R31). However, some landowners, the old associations 
and some village opinion leaders opposed the group for not being initiated by the residents, not 
being accountable, and their views not necessarily representing the wider community. With the 
support of the Conservation Area Manager of Lake Mburo, the opposition to the group 
organized a joint meeting with the residents of the three parishes (R31), where it was agreed to 
merge the old associations (R36). Consequently, a new association, the Nshaara Wildlife 
Association, was founded, covering four sub-counties (Figure 4.1), and taking over the 
management of the sport hunting benefits (R31). As a result the opposition managed to end the 
capturing of hunting benefits by the elite and abandon the Kampala association. However, 
although the communities gained more benefits they still demanded that the government fence 
the Park to mitigate human−wildlife conflict. 
 
2012- present 
The fourth period marked the settlement of the battles over the benefits in favour of landowners, 
and the emergence of winners and losers. Institutions and the sub-counties were excluded from 
the arrangement. 
 
Following the continued implementation of sport hunting, the battles over the benefits 
intensified in 2012. The coalition of landowners and the association succeeded in influencing 
debates, and the revenue-sharing rule was amended so that landowners received 50%, the 
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association 40%, and the government 10% (Table 4.1). At this point the government (the chief 
architect of the policy) and the association lost ground to the landowners. Landowners became 
winners, while the institutions and the sub-counties were no longer part of the benefit-sharing 
scheme. ‘The current revenue-sharing rule gives landowners and the associations more power 
and opportunity to influence policy debates. However, smaller landholders complain that it 
only favours large landowners’ (R21). Large landowners own large herds of livestock and 
receive 50% of the revenue, whereas small landowners are disadvantaged. One interviewee 
summarized the situation thus: ‘The problem is that some of us own smaller plots of land...the 
animals may have spent the night in my land...by morning they have crossed over to another 
person’s land. When the sport hunters come, they find the animals in the other person’s land 
(because his land is large), he is the only one that is paid and not me, yet I have also suffered 
losses’ (R32). In conclusion, although the current rules favour the communities in terms of 
giving them control over more benefits, their attitudes towards wildlife have not changed as a 
result. The association and landowners are still unsatisfied with the benefits, claiming they 
continue to suffer from damage caused by wildlife. Only the larger landowners, most of whom 
reside in Kampala, support hunting, because the size of their land favours hunting, and thus 
they receive more revenue. 
 
4.4.2. Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
 
Contrary to the situation at Lake Mburo, the sport hunting policy arrangement at Kabwoya has 
been relatively constant over time. Government agencies have remained in control of major 
resources. Although the communities show signs of discontentment, they do not own land 
where hunting is conducted, and therefore they are unable to change the arrangement. 
 
Following an evaluation of the situation around Lake Mburo in 2008 (Muhimbura & Namara, 
2009), the government decided to extend sport hunting to Kabwoya. The policy goals were the 
same as in Lake Mburo: to reduce human−wildlife conflict and illegal hunting by providing 
benefits to the communities. Previously Kabwoya had experienced uncontrolled (subsistence) 
hunting, and encroachment of protected areas by the (pastoral) communities (R49). To derive 
income from wildlife, the government granted the company Lake Albert Safaris a hunting 
licence in 2008, and subsequent benefits were to be shared (R49). The licence was based on a 
4% quota of the available population per species (R49, R52). However, official national rules 
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in Uganda grant a 2% hunting quota of the population per species, reflecting inconsistencies 
between rules on paper and in practice. 
 
To encourage participation by local actors in the Kabwoya arrangement, the government and 
the hunting company incorporated the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya and 
Buseruka sub-counties and the local communities (R52). Although the residents of Kabwoya 
supported sport hunting, the residents of Buseruka opposed it initially, arguing that the 
government wanted to grab land and would eventually restrict subsistence hunting (R49, R50). 
Following sensitization and persuasion by the government, the residents of Buseruka supported 
the policy (R51, R52). The revenue-sharing rules were drafted, with the following 
beneficiaries: government (50%), district (15%), association (20%), and Buseruka and 
Kabwoya sub-counties (7.5% each; Table 4.1). The government justified its 50% share by 
arguing that it introduced sport hunting, that sport hunting was conducted within a government-
owned game reserve, and that it needed to raise money to finance conservation and reduce 
poaching. One respondent (R51) noted, ‘the government is the most important partner...their 
rangers ensure that encroachers are kept away from the reserves.’ 
To manage the 20% community benefits the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife 
Association was founded in 2009. Association membership included residents of Kabwoya, 
Buseruka and Kyangwali sub-counties (R51). Kyangwali sub-county joined the arrangement 
later, and to date benefits only from the association’s 20% revenue. The association is a 
registered community-based organization to manage hunting benefits, and is supervised by the 
district (R55, R56). 
 
Because of the involvement of various actors who do not own land but who receive wildlife 
benefits, some residents have shown a positive attitude towards conservation (R49). Interviews 
with some association members indicated that they supported the idea that unrestricted use of 
environmental resources can lead to their decline. They believed that the government should 
grant residents only limited access to wildlife resources to safeguard resource sustainably 
(R56). One interviewee (R51) summarized the situation thus: ‘We want to preserve the 
environment, for the good of the people, if you allow people to move freely here, it’s a matter 
of months, it will go away.’ Consequently, the association executives encourage former 
poachers to register as reformers (without prosecution, so they can receive meat from sport 
hunting as an additional benefit to the 20% revenue (R57). One respondent (R56) noted, 
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‘...some meat is taken to the association leaders to be distributed among the members.’ This is 
supposed to discourage poaching and other illegal activities. Some residents admitted they 
inform government rangers when wild animals stray into their communities, and rangers then 
drive them back into the reserves (R56, R57). Under the 2013 association constitution, any 
member found poaching is arrested and prosecuted (R56). Consequently, poaching has been 
reduced at Kabwoya. One respondent (R55) noted, ‘...the communities used to kill the animals 
because they didn’t know their importance, but the association involved the community which 
made them feel important...poaching stopped.’ 
 
Although this reflects a high level of congruence between actors, discourses and rules, some 
community members claimed that sometimes the government and hunting company hoarded 
the meat in their camps and did not share it with the communities (R50). Revealing another 
‘battle over the benefits’, one respondent (R54) suggested they ‘...bring the meat to the 
community and it is the executive to share it... the community will love the animals,’. 
 
Whereas some community members agreed that sport hunting had partially achieved its goals 
of delivering benefits and reducing poaching, other members of the association criticized the 
arrangement. They accused the government of not inviting them to most meetings, especially 
when determining hunting rules, fees and quotas, and monitoring hunting (R51, R56). One 
interviewee (R51) lamented, ‘...we are never informed, yet we are part and parcel.’ Similarly, 
association members expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the hunting companies never 
revealed how many animals were hunted, or how much the association should expect at the 
end of the hunting season. ‘They never tell us...they just give us the money by cheque’ (R51). 
Although the policy arrangement has proven relatively stable, with some notable positive 
changes in communities’ attitudes towards wildlife, the Kabwoya arrangement is still 
characterized by mistrust and a lack of accountability and transparency. Mistrust in the 
arrangement reinforces passive community involvement, which undermines the principal aim 
of involving local residents. The current revenue-sharing rules reinforce the government’s 
control over conservation, with the communities receiving benefits as determined by the 
government and its allies. 
 
In conclusion, because the government dominated the Kabwoya arrangement it has remained 
the same over time. Although the communities showed willingness to support conservation and 
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are deriving more benefits, they do not own land, and lack adequate financial resources and 
experience to negotiate or cause a change in the revenue-sharing scheme, as at Lake Mburo. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
We used the policy arrangement approach (Arts et al., 2006) and the concept of congruence 
(Arts & Goverde, 2006) to analyse the development of sport hunting policy in Uganda, with a 
focus on Lake Mburo and Kabwoya. The Lake Mburo policy arrangement evolved in four clear 
phases, illustrating incongruences among the dimensions of the policy arrangement approach. 
Land ownership emerged as a crucial factor for changes in benefit-sharing rules. However, 
although landowners received hunting benefits, their inclusion has not necessarily increased 
their support for conservation. Compared to Lake Mburo the Kabwoya arrangement was more 
stable over time, as the government remained the main landowner, could set and maintain the 
rules, and received 50% of the revenue. More generally, both arrangements started with small 
constellations of actors but developed as complex and messy arenas where debates were not 
focused on the formal aims of the policy arrangement (reducing poaching and changing 
community attitudes towards wildlife) but on battles over the benefits. 
 
Discourses have influenced the arrangements in various ways. We found that the arrangements 
were characterized by two conflicting local discourses. The government’s official discourse of 
changing communities’ attitudes towards wildlife through benefits was challenged by a 
competing community discourse that considered wildlife to be a nuisance. Although the Lake 
Mburo communities received more money over time, they continually advocated fencing of 
the park to reduce human−wildlife conflict. 
 
Human−wildlife conflict prevails in two ways: one where animals are regarded as pests (e.g. 
through the destruction of crops; Ochieng, 2011), and another where people poach wildlife 
(Duffy, 2000). The government implements the sport hunting policy to reduce poaching, 
whereas the communities interpret the formal goal of reducing human−wildlife conflict as 
reducing wildlife on private land and thus reducing its impact on livestock and farms. 
Consequently, the discursive incongruence remains unresolved and the communities still 
perceive benefits to be more important than wildlife. Solving human−wildlife conflict will not 
therefore automatically lead to communities protecting wildlife on private land. A related 
lesson learnt here is that human−wildlife conflict reflects conflict over land use, and therefore 
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wildlife protection remains a daunting challenge for governments amidst changing land-use 
practices as the human population increases (Emerton, 1999). 
 
Although the government’s discourse links to the broader international discourse of promoting 
conservation through market-based approaches (McAfee, 1999; Fletcher, 2010), in Uganda this 
discourse remains implicit. The government expects to achieve its conservation goals after the 
communities have appreciated hunting benefits, stopped poaching and begun to protect wildlife 
on their farms. Whether this will be achieved remains uncertain. Another discourse, on 
concerns about the ethics of sport hunting and animal welfare and rights (Loveridge et al., 
2006; Fischer et al., 2013), which is gaining increasing attention globally, has not influenced 
debates in Uganda. 
 
Our analysis of the reintroduction of sport hunting in Uganda has four general findings. Firstly, 
we have shed light on the role of government in market-based conservation approaches. Across 
Africa sport hunting is practised and controlled by public, private and communal actors 
(Lindsey et al., 2007). Although this signals a declining role of state actors, the uncontrolled 
influence of non-state actors could result in unsustainable practices. To prevent this, 
governments should guide the implementation of such market-based approaches (Büscher et 
al., 2012); for example, by mobilizing resources and setting legal frameworks. 
 
Secondly, we have raised questions about the durability and feasibility of implementing two 
different tourism models to raise funds for conservation, namely traditional tourism, based on 
tourists’ love for and admiration of wildlife, and sport hunting. In Lake Mburo, traditional 
tourism is implemented within the National Park, and sport hunting is organized outside the 
Park, whereas in Kabwoya both traditional tourism and sport hunting exist in the same 
landscape. Although this coexistence may appear to be viable in the short term, the combination 
seems impossible in the longer term, as traditional tourists may start avoiding areas where 
conservation-based tourism is combined with sport hunting when they realize that the same 
animal they admired within a protected area may be shot to make a profit once it crosses the 
protected area boundary. 
 
Thirdly, market-based solutions are widely implemented across Africa to deliver conservation 
benefits (Booth, 2010; Nelson et al., 2013). However, implementation of sport hunting in 
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Uganda led to mixed reactions from the communities. This finding shows that market-based 
solutions do not always bring about community involvement in conservation (Ahebwa et al., 
2012a; 2018; Van der Duim et al., 2015). 
 
Fourthly, we have contributed to the literature on the role of tourism revenue-sharing in 
conservation and development (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Ahebwa et al., 2012a). 
The ongoing debate about big vs small landowners around Lake Mburo demonstrates the 
prevailing resource inequality among communities. The government’s policy is to buy 
landowners’ acceptance of wildlife on private land; however, the big landowners are more 
influential in the arrangement, and therefore most are able to supplement their income from 
livestock with hunting revenue, whereas the ability of small landowners to do so is limited. 
Similar results were recorded in the Maasai Mara, where elites with more land and livestock 
have greater opportunities to receive tourism revenues (Thompson et al., 2009), whereas 
smaller landowners do not usually receive substantial direct compensation for wildlife 
damages. Although tourism revenue-sharing is often considered to be a panacea for 
conservation challenges in Africa (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001), we found that most 
communities in both arrangements in Uganda considered livestock to be more important than 
wildlife. Around Lake Mburo the communities consistently called for the government to fence 
the park, even after they had received revenue from hunting. Our results also indicate that if 
benefits cease, animosity towards wildlife may be renewed. Regarding a similar case in Kenya, 
Anyango-Van Zwieten et al. (2015) argued that sustainability of the benefits is a necessary pre-
condition to guarantee the success of incentive-based conservation approaches and avoid 
renewed animosity towards wildlife. Although market-based arrangements are widely 
supported and implemented, the basic assumption on which they are based may not hold. We 
therefore argue for a careful analysis of the complex and messy social, cultural and political 
contexts in which tourism revenue-sharing is implemented. 
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CHAPTER 5: HUNTING OR POACHING? THE SOCIAL AND 
ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF HUNTING IN UGANDA 
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Abstract  
In 2001 Uganda reintroduced sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park, and in 2006 in 
the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, with the aim to reduce human-
wildlife conflicts by providing incentives for the local inhabitants, thus positively changing 
residents’ attitudes towards wildlife. We conducted interviews and reviewed documents to 
analyse and evaluate the impacts of this reintroduction of sport hunting. The income generated 
from sport hunting was used to provide social services and implement social development 
projects. Although this did initially help to improve local residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, 
residents continue to perceive wildlife as a nuisance. Poaching only stopped temporarily. 
Hence, this study shows that the common underlying assumption of sport hunting policies and 
other market- and community-based approaches to conservation – that when local residents 
receive benefits, they will appreciate wildlife – is debatable.  
 
Keywords Effectiveness, livelihoods, poaching, sport hunting, Uganda  
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5.1. Introduction 
In order to ensure that conservation links with and contributes to human welfare and 
development, several African countries, including Uganda, have adopted a variety of market- 
and community-based approaches to improve the people’s livelihoods and address human-
wildlife conflicts – especially uncontrolled (subsistence) hunting. Sport hunting is seen as one 
of these approaches. It is an activity where a tourist pays to hunt and kill an animal with desired 
physical attributes, such as large horns, tusks or a certain body size (see Lindsey et al., 2007; 
Booth, 2017). Although sport hunting has many forms (Lindsey et al., 2016), we particularly 
refer to trophy hunting (found in Uganda): hunting particular animals to keep the animal or 
certain body parts (e.g. entire heads or hides, but this may also include scrotum, tail, hooves or 
teeth) as souvenirs or mementos (trophies). 
   
Sport hunting – especially in Africa – has attracted mixed reactions. Several countries in 
Southern Africa continue to practice it, including Zimbabwe, South Africa and Tanzania 
(Booth, 2017). Uganda has reintroduced it in 2001. Kenya (although still maintaining hunting 
for birds) and Botswana (although now considering to reintroduce it again), banned sport 
hunting while at the same time promoting photography tourism as a source of income for local 
communities (Muposhi et al., 2016).  
 
Currently, sport hunting advocates (e.g. Yasuda, 2011; Booth, 2017) argue that local 
communities around protected areas are able and willing to sustainably manage and use wildlife 
(while at the same time abandoning poaching), especially when they share in the income and 
meat from legally hunted animals (Muposhi et al., 2016). They say that hunting operators can 
promote anti-poaching campaigns by integrating (former) poachers in conservation 
programmes as village scouts (Lindsey et al., 2007). Recent studies (e.g. Di Minin et al. (2016) 
and Muposhi et al. (2016)) show that for example Zimbabwe’s trophy hunting industry 
generates approximately US$ 16M/year. The authors highlight the potential of sport hunting 
for African governments to involve and motivate local residents when political and governance 
structures are adequate. 
 
However, there are fundamental social, ecological and ethical problems associated with sport 
hunting. Southwick (2015) and Weaver et al. (2016) for example argue that the rate of return 
from the hunting industry remains minimal in comparison to other conventional land-use 
 
 
78 
 
activities such as agriculture (Lindsey et al., 2016) or traditional, non-consumptive, tourism. In 
ecological terms, Loveridge et al. (2006) and El Bizri et al. (2015) further contend that 
commercialization of nature threatens species survival, just as poaching (Lindsey et al., 2007). 
Also, the killing of wild animals in the name of conservation remains unacceptable to 
organizations and individuals promoting animal welfare and rights (Visseren-Hamakers, 
2018). Bekoff (2013), for example, proposes a paradigm shift from a dominant and exploitative 
conservation to a compassionate one. Especially following the incident in July 2015, when a 
trophy hunter killed a radio-collared lion named Cecil in Zimbabwe, the anti-hunting 
movement intensified its campaigns against killing of animals (Lindsey et al, 2016), or linking 
sport hunting to conservation. These campaigns – so far – only had a limited impact in terms 
of policy changes (Carpenter & Konisky, 2017). Related, the Africa Union recently adopted an 
animal welfare strategy recognizing animals as sentient beings, including wild animals, farm 
animals and animals used in research (AU, 2017). 
  
This chapter contributes to these discussions by analysing and evaluating the impacts of sport 
hunting in Uganda, around Lake Mburo National Park (hereafter Lake Mburo), where sport 
hunting was first piloted in 2001, and the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
(hereafter Kabwoya), to which it was extended in 2006. The government reintroduced sport 
hunting in order to try to address poaching, which was affecting the survival of species in the 
two areas: lions became extinct in Lake Mburo and rhinoceros in the whole country, and other 
species (currently listed for sport hunting; see Tables 2 and 5) equally declined (UWA, 2015).  
 
For the reintroduction of sport hunting around Lake Mburo, the Uganda Wildlife Authority 
(responsible for managing wildlife in Uganda, hereafter the government), involved the local 
governments (both the district and sub-county, hereafter local government) responsible for 
enforcing government programmes, including wildlife management. The government also 
engaged the Community Protected Areas Institutions (hereafter institutions), formed by the 
government in 1997 to harmonize community-protected area interactions in Uganda, the 
Associations (registered community-based organization to manage hunting benefits) and the 
landowners (individuals who own land around Lake Mburo where hunting is conducted). 
 
In Kabwoya, the government and Lake Albert Safaris (hereafter the hunting company) 
collaborated with the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya, Buseruka and Kyangwali 
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sub-counties and the local communities represented by Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Community 
Wildlife Association (hereafter Association).  
 
In this chapter, we analyse three formal goals for reintroducing sport hunting in Uganda, to (1) 
reduce human-wildlife conflicts by (2) positively changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife 
through (3) the providing of incentives for the local inhabitants (UWA, 2002). We employ the 
concept of effectiveness to evaluate if and to what extent these goals have been achieved and 
thus answer the following research question: what are the impacts of the sport hunting policy 
around Lake Mburo and Kabwoya in terms of changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, 
reducing poaching, and improving livelihoods? 
 
5.2. Conceptual framework 
In this chapter, we adopt the concept of effectiveness (Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) 
to evaluate and analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy in Uganda. Levy and Young 
(1994: 20) define effectiveness as ‘the extent to which a regime ameliorates the problem(s) that 
prompted its creation’. Thus, we analyse the effectiveness in terms of the three sport hunting 
policy goals (UWA, 2002).  
 
The concept of effectiveness has been defined, discussed and operationalized in literature on 
regimes (Mitchell, 2003), and in particular international environmental regimes (Arts, 2000; 
Visseren-Hamakers, 2018); institutions (Giddens, 1984); and policy evaluation (Crabbé & 
Leroy, 2008; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). The literature on regimes and institutions recognises 
the commonality between the two (Giddens, 1984; Scott, 2001), as both – in a nutshell – denote 
sets of rules (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). New-institutionalist or neo-institutionalist scholars 
conceptualise institutions or regimes as societal instruments that shape, guide and constrain 
human action and agency (Ochieng, 2017), thus also incorporating informal rules and norms. 
Hence, institutions refer to the norms and values that define goals, impose constraints on social 
behaviour and empower social actions (Scott, 2001). Institutions are known to function at all 
levels of governance, from the (inter)national to the local level, and govern (inter)national and 
local issues. Regimes refer to ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures’ (Krasner, 1982:185) at the international level, governing international issues 
(Visseren-Hamakers, 2018).  
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Policy evaluation literature is inspired by several traditions, namely rational-instrumental ex-
post and ex-ante evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006) and interpretative policy analysis (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). Whereas the evaluator in the former determines policy (in)effectiveness 
based on particular policy goals (Arts & Leroy, 2006), the evaluator in the latter considers 
policy (in)effectiveness as a matter of multiple interpretations – based on the evaluator’s 
theoretical lens (Mosse, 2005). Our interest here is particularly on the effectiveness of 
institutions (e.g. the sport hunting regulations) implemented at national and local levels in 
Uganda, thereby positioning the chapter within the literature on institutional effectiveness 
(Mitchell, 2003) – the ‘problem-solving capacity’ of regimes or institutions (Kalfagianni & 
Pattberg, 2011; Ochieng, 2017) – while including both rational and interpretative perspectives, 
as discussed below. 
 
Therefore, we study the effectiveness of the sport hunting policy from the perspective of 
whether or not the policy reaches its intended goals. Although effectiveness can be analysed as 
a two-dimensional concept (i.e. the first order and second order effects), in this chapter, we 
focus only on the first order effects (as our analysis is limited to the policy goals achievement 
at local level), which is the ‘contributions of the set rules or policy in solving problems that led 
to their creation’ (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011:3). Thus, we regard first order effects as the 
direct impacts of sport hunting in Uganda. 
 
We define direct impacts of sport hunting as the social and ecological effects resulting directly 
from its implementation. Epistemologically, we consider both the objectivist and subjectivist 
approaches (Moon & Blackman, 2014) towards the evaluation of these impacts. Thus, we 
analyse hunting effects based on the existing official (formal) hunting data, and through the 
perceptions of stakeholders, collected through interviews. We assume that some stakeholders 
may think that, for example, the benefits of the arrangement are insignificant, and others may 
think the benefits are actually significant, while they are both reflecting on the same amount of 
revenue generated by the policy over time. This is because different stakeholders usually have 
different interests, opinions and expectations concerning any policy implementation (Visseren-
Hamakers, 2018). Since the hunting policy lacks clear criteria or indicators for assessing its 
effectiveness, we adopt the three formal policy goals and categorise the direct impacts into four 
aspects: the number of hunted animals through sport hunting, through poaching, impacts on 
 
 
81 
 
livelihoods, and changed community attitudes (Table 5.1). We briefly highlight these aspects 
below: 
 
Table 5.1: Indicators for assessing the impacts of sport hunting policy in Uganda 
 
Policy goal Aspects Indicators  Data Research methods 
Reduction 
of human-
wildlife 
conflicts 
(poaching) 
 Hunted 
animals 
through 
sport 
hunting 
 Illegal 
hunting 
 Number of animals hunted 
per year through sport 
hunting 
 Poaching rates per year  
 Number of individuals/ 
communities protecting 
wildlife  
 Adherence to set quota  
 Actors’ perceptions 
regarding sport hunting 
 
 Hunting evaluation 
report(s) 
 Government records  
 Association records  
 Animal census data 
 Sport hunting 
documents  
 Poaching statistics  
 Interview data on 
perceptions 
 Interviews 
 Document 
review 
 Informal 
conversations 
Provide 
incentives 
for local 
inhabitants 
to manage 
and protect 
wildlife and 
improve 
livelihoods 
Financial 
incentives 
 The accumulated and 
distributed income  
 Adherence to the revenue 
sharing rules  
 The projects financed by 
hunting income  
 Number of directly 
benefitted landowners  
 Actors’ perceptions 
regarding incentives 
 Official revenue 
records 
 Record of financed 
projects 
 Interview data on 
perceptions 
 Interviews 
 Document 
review 
 Observation 
notes 
 Informal 
conversations  
Positively 
change 
residents’ 
attitudes 
towards 
wildlife 
Changed 
community 
attitudes 
 Number of residents 
protecting wildlife 
 Number of residents 
allowing wild animals to 
freely graze on their farms 
 Number of residents 
reporting poachers 
 Number of residents 
forming associations to 
protect and benefit from 
wildlife 
 Number of residents 
working with other 
individuals/ organisations 
to support and benefit from 
sport hunting 
 Residents’ attitudes 
towards sport hunting 
benefits  
 
 Minutes of meetings 
 Hunting agreements 
and other hunting 
policy documents 
 Association records 
 Interview data on 
perceptions 
 
 
 Interviews 
 Document 
review 
 Studying 
minutes of 
meetings 
 Informal  
conservations  
 
Hunted animals: we analyse the (data on) numbers of animals hunted through sport hunting 
between 2001-2016 around Lake Mburo and 2006-2016 in Kabwoya. Further, we analyse the 
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hunting agreements signed by the actors, including rule implementation and rule adherence in 
the two areas. 
  
Poaching: this study does not draw causal relationships between sport hunting and 
conservation, because (1) the available data on wildlife numbers in our case studies are 
unreliable, and (2) the objectives of reintroducing sport hunting in Uganda are not explicitly 
aimed at conservation but rather at reducing human-wildlife conflicts (i.e. poaching by the local 
communities). Therefore, we operationalise conservation impacts in terms of reducing 
poaching and analyse the rate of poaching based on the available seizure data to determine 
whether there is a de- or increase in poaching in the two areas. We also analyse the views of 
the stakeholders on poaching, and the extent to which they are protecting wildlife in the two 
areas. 
   
Livelihoods: we mainly analyse the financial (livelihoods) assets (see Scoones, 2009): hunting 
income and the social projects supported through sport hunting in the two areas. First, we 
examine how, and how much of, the income was shared among the beneficiaries, and analyse 
actors’ adherence to the revenue-sharing rules. We then show how the individual(s) and the 
communities utilised hunting income. Finally, we incorporate the residents’ thoughts about 
these projects and whether or not these improved their livelihoods over the years.  
 
Changed community attitudes: here, we analyse whether or not local communities’ attitudes 
towards wildlife have changed. 
 
5.3. Materials and methods 
This chapter focuses on a comparative analysis of two case studies (Yin 2003): Lake Mburo 
and Kabwoya. Data sources include document review and qualitative in-depth interviews. 
Fieldwork was conducted in four phases: February – August 2014, January – May 2015, 
October – November 2016 and June – September 2017. For Lake Mburo, fieldwork covered 
four sub-counties: Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga Town Board (Kiruhura 
district), and for Kabwoya three sub-counties: Kabwoya, Buseruka, Kyangwali (Hoima 
district). Most interviewees were selected using snowball sampling. NGO representatives and 
government officials were purposively selected (Kumar, 2012) because of their relative 
importance to the topic. In total 47 respondents were contacted and interviewed:  22 (R1-R22) 
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around Lake Mburo, 18 (R28-R45) in Kabwoya and 7 (R23-27, R46-R47) relevant to both 
areas. More specifically the first author interviewed representatives from one conservation 
organisation (R26), two sport hunting companies (R1, R44), and two tourism associations 
(R24, R27), four district local leaders (R32, R39-R40, R42), six government representatives 
(Lake Mburo, Kabwoya) (R23, R25, R31, R41, R45, R46), one wildlife expert (R47), and 31 
village leaders/local communities/landowners (R2-R22, R28-R30, R33-R38, R43). Six 
respondents were interviewed twice. Interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes and 
offices and in restaurants; they lasted 20-90 minutes and were recorded. All recordings were 
transcribed. Ten informal conversations took place with various officials. Interview transcripts 
and documents were analysed thematically, implying ‘a form of pattern recognition within the 
data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2006: 4).  
 
The official data used in this study include the number of hunted animals through sport hunting 
and income generated between 2001-2016 (Lake Mburo) and 2006-2016 (Kabwoya), poaching 
rates, and the livelihoods projects financed using hunting income. However, these data may 
not be free from errors and are not readily available to the public. We, for example, received 
three sets of data on hunted animals and hunting income around Lake Mburo. One set was from 
the hunting company, another from the government and yet another from the hunting 
evaluation report (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). Because the figures varied between the 
different sources in some years, we used the averages of the three sources. To corroborate this 
data, we present quotes (coded to anonymise respondents) from interviews (based on 
respondents’ memories) as evidence of respondents’ perceptions of the policy impacts.  
 
The trustworthiness (cf. Decrop, 2004) of this research approach was established through the 
intense engagement of the first author with the two cases. Credibility was enhanced by 
systematic and transparent data analysis with tangible products (transcripts, codebook, coded 
transcripts); and joint analysis of the various data sources (interviews and documents) provided 
validation by triangulation. Finally, the second and third author acted as ‘auditors’ reviewing 
analytical procedures and ‘adherence to sound research practices’ (Decrop, 2004: 161). 
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5.4. Results  
5.4.1. Lake Mburo National Park  
The Lake Mburo sport hunting and its benefits, including direct income, social services and 
funded social development projects, only had a limited impact on local residents’ attitudes 
towards wildlife and incidences of poaching. Wildlife is still viewed as a nuisance by local 
communities even when benefit-sharing rules were adjusted in their favour. 
 
Hunted animals 
The Lake Mburo sport hunting policy allows 2 per cent of adult male animals to be killed (R1) 
– based on census results per species (R25, R46), but the data on wildlife numbers is unreliable. 
Based on three data sets on the numbers of hunted animals, we estimate that 1,819 animals 
were hunted between 2001-2016. The most hunted species include: impala and zebra while the 
least hunted sitatunga and hyena (Table 5.2). This hunting is mainly regulated by the Uganda 
Wildlife Authority (UWA) through its rangers, who escort sport hunters and record details of 
the hunted animals including the Global Positioning System (GPS) locations of where an 
animal is killed (R1, R2, R46). The recording is then used to identify the landowner who later 
receives direct revenue based on the specified revenue-sharing rules (R2). Furthermore, the 
government’s strategic plan (2013) and monitoring and research plan (2003) provide for 
regular monitoring (although this has not always happened) of the operations of Game Trails 
Uganda Limited (hereafter the hunting company) to avoid affecting the species populations, 
abundance and distribution that can be caused by killing more than the specified annual quota 
per animal species (R1, R46). Similarly, the 2015 professional hunting agreement (signed by 
all actors) stipulates that the hunting company can only hunt on private land outside LMNP. 
This involves killing of healthy mature male animals for their treasured trophies. Any form of 
non-compliance by the company or its clients is supposed to be penalised, which could even 
mean revoking the company’s hunting license (UWA, 2015). So far, the company’s hunting 
license has not been revoked in sixteen years. This hunting, however, if left unmonitored, may 
threaten the very species it is now supposed to protect, as more sport hunters look for healthy 
male animals that could be leaders of herds.
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Financial benefits  
One of the goals of the sport hunting policy was to provide incentives for local residents to 
protect wildlife. A government official (R46) confirmed ‘it was to demonstrate the economic 
value of wildlife to the community’. Since its implementation, almost US$ 1 M was generated 
from sport hunting (Table 5.3). The income was shared according to the hunting agreement’s 
benefit-sharing rules (Table 5.4), with the communities receiving more revenue following a 
continued dispute over the benefits. Consequently, residents’ attitudes towards wildlife initially 
improved (UWA, 2002; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) and the numbers of arrested poachers 
were low in the early years of sport hunting (see Figure 5.1). However, the majority of the 
respondents remained discontented and agitated, claiming that more revenue should be 
returned as household income. As landowner (R4) complained: ‘we are receiving peanuts’, 
and tourism association representative (R24) observed, ‘the money only benefits a few 
individuals’. Dissatisfaction with the revenue sharing fuelled disputes over the benefits 
between the big landowners and the small or non-landowners, who claimed that the big 
landowners benefitted disproportionately and maintained that, as a rule, they only benefitted 
through public goods financed by the association. Moreover, this conflict about the benefits 
also manifested in an attempted but failed ‘elite seizure’ of the hunting benefits by larger 
landowners who are originally from the region but are currently mainly living in the capital 
city Kampala.  
 
Although the government also receives a share of the hunting income, which it is supposed to 
reinvest in monitoring and conservation, there is no paper evidence of how much of income 
from sport hunting or traditional tourism is being used for conservation. Only one government 
representative stated that this income was partly used for monitoring illegal activities around 
LMNP: ‘We use it to carry out patrols and monitoring’ (R46).
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Projects financed using sport hunting income between 2001-2015 
The residents received different benefits from sport hunting to support their livelihoods, including 
income (Table 5.4), meat, and employment (R5). Out of about 2,591 landowners around Lake 
Mburo, only 461 landowners allegedly received direct income (R2) to cater for their household 
needs (R4, R6). One landowner (R2) mentioned, ‘I paid school fees for my children, fenced my 
banana plantation, [...] and employ 5 scouts on my land to monitor encroachment’. The scouts are 
paid an incentive of US$ 8 only if they report and the poacher/encroacher is arrested by the 
government or the company rangers. This amount is based on an informal agreement between the 
scout(s) and the landowner(s). Similarly, some 13 workers were employed by the company at its 
camp – most of them former poachers – earning between US$ 33 and US$ 167 per month (R1).  
Generally, the association used its income (about US$ 53,000) to finance different community 
projects between 2010-2015 e.g. schools dormitory blocks and classroom blocks, health centres, 
roads, churches and mosques (Table 5.5) – which improved local healthcare and literacy levels 
(R2, R4, R46). A very tangible improvement the sport hunting income was used for, is the 
infrastructural transformation in Rurambiira parish (a parish is the lowest administrative unit in 
Uganda) in Nyakashashara sub-county, a formerly remote village, as well as in other sub-counties 
(Table 5.5). The majority of the local resident landowners in Rurambiira parish have been able to 
construct semi-permanent houses within the Kashenshero trading centre and now run small-scale 
retail businesses. Furthermore, a murram road was opened to link Rurambiira trading centre to 
Kagetti trading centre on the main Masaka-Mbarara highway, which helped to ease traveling and 
boosted trade between the villages and nearby towns of Mbarara and Lyantonde. 
 
Table 5.5: Projects financed using hunting income around Lake Mburo between 2001-2015 
Sub-county  Project and period Amount (US$) 
2001-20071 2010-20152 
Nyakashashara  Kashenshero Primary School – 
dormitory block, latrines, staff 
kitchen, water tank, fencing, 
mattresses, beds, boarding 
contribution  
 Two water dams 
 Nyanga Primary School 
contribution, teachers’ salaries, 
teachers’ lunch 
 Administrative costs – meetings, 
stationery, communication, office 
 Construction of 
Rurambiira Church of 
Uganda (Anglican church) 
11,765 
 Construction of 
Rurambiira Church house 
(Priest’s residence) 
2,941 
 Construction of two 
classroom blocks at 
Birunduma Primary school 
4,706 
 Construction of classroom 
blocks at Nyakahiita 
Primary School  
3,235 
 
 
90 
 
rent, writing Constitution, 
compound maintenance, transport 
 Cattle vaccination against anthrax 
 Opening of a (new) 3km 
Karunyiga-Rwitsura 
feeder road   
4,706 
Kanyaryeru  Health centre with staff house, 
kitchen, water tank and 2 latrines  
 Karengo Primary School 
classroom block 
 Girls’ dormitory at Sanga Senior 
School 
 Cattle vaccination against anthrax 
 Water dam in Akayanja  
 Graded Sanga to Kibuza road 
(approximately 21km)  
 Ntura Primary School – two 
classroom blocks 
 Kigarama Primary School – two 
classroom blocks 
 Rwemikunyu primary school 
 Facilitated annual community 
education meetings 
 Administrative expenses – 
opening of bank account, office 
opening and rent, meetings and 
allowances, welfare, intelligence 
information, coordination 
allowances 
 Construction of 
Rwamuranda boarding 
Primary School 
2,544 
 Contribution to renovate 
Kibega Primary School 
1,309 
 Construction of Toilets at 
Akayanja Primary School 
1,529 
 
 
 
 
 Staff office 
 
2,294 
 Classroom block 3,824 
Sanga I and II   Construction of two 
classroom blocks at 
Rwemikunyu Primary 
School 
2,647 
 Contribution to Rwabarata 
Health Centre 
1,471 
 Contribution to Kakagate 
Primary School 
735 
 Contribution to Sanga 
Church of Uganda 
(Anglican church) 
882 
 Contribution to Sanga 
parents Primary School  
1,471 
 Contribution to Sanga 
Muslim Primary School  
735 
 Contribution for acaricide 
distribution 
1,471 
 Contribution to the 
construction of four 
classroom blocks at 
Kikatsi Primary School  
4,285 
 Contribution to the 
renovation Bisheshe 
Primary School  
706 
Total 
expenditure 
  53,256 
Source: Muhimbura and Namara, 2009; NWA, 2015 
 
 
91 
 
Although the majority of stakeholders are of the opinion that sport hunting improved the 
livelihoods of the residents, a few are disappointed by the quality of the facilities. The hunting 
company representative (R1) lamented: ‘now the maternity ward is cracked’. This is explained by 
the unprofessional manner in which the facilities are constructed – without proper supervision by 
the (local) governments – resulting in low-quality facilities. Hence, the majority of interviewed 
residents are of the opinion that all the income should be distributed among themselves to meet 
their household needs (R13, R14, R16). 
  
Illegal hunting 
Government officials (R23, R25) confirmed that the government introduced sport hunting to 
reduce poaching. However, the policy’s effectiveness in reducing poaching has varied significantly 
over time. The number of illegal hunters in and around Lake Mburo was low between 2001-2004 
(Figure 5.1), because of a shared patrol by the government, hunting company and the association 
(UWA, 2015). The residents also reported poachers, especially after receiving awards (R1, R2). A 
resident (R9) confirmed, ‘I blow the whistle on every poacher taking away the animals’.  
Figure 5.1: Estimated poaching trends in and around Lake Mburo between 2002-2016 
 
Source: UWA, 2015; 2017 
  
However, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, in subsequent years poaching picked up with fluctuations in 
poaching seizure data consistent across the years with two peaks in 2006/2007 and 2014/2015. 
These figures are high because some poachers were arrested several times a year (R1, R2). For 
example, about 388 poachers were arrested in 2014/2015. Overall, substantially higher numbers 
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were recorded in the years after 2006/2007, more than for instance in 2002-2004. This possibly 
indicates that residents either practiced retaliatory killing or perpetuated poaching for either 
subsistence or small-scale commercial purposes, even while they were receiving sport hunting 
benefits (R6, R7). They were driven by the local demand for low-priced alternative sources of 
animal protein (Kisame et al., 2017). For example, during fieldwork the meat of an entire impala 
was sold for between US$ 111-US$ 195, and zebra for US$ 69-139 (R1, R10). Most of the 
landowners claimed that the government was the main beneficiary from (hunting) tourism, 
although they were the ones who were expected to protect the animals on their land (R4, R5). As 
such, the high poaching seizure numbers between 2006-2007 and 2013-2016 are probably still too 
low, and more animals were being killed off the record. So these data may not be very reliable, 
especially since we received two sets of seizure data and averaged these (see UWA, 2015; 2017).  
 
Although the government and the company have tried to recruit and employ scouts, and arrested 
some poachers, they have not been very successful. Many poachers do not have permanent 
addresses, making it hard to write anti-poaching agreements and to warn them (R2). Whilst 
poaching (and particularly retaliatory killing) is perpetuated, especially to eliminate animals on 
private land (R10), the government lacks a strong and independent legal framework to deal with 
culprits. Perpetrators are often released by the police after paying a bribe of about US$ 46 (R2, 
R36), after which they usually return to poaching. 
 
Community attitudes towards wildlife  
The sport hunting policy only partially changed community attitudes towards wildlife. Our results 
show that although the residents’ ‘ultimate’ aim is to benefit from wildlife, their mostly negative 
attitudes towards wildlife have not significantly changed after sixteen years of sport hunting 
around Lake Mburo. 
 
Internal (UWA, 2002) and external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) evaluations also revealed that 
although sport hunting generated benefits, it only partially improved residents’ attitudes towards 
wildlife (R19, R23, R46). The majority of landowners are critical of the current hunting benefits: 
it does not compensate for wildlife damages (R4, R24), and not everyone benefits directly (R10). 
Only the big landowners benefit directly, at the expense of the small or non-landowners.  
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Moreover, landowners are changing the Lake Mburo landscape by diversifying land uses to 
include cultivation and rearing exotic livestock, such as cows and goats. A government 
representative (R46) confirmed that ‘change in land use is a challenge’, as it can destroy wildlife 
habitat, and the exotic livestock is incompatible with wildlife and could result in a greater number 
of human-wildlife conflicts. This can have a negative impact on policy effectiveness, as the 
benefits are thought to be lower than the possible extra income from land-use change.  
  
Although the association uses hunting income to finance so-called ‘social goods’ (Table 5.4), the 
majority of respondents are of the opinion that these ‘goods’ should be provided by the central 
government (R13, R14, R16). One community member (R4) noted, ‘they are making the 
government ignore its responsibilities’, as private actors provide public goods/services; a role 
traditionally by the government. Thus, a majority of the landowners are therefore of the opinion 
that the 2012 benefit sharing-rules should be adjusted so that at least 90 per cent of the sport 
hunting revenue is allocated to individual landowners (R2). Furthermore, the landowners demand 
for the annual hunting quota to be increased to generate more income (R7). This shows that the 
conflict over the benefits remains unsettled. Other local residents, living within 5km radius from 
Lake Mburo, allegedly connive with poachers to kill game and sell the meat to local restaurants 
(R2, R6, R7).  One local resident (R10) confirmed, ‘there is a local restaurant in Lyantonde town 
where I eat […] I realised I was not eating beef but zebra meat’. Although allocating more benefits 
to individual landowners may improve household incomes, it could perpetuate local inequality as 
bigger landowners would continue to receive a bigger share than the small and non-landowners. 
 
5.4.2. Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
In comparison to Lake Mburo, sport hunting benefits in Kabwoya created a stronger, albeit 
temporary, community interest in conservation. The communities, however, continued poaching 
for subsistence and small scale-commercial purposes. 
   
Hunted animals 
Following an application by the hunting company in 2002 for a concession to use Kabwoya for 
(sport hunting) tourism (R46), the government decided to increase the number of game in the area 
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by translocating animals from other protected areas (R45). The government, local governments 
and the company signed a 20-year lease agreement in 2005, where the company was to construct 
a tourist lodge and eventually provide residents (especially former poachers) with employment 
opportunities. In 2006 the government introduced hunting in a formal government protected area 
covering 87 square kilometres and in 2008 expanded it to Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area, 
which covers 107 square kilometres, as opposed to hunting on private land outside Lake Mburo 
National Park. The rules regarding hunting here are the same as in Lake Mburo except that 4 per 
cent adult male animals are killed based on census results per species even when the rule on paper 
stipulate 2 per cent. One government official (R23) mentioned, ‘Kabwoya had many Uganda kobs 
and warthogs of which if the company was to remove 4 per cent, the conditions would still be 
sufficient for sport hunting’. The other hunted species are the same as in Lake Mburo. A total of 
452 animals were hunted between 2008-2016 (Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6: Number of hunted animals through sport hunting in Kabwoya between 2008-
2016 
 
Species  
Period Total hunted 
animals 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Baboon 5 7 4 0 13 3 6 2 5 45 
Buffalo 1 2 3 3 2 0 1 3 3 18 
Bushbuck 10 11 11 9 11  9 11 14 86 
Bushpig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
Bush Duiker 3 12 7 3 6 6 5 4 10 56 
Oribi 6 10 6 2 5 6 5 3 6 49 
Warthog 2 10 10 6 7 3 7 6 10 61 
Waterbuck      9   2 11 
Ugamda kob 18 17 10 12 17 9 10 10 16 119 
Vervet Monkey       0   0 
Hippopotamus      0   0 0 
Black and White 
Colobus Monkey      3  2  5 
Leopard       0   0 0 
Hartebeest        1 1 2 
Total 45 69 51 35 61 39 43 42 67 452 
 Source: UWA, 2017 
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Financial benefits   
Apart from generating income for the government, the association and the local governments also 
receive direct benefits. Association representative (R28) confirmed, ‘there was no other source of 
income for the community’. 
 
Table 5.7: Distributed income in Kabwoya between 2006-2016 in US$   
 
 
Year 
Beneficiary and the amount of revenue (in US$) received in Kabwoya between 
2006-2016 
Total 
Revenue 
Government District 
local 
government 
Association Local governments 
Buseruka 
sub-county 
Kabwoya 
sub-county 
2006 2,265 
    
2,265 
2007 10,650 
    
10,650 
2008 26,150 
    
26,150 
2009 42,875 
    
42,875 
2010 22,276 4,201 4,256 1,596 1,596 33,925 
2011 25,168 4,632 3,720 1,395 1,395 36,310 
2012 29,410 5,419 4,532 1,700 1,700 42,761 
2013 31,348 5,569 4,856 1,821 1,821 45,415 
2014 23,447 3,849 3,294 1,235 1,235 33,060 
2015 33,337 5,292 4,658 1,747 1,747 46,781 
2016 35,034 5,881 5,980 2,243 2,243 51,381 
Total 281,960 34,843 31,296 11,737 11,737 371,573 
Source: UWA, 2017 
 
Thus, a total of US$ 371,573 hunting income was generated between 2006-2016 and shared 
according to the hunting agreement’s benefit-sharing rules (Table 5.7).  
 
However, the government fully retained the hunting income in the first four years (i.e. 2006-2009) 
because there was no functional revenue-sharing agreement (R25) and hunting was only conducted 
in the formal government protected area (R45). The communities started receiving income in 2010 
following the expansion of hunting to the community-owned land (R37, R41). Since then, the 
government monitors hunting and the distribution of benefits by the company to the other 
stakeholders. Association representative (R34) confirmed, ‘the government ensures that the money 
is shared’. Similarly, the 2013 revenue-sharing agreement in Kabwoya stipulates that the 
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government has to offer technical advice to the association about providing ‘social goods’ with the 
aim of helping to improve the residents’ attitudes towards wildlife.  
 
Projects financed using sport hunting income between 2008-2016 
The income received by the association was used to finance livelihoods projects in Kabwoya, 
Buseruka and Kyangwali sub-counties (Table 5.8). This followed consultative meetings of the 
association and the wider community to generate a list of needs for funding (R35). The lists usually 
vary but include mostly public goods, such as schools and clinics (R25, R29, R31). One association 
representative (R37) explained, ‘we supported the construction of teachers’ quarters in Tonya and 
Kabaale public schools’. Similarly, the association supported organised groups to start up pig 
farming, goat keeping, beekeeping and tree-planting projects (R32, R35).  
 
These projects are intended to improve household income and to eventually reduce (or stop) 
poaching. It is not clear how the district and the sub-counties used their income. The government 
claims it used its income to carry out patrols and monitor encroachments in Kabwoya (R41), 
including sensitising residents to conservation (R46). However, there was no paper evidence for 
the income from sport hunting being used by the government for conservation. Some interviewees 
(R41, R36, R46) did state that this income was partly used for monitoring illegal activities, 
conducting animal censuses, sensitisation and hiring community wildlife scouts. 
 
Although the benefits have been shared with the stakeholders, the association criticises the limited 
amount of income they received (R29, R34, R37). One association representative (R29) 
complained, ‘we don’t get enough revenue’. Some residents also allege that the projects financed 
with hunting income do not translate into improved household income (R34). Also, the actual 
amount spent by the association in providing the ‘social goods’ largely remained unclear (except 
for where respondents were able to estimate the activities/projects costs (Table 5.8)), reflecting 
inconsistency in record keeping, a lack of transparency and accountability. Some residents even 
stopped working as wildlife scouts and resorted to poaching (R29). One association representative 
(R28) confirmed, ‘one guy was given a job as a community scout but left’. Moreover, some 
individuals who previously hunted for commercial purposes (R38) feel deprived of their source of 
income. 
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Table 5.8:  Projects financed using hunting revenue in Kabwoya between 2010-2016 
 
Project funded Beneficiary Cost in US$ 
A motor cycle for the association chairperson 
(Transferable in case one leaves office) 
Association  964.90 
Eighteen bags of cement for the construction of staff 
quarters 
Kabale Public School 158.80 
Eighteen bags of cement for the construction of staff 
quarters 
Tonya Primary School 158.80 
Mattresses, curtains, blankets and bed sheets  Kabwoya Health Center  
Construction of toilets (first phase) Association 956 
School materials (text books, pens, pencils, and 
literature books) 
Kyehoro primary school, Hoima 
district 
 
Sensitisation meetings, Radio programme and 
formation of resource use groups 
All three sub-counties 634 
Facilitation of meetings to ensure that Rwembogo 
becomes a protected buffer zone along Howha river 
in the CWA 
Government  330.90 
Acquiring one acre of land and construction of 
association offices in Howha trading centre 
Association 964.90 
Construction of Association offices Association 5100 
Designing association logo, T-shirts and sign post All three sub-counties 271.50 
Acquiring office furniture (two tables, six chairs and 
four benches) 
All three sub-counties 99.70 
Distributing thirty piglets Nyakabingo, Igwanjura, Buhogo 
women’s groups (ten piglets each) 
275.60 
Distributing thirty high breed goats Buhuka parish and women’s groups 1240.40 
Distributing ten beehives  Nkondo parish community group 413.60 
Donating seventy iron sheets and ten poles for 
renovation 
Humuro and Kimbugu community 
primary school 
443.90 
Acquiring one digital camera Association  1282 
Fencing Association land Association 403.60 
Office stationary (visitors’ book, pens), typing and 
photocopying 2015 & 2016 
Association 74 
Allowances and transport for 11 Association 
executive members twice a year 
Association 485 
Source: UWA, 2017 
 
Illegal hunting  
Similar to the Lake Mburo case, the Kawoya residents had a long history of human-wildlife 
conflicts. A community member (R35) confirmed and elaborated, ‘poaching was almost being 
done in the open, there was no conservation’. This led to the local extinction of some species, such 
as the hartebeest in the 1980s, while buffalo and waterbuck were reduced to very low numbers 
(Plumptre et al., 2009). Following the implementation of sport hunting, some respondents (R37, 
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R41, R44) noted that poaching reduced, as some residents reported illegal activities. Association 
representative (R28) puts it: ‘people have known that they are part of wildlife […] they report 
poaching’. Similarly, the government conducts regular patrols to curb illegal activities (R45). 
Those found guilty are jailed for three months or fined US$ 42 (R28). As government 
representative (R41) explained, ‘We extended patrols, rangers stay in the bush for about four 
days’. Equally, the association organises regular sensitisations to convince known poachers to 
surrender and register as ‘reformers’ (R34), who are later recruited as community wildlife scouts 
(R25, R35, R45, R46). A community leader (R36) elaborated, ‘when poachers are sensitised […] 
they are more likely to appreciate wildlife and to convince others to abandon poaching’.         
   
Although we were unable to access poaching seizure data in Kabwoya, as there are said to be no 
records of it, the communities appear to have diverse expectations of the reserve, including 
poaching, pastoralism and charcoal production (R29). Association representative (R28) confirmed, 
‘poachers get more money than they would working as community wildlife scouts’. Poachers 
usually earn about US$ 139 from selling Uganda kob meat (R29) and thus usually opt to pay the 
US$ 42 fine and then return to the village to poach (R28). Conversely, some respondents (R29, 
R35) blame the persistent poaching on the unfair distribution of meat. One community leader 
(R36) noted, ‘they were used to wild meat […] sport hunting has some restrictions’. Association 
representative (R30) complained, ‘sometimes the meat is given to the staff and clients of the 
company or the government soldiers’. Similarly, when the company decides to share the meat, it 
only delivers to the nearby villages to keep transportation costs low (R29). This means that faraway 
villages never receive the meat, thereby provoking poaching.  
 
Community attitudes towards wildlife 
The implementation of sport hunting in Kabwoya has received mixed reactions from the 
stakeholders. While the residents’ mainly negative attitudes towards wildlife generally changed 
over the years, the residents are still more concerned about livelihood security than conservation. 
Obviously, those who are given meat are happy, compared to those who have never received any. 
A local leader (R40) noted, ‘we have benefited […] meat and some money to support our projects’. 
However, another leader (R39) from the same area is not content with the arrangement: ‘we are 
given like one Uganda kob, which is not enough […] they should give like five animals’. Another 
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community member (R33) lamented, ‘we never receive benefits, including meat’ – reflecting how 
benefits remain insufficient to guarantee the communities’ continued support for conservation. 
Consequently, the communities only temporarily stopped and resumed poaching for subsistence 
and small-scale commercial purposes. Moreover, this local policy arrangement is not only 
characterised by passive community involvement, but also marred by mistrust and a lack of 
accountability (R28, R40). There were corruption allegations especially in regard to the sharing of 
meat (R38, R43) and a lack of transparency in terms of data availability – as we were even unable 
to get poaching seizure data for this site. The person responsible claimed not to have these records. 
Although, a majority of the residents were very interested in conservation in the beginning, they 
are gradually becoming unhappy about the inadequate benefits. Moreover, a tourism association 
representative (R24) views sport hunting as a ‘deceptive activity’ that ‘leads to reductions in 
species populations’. 
  
5.5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we evaluated and analysed the impacts of sport hunting for three formal policy 
goals around Lake Mburo and Kabwoya in Uganda, namely to (1) reduce human-wildlife conflicts 
by (2) positively changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife through (3) the providing of 
incentives for the local inhabitants (UWA, 2001). 
 
Our results show that around Lake Mburo sport hunting is practiced on private land and on the one 
hand it does help to enhance local livelihoods. On the other hand, the politics of landownership 
perpetuates disputes over how the benefits are distributed. Sport hunting seems to temporarily and 
partly help to address human-wildlife conflicts, especially as local residents are hired as wildlife 
scouts. However, there are no official records on how many scouts were hired and paid over the 
years. Only the associations and a few (of the big) landowners around Lake Mburo who receive 
direct income talked about hiring some scouts. The association and landowners have used a large 
bulk of the income from sport hunting for conservation-unfriendly development, such as 
diversified land use with arable farming and stock breeding, accompanied by the construction of 
new roads and (semi-)permanent houses, thus destructing habitat. In Kabwoya, sport hunting was 
reintroduced in a formal government protected area and mainly practiced to generate income for 
the government to reduce human-wildlife conflicts. 
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Although sport hunting in Kabwoya was later extended to a community-owned wildlife area, most 
residents only had strong interests in conservation at the start, and remained largely unhappy about 
the hunting benefits, especially the sharing of meat. The communities accused the government and 
hunting company of holding back meat and not delivering it to the distant villages. Related, the 
majority of respondents around Lake Mburo believe that the current hunting benefits do not 
compensate for losses caused by wildlife. These respondents maintain that using hunting income 
to finance ‘social goods’ leads to what has been referred to as ‘hollowing out the state’ (Rhodes, 
1996), as private actors are taking over what are usually considered public responsibilities. As 
such, the local communities feel that the benefits are insufficient to have a meaningful impact on 
their livelihoods. Moreover, the official government price tags for hunting animals in the two areas 
have remained low. While hunters in Tanzania pay US$ 1,900 for buffalo and US$ 1,700 for eland 
(see Booth, 2017), in Uganda hunters pay US$ 1,500 for buffalo and US$ 1,000 for eland (UWA, 
2012).  
 
As a result of these mixed outcomes of the sport hunting policy, communities’ attitudes towards 
wildlife did not fundamentally change. Whereas the Kabwoya residents initially showed a changed 
attitude after receiving benefits, the Lake Mburo residents still view wildlife as a nuisance. Overall, 
the majority of the respondents in the two areas are still more concerned about livelihood security 
than conservation.  
 
The third goal of the sport hunting policy is reducing human-wildlife conflicts, especially 
poaching. Although this goal is related to broader debates about the extent to which market-and-
community-based approaches such as sport hunting contribute to conservation goals, our analysis 
shows that poaching has not been significantly reduced in the two cases. Poaching was only 
temporarily low around Lake Mburo after which it increased, on top of the legal hunting. This is 
demonstrated by the sharp increases in poaching seizure trends between 2006-2007 and 2013-2016 
(Figure 5.1). As residents continued to think of wildlife as a nuisance, more animals were probably 
killed off-the-record. Moreover, there was no paper evidence that legal hunting actually 
contributes to paying for conservation. Thus, due to the unreliable data on both legal hunting and 
poaching, the sustainability of sport hunting in the two areas and its impact in terms of conservation 
remains unknown. Although we were unable to access poaching statistics for KKTGMA, interview 
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data revealed that poaching is still practiced especially for subsistence and small-scale commercial 
purposes. 
 
Three main lessons can be learned from our analysis. Firstly, policy effectiveness is threatened by 
the lack of coordination among government agencies. Although the government implements 
hunting through the Uganda Wildlife Authority with a view to reduce poaching, the same 
government distributed exotic livestock (cattle and goats) to residents to promote the ‘wealth 
creation’ agenda through the National Agricultural Advisory Services. This new policy not only 
threatens the sustainability of wildlife but also encourages further land-use changes. Consequently, 
the government translocated 11 zebras and 68 impalas from around Lake Mburo to the Katonga 
wildlife reserve in western Uganda (UWA, 2017), casting doubts about the future of wildlife on 
private land around Lake Mburo. Whereas historically, wildlife co-existed with the indigenous 
long-horned Ankole cattle, the exotic breeds require vegetation to be cleared. Similarly, in 
Kabwoya, the government declared the entire Lake Albert region an oil reservoir. Although an 
intensive exploration is underway, it potentially breaches the government’s objective ‘to protect 
and conserve Kabwoya […] with varied ecosystems providing habitat to flora and fauna’ (UWA, 
2013:10). These two examples illustrate that: 1) the impact of Uganda’s sport hunting policy is 
undermined by a lack of policy coherence and 2) there are serious conservation-development trade-
offs in the two areas. The different policies in Lake Mburo and Kabwoya have contradicting goals 
and requirements, although they are all expected to contribute to transforming Uganda from a 
predominantly peasant/low income economy to a competitive, upper-middle income economy 
with an average per capita income of US$ 9,500 by 2040 (Republic of Uganda, undated).  
 
Secondly, figures on benefits, hunted animals, poaching, and even census data are in essence 
political, and not as neutral as one might think. We were not able to get all the data on the different 
(financial) benefits generated, animals hunted through sport hunting and poaching, as this data is 
typically not systematically collected and recorded. Moreover, the census data attained through 
monitoring the number of animals per species are also flawed as it is irregularly conducted and 
poorly recorded. Similar inconsistencies regarding sport hunting data sets were observed in 
Tanzania (Booth, 2017). Baker (1997) also highlights inaccuracies in sport hunting data as well as 
animal censuses used for setting annual hunting quotas in southern and eastern Africa. Elsewhere, 
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acquiring data on illegal hunting, for example in Brazil, is also a challenge (El Bizri et al., 2015). 
Moreover, non-state actors usually have no insight in the actual (income) figures, except for what 
is shared with them. Although conservation organisations have demanded (income) audits, these 
data have not been released, nor publicly discussed. This reflects a lack of accountability and 
transparency, which are key elements of good governance (Rhodes, 1996). It is therefore possible 
that some data we received from different sources were provided to paint an image of a well-
managed and supervised process – a challenge regularly associated with private-sector 
involvement in biodiversity conservation (MacDonald, 2010). It also shows that the sport hunting 
policy is not based on accurate, reliable data, casting doubts as to its sustainability. 
 
Thirdly, based on our analysis, we conclude that whereas sport hunting generated benefits and 
helped to improve local livelihoods and attitudes towards wildlife in the first years of its 
implementation, the benefits remain insufficient to make meaningful livelihood improvements and 
sustain more positive attitudes towards wildlife in the two areas. As such, the underlying 
assumption of the sport hunting policy – that when local residents receive benefits, they will 
appreciate wildlife and thus human-wildlife conflicts will be reduced – is debateable. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the communities around Lake Mburo still perceive wildlife as a nuisance 
even when they receive benefits. In Kabwoya, discontentment over the way meat and other benefits 
are shared generally led residents to resume poaching. This conclusion supports similar findings 
in earlier studies on market- and community-based conservation (see Nthiga et al., 2015), and has 
big consequences for conservation policy in a more general sense. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
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6.1. Introduction 
Sport hunting, defined as an activity where a tourist pays to hunt an animal with desired physical 
attributes (e.g. large horns, tusks, or a certain body size or skull length) (Booth, 2017; Cooney et 
al., 2017) has been subject to heated debates around the world, and especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In Kenya it was banned in 1977 and more recently (2014) in Botswana as well. In Uganda, 
however, it was reintroduced in 2001, first as a pilot project around Lake Mburo National Park 
(LMNP) and later in Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) in 2006 
and in other areas. 
 
Uganda reintroduced sport hunting to achieve the following objectives: 1) to positively change 
residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching 
by local communities), by 3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop 
guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001). These 
objectives were expected to contribute to achieving the wider goals of conservation and 
development in the country. This thesis analyses this reintroduction of Uganda’s national sport 
hunting policy. 
 
This thesis is positioned in the broader debates on conservation and development trade-offs in 
Africa. The analysed sport hunting policy arrangements are implemented based on both market-
base conservation and community-based conservation approaches. Market-based conservation 
approaches are guided by the idea that attaching monetary value to nature will raise nature’s worth 
and improve its chances of survival (see Fletcher, 2010; McAfee, 1999). Community-based 
conservation approaches are based on the idea that conservation and development can be 
simultaneously achieved (see Baker, 1997; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Lewis & Alpert, 1997). 
  
For this research, I drew on the theory of institutionalism, particularly discursive institutionalism 
(DI), regime theory and the governance literature to conceptualise Uganda’s sport hunting policy 
as a policy arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but 
implemented at the local level. I then used the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 
2006) and the concepts of governance capacity (see Arts et al., 2006; Dang et al., 2015), together 
with the concepts of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) and institutional effectiveness 
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(Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) for my conceptual 
framework to analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy 
arrangements and their impacts around LMNP and KKTGMA (see Figure 2.1). Policy 
arrangements comprise policy discourses, actors, rules and resources. It is argued that policy goals 
can only be achieved when these dimensions are, to a certain extent, consistent with each other, or 
at least experience a certain level of congruence. This thesis thus aims at understanding the 
indicative governance capacity of the sport hunting policy arrangements in the two areas – that is 
the potential of these (new) modes of governance to contribute to the solution of societal or 
administrative problems, as seen differently by the different stakeholders (Arts et al., 2006:75; see 
also Dang et al., 2015).  
 
The performative governance capacity – ‘the performance of the (new) modes of governance in 
those practices that are meant to solve these societal or administrative problems’ (Arts & Goverde, 
2006:76) – was analysed using the concept of effectiveness (Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003). 
To understand the effectiveness of the two sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and 
KKTGMA, I analysed the sport hunting policy impacts in terms of improving local livelihoods, 
reducing human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local residents) and changing local 
communities’ attitudes towards wildlife. 
 
Also informed by the framework developed in chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) this research therefore 
had the following main objective: 
To analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements 
in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development.  
In order to operationalise the objective of this thesis, the following research questions were 
formulated: 
1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda? 
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time, and what have been 
the driving forces for this change?  
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo 
National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of 
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enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing residents’ attitudes towards 
wildlife? 
 
In order to the answer the three research questions, this thesis is based on a comparative case study 
approach (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2003). Sport hunting arrangements in Lake Mburo National Park 
(LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) were analysed. 
The use of various data sources (i.e. literature and document review, qualitative in-depth 
interviews and non-participant observation) provided for validation (Kumar, 2012) and 
triangulation (Jennings, 2001).  
 
This final chapter of the thesis comprises four sections. Section 6.2 draws on the empirical chapters 
to answer the research questions. Section 6.3 discusses these findings to make a contribution to 
the debates around sport hunting implementation, and reflects on the methods used in this study. 
Finally, section 6.4 provides some policy recommendations and areas for future research. 
 
6.2. Conclusions 
I will first present the main conclusions of the thesis here, before zooming into my three research 
questions. 
 
The Ugandan government developed and implemented its sport hunting policy first as a pilot 
around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) in 2001 and later extended it to Kabwoya and Kaiso-
Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) and 11 other areas. The national level sport hunting 
policy aims have remained the same, with adjustments only having been made in animal fees (the 
amount of money to be paid by each sport hunter to kill a certain animal) and the annual population 
quotas per species. Most of the changes happened at the local level. First, although the rule on 
paper states that it is allowed to hunt 2 per cent of the available population in both LMNP and 
KKTGMA, in the latter, the actual percentage is 4 per cent. This implies that rules on paper are 
different from rules in practice. Second, the sport hunting policy arrangement around LMNP 
changed through four major periods as the communities actively participated in the debate and 
they owned the land where sport hunting takes place. Moreover, the government and the local 
communities had different interpretations of what sport hunting is all about. The LMNP 
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arrangement has been dominated by politics of landownership, conflicts over the benefits and 
changes in the local discourses (as elaborated below). In the KKTGMA, the arrangement remained 
relatively stable as the community was less active in the debates and the government is dominant 
and owns most of the land where hunting takes place, thereby exhibiting a high congruence among 
the policy arrangement dimensions.  
 
Generally, landownership is an important variable in explaining the nature of the two policy 
arrangements. Obviously, the sport hunting policy arrangements generated revenue, which was 
shared with the beneficiaries following agreed revenue-sharing rules. In LMNP, the association 
and the landowners received more revenue because they own the land where hunting is practiced. 
In KKTGMA, the government took the lion’s share of the hunting revenue because sport hunting 
is mainly practiced on government land. Although the money received by the associations was 
used to provide social services and support social development projects at the community level, 
the community members interviewed do not think that their household-level livelihoods have 
improved. The majority of the local residents around LMNP are small landowners on whose land 
sport hunting rarely takes place, meaning they rarely earn from the landowner’s share of the 
revenue. Most of the benefits flow to the larger landowners. 
 
In the government’s official sport hunting policy, reducing human-wildlife conflicts, especially 
poaching by the local communities, was implicitly expected to contribute to conservation goals. 
However, this has not happened in either of the studied areas. Moreover, there are significant 
questions to be asked about the sustainability of the sport hunting itself (as discussed below). The 
local people in the two areas only temporarily stopped, but soon resumed poaching for subsistence 
and small-scale commercial purposes. Furthermore, the local communities’ attitudes towards 
wildlife in the two areas only temporarily improved in the earlier years of the sport hunting policy 
arrangements’ implementation despite the fact that they continued to receive benefits. Initially 
there were high expectations, especially around LMNP, about sport hunting ‘providing 
opportunities to reduce’ wildlife on private land, and also providing a new revenue source 
alongside the traditional tourism (e.g. visiting to protected areas to observe wildlife, photographic 
tourism) revenue-sharing scheme. However, the communities, especially around LMNP, still think 
of wildlife as a nuisance.  
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Also, the LMNP arrangement experienced disputes over the benefits, including an attempted but 
failed ‘elite seizure’ of sport hunting benefits by larger landowners who are originally from the 
region but are currently mainly living in the capital city Kampala. Overall, the communities think 
that the two arrangements are characterised by insufficient benefits, which have not translated into 
household-level development. Moreover, the practice of sport hunting in KKTGMA is marred by 
corruption allegations, as the communities accuse the government and hunting company of not 
sharing meat and not delivering it to the faraway villages.  
 
Although sport hunting in Uganda can be described as a ’double-edged sword’ with the potential 
to control poaching, provide benefits and improve local attitudes towards wildlife, it may also 
destroy the very wildlife it is supposed to protect, as more healthier animals are hunted for their 
treasured trophies. Moreover, my research shows that changes in local attitudes and behaviour 
were only temporary. The continued disputes over the benefits indicate that the local communities 
are more interested in the hunting benefits than in sport hunting as a conservation approach. As 
such, a large bulk of the income from sport hunting is often used for conservation-unfriendly 
development, such as the construction of roads and (semi-permanent) houses, as well as clearing 
habitat for cultivation and livestock rearing by individual landowners around LMNP. So there are 
tremendous trade-offs between development and conservation. This is worsened by the continued 
local community demand for raised hunting quota to generate more revenue while other 
individuals connive with poachers to illegally profit from wildlife by selling the meat to local 
restaurants in nearby towns.  
 
This thesis reveals a lack of complete and reliable data on the populations of wildlife in the two 
areas, including data on the number of hunted animals, number of arrested poachers and revenue 
generated. It cannot be guaranteed that continued implementation of sport hunting will not hurt 
Uganda’s wildlife population in the long run. Questions can therefore be asked about the 
sustainability of sport hunting in Uganda.   
 
In the next paragraphs I will elaborate on these findings by answering the three main research 
questions. 
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6.2.1. Uganda’s sport hunting policy  
The first research question dealt with how sport hunting has been reintroduced and implemented 
in Uganda. This question is answered in Chapter 3 based on a review of the policy documents, and 
on interviews with policymakers and other stakeholders on the sport hunting implementation at 
the national level and around the first pilot area, Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP). 
 
Sport hunting was reintroduced in Uganda as a form of ‘new’ sport hunting following a global 
change in conservation discourses, namely from a ‘fences and fines approach’ to ‘community-
based approaches’ . Whereas the implementers of the ‘old’ sport hunting did not consider the views 
of the local residents during the design and implementation of the policy nor did they contribute 
direct benefits to the local communities, the designers of the ‘new’ sport hunting in Uganda 
implement it as an approach aimed at achieving both conservation and development goals through 
increased local participation in conservation activities (see also Table 6.1).. They also aim to 
generate and share hunting benefits with the local people in areas where sport hunting is 
implemented as well as in neighbouring areas. In Uganda, the new sport hunting was adopted to 
achieve four specific objectives, namely, 1) to positively change residents’ attitudes towards 
wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by 
3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop guidelines and procedures for 
further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001).  
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Table 6.1:  Broad characteristics of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ sport hunting 
‘Old’ sport hunting ‘New’ sport hunting 
 Introduced during the colonial era 
 Solely controlled by the government  
 Practiced mainly in government-controlled 
reserves 
 Faced resistance from the communities as it 
prohibited traditional hunting by 
communities 
 Persistent wildlife poisoning, poaching and 
encroachment of protected areas by the local 
communities 
 Mostly targeted larger species  
 Led to decline and/or extinction of some 
species 
 Banned by some countries (e.g. Kenya and 
Botswana) 
 Notion of new sport hunting in Uganda is part of a changed 
discourse on conservation and development since the 
1980s 
 Collaborative management arrangement involving the 
government, private sector, civil society, local 
communities and individuals 
 Practiced on private land, community-owned land and in 
government reserves 
 Meant to enable controlled hunting (e.g. focused on 
hunting old male animals) 
 Reintroduced in Uganda while other countries, e.g. 
Zimbabwe, changed its organisation to better involve local 
communities. Botswana now reconsidering reintroducing it 
after the 2014 ban (see Mbaiwa, 2018) 
 
The ‘new sport hunting’ was first reintroduced in Uganda as a pilot project in 2001 in Rurambbiira 
parish, due to its proximity to the Lake Mburo National park boundaries. Therefore, its residents 
experienced more crop damage and animal attacks as well as poaching by people from 
neighbouring communities (UWA, 2002; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). Before the reintroduction 
of sport hunting the communities thought of wildlife as a nuisance, but this changed after they 
started receiving hunting benefits in the first period with the anticipation of more revenues to come, 
but this change in view was only temporary. Following an internal evaluation in 2002 (UWA, 
2002), in which the new sport hunting was reported to have positive outcomes in terms of 
delivering benefits and changing local people’s attitudes towards wildlife, the government decided 
to extend the sport hunting policy to two other parishes (i.e. Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe). This 
marked a change in the actor, resource and discourse dimensions of the policy arrangement around 
LMNP. Although the rules dimension of the arrangement remained the same, the new parishes 
started to receive direct benefits from the continued sport hunting implementation. However, in 
2003 the landowners (individuals who own land where wild animals graze and hunting is 
conducted) started to challenge the revenue-sharing rules on the basis that they own the land where 
sport hunting is practiced and therefore deserved to be included among the direct beneficiaries. 
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Accordingly, these rules were adjusted in 2003 and the landowners started to receive direct 
benefits. As there was little inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders (especially landowners) 
during the initiation of the LMNP sport hunting policy arrangement, it was bound to be dynamic 
from the onset. Furthermore, in 2006 sport hunting was extended to Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve 
(KWR, a government-controlled reserve situated on the western side of the lake) and in 2008 to 
the Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area [KTCWA] (community-owned wildlife area situated 
on the eastern side). 
  
6.2.2. Sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya 
Game Management Area  
The second research question dealt with how the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake 
Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
(KKTGMA) evolved over time and what the driving forces for change were. 
 
While the national sport hunting policy objectives remained the same, the LMNP sport hunting 
policy arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement over four main periods, characterised by 
disputes over the benefits, politics of landownership and changed local discourses, thereby 
reflecting a highly incongruent policy arrangement in terms of the actors and rules dimensions of 
the policy arrangement. However, in the first period (2001-2003) the policy arrangement 
dimensions were relatively congruent. Communities were excited about the new opportunity to 
receive benefits from the hunted animals especially alongside the already existing traditional 
tourism revenue sharing scheme (TRS) initiated by the Uganda Wildlife Authority in 1996 
(Ahebwa et al., 2008). Also, the communities expected that sport hunting would reduce the 
numbers of wildlife on private land, so they would have fewer problems with crop damage and 
animal attacks. Thus, benefits were shared among the different stakeholders as specified in the 
revenue-sharing rules and the communities continued to simply hope that the numbers of wildlife 
would go down because of the sport hunting. However, in the second period (2003-2008) the 
arrangement began to experience some incongruence between the rules and actors dimensions, 
largely fuelled by the politics of landownership. The landowners argued that since they owned the 
land where wildlife grazes and hunting is practiced, they deserved preferential treatment. 
Therefore, certain rules, including the revenue-sharing rules, were adjusted in 2003 to include 
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landowners among the direct beneficiaries. Similarly, sport hunting was introduced in two other 
parishes (i.e. Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe) during this period, and they equally received benefits. 
Although the rules were changed to include landowners in the arrangement, these rules continued 
to be a source of discontentment. 
 
Similarly, the third period (2008-2012) revealed a total mismatch between the national and local 
level discourses in terms of what sport hunting is all about. The government, hunting company and 
community protected areas institutions (CPI – hereafter institutions) continued to perceive sport 
hunting as a means to derive benefits from wildlife to help change the local residents’ attitudes 
towards wildlife and to eventually reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by the 
local people). The local people, on the other hand, had a different interpretation of the policy and 
not only viewed sport hunting as a means to derive financial benefits, but also as a way of 
decreasing wildlife numbers in order to reduce crop damage and animal attacks. This mismatch in 
policy interpretation, interestingly, reflects different discourses on human-wildlife conflicts and 
the role of sport hunting in addressing these conflicts, with one discourse coalition interpreting 
human-wildlife conflicts as having to reduce poaching, and the other as having to reduce crop 
damage and attacks by animals. This confusion among stakeholders on this aim of the sport hunting 
policy has played an important role in the arrangement throughout its development. More so, it 
perpetuated increasing disputes over the benefits, with land being a critical factor in the debates 
about sport hunting implementation at the local level. As such, the communities resumed to think 
of wildlife as a nuisance especially as they were still faced with animal attacks and crop damage. 
In their view the purpose of sport hunting was merely to receive benefits and lower wildlife 
numbers. More changes were made in the revenue-sharing rules at the local level and eventually 
some actors were removed from the arrangement in favour of the association (community based 
organisations that manage sport hunting benefits and implement community development projects) 
and the landowners.  
 
Furthermore, in period four (2012 to date), the continued conflicts over the benefits resulted in a 
total reorganisation of the benefit-sharing rules, including which actors directly receive benefits. 
This period also witnessed the failed attempt of ‘elite seizure’ of the benefits by larger landowners 
who are originally from the region but are currently mainly living in the capital city Kampala. 
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Although this group claimed they wanted to improve community involvement in sport hunting and 
convince the government to fence the park in order to reduce human-wildlife conflicts, the local 
landowners opposed them because they thought that the group wanted to deprive them of sport 
hunting revenues. Eventually, new actor coalitions arose based on landownership size: ‘the big 
landowners’ versus ‘the small landowners’. Related, between 2008-2012 the LMNP landowners 
argued that they should be given at least 90 per cent of the sport hunting revenue. After 
negotiations, landowners started receiving 50 per cent of the sport hunting revenue in 2012 
following changed benefit-sharing rules to help enhance development at the household level. As 
sport hunting is mostly conducted on large pieces of land usually owned by the ‘big landowners’, 
it is, however, likely that they will continue to receive benefits at the expense of the ‘small 
landowners’ on whose land sport hunting is rarely practised.  
 
In comparison (see Table 6.2), the KKTGMA sport hunting policy arrangement remained stable 
over the years due to its relative congruency. Following the extension of sport hunting to Kabwoya 
Wildlife Reserve (KWR, a formal government protected reserve) in 2006, the government and the 
hunting company (Lake Albert Safaris Limited) incorporated other actors in the arrangement, such 
as the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya and Buseruka sub-counties and the local 
communities through their association. Generally, the government and the association executive 
share similar views regarding wildlife protection and agree that unrestricted use of environmental 
resources can lead to their decline. In comparison to the case in LMNP, landownership did not 
really play a key role in determining the distribution of benefits in KKTGMA. Because the 
government allegedly introduced sport hunting here to raise money to enable financing 
conservation activities in the area (although there is very little proof that hunting income is actually 
used for conservation), the benefit-sharing rules were stipulated to favour the government, getting 
50 per cent of the sport hunting revenue. Nevertheless, a minimal change happened in the rules 
and actors’ dimensions of the policy arrangement in 2008. First, sport hunting was extended to 
Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area (KTCWA, community-owned land) and second, a new 
actor, Kyangwali sub-county, was included among the sub-counties to receive sport hunting 
benefits. Further, there was a little incongruence in the rules, resources and actors’ dimensions of 
the arrangement, as the rules never specified what percentage of direct revenue the new actor 
would receive as is the case with Kabwoya and Buseruka sub-counties (see Chapter 4). Currently, 
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Kyangwali sub-county only indirectly benefits from the association’s 20 per cent share of the 
revenue, mainly through the provision of social services regarding education and health, and 
funding of social development projects (see Chapter 5 and section 6.2.3 below). But overall, this 
arrangement experienced few conflicts over the benefits, except regarding the sharing of meat – 
with claims that UWA and the hunting company sometimes hold back the meat and/or do not 
distribute it to villages located further away from the areas where hunting takes place. In 
conclusion, in KKTGAM the arrangement exhibited congruence in the policy arrangement 
dimensions, first due to the fact that the government and the local leaders share relatively similar 
views regarding wildlife protection, and second, the politics of landownership were largely absent 
here. This is because sport hunting was first introduced and is mainly practiced on government-
owned land, (although it was later expanded and is also practiced in community owned-land in 
KTCWA) and thus the government wields more power in terms of decision-making.  
 
Table 6.2: Comparison between the LMNP and KKTGMA sport hunting policy 
arrangements 
LMNP KKTGMA 
 Hunting on privately owned land 
 Evolved in 4 periods 
 Changes in all the PAA dimensions 
 Mismatch in discourses between the government 
and hunting company on the one and hand and local 
people on the other 
 Disputes over the benefits (including ‘elite seizure’ 
of the benefits) 
 Changing community discourses on wildlife  
 Community more active in the debate over time 
 Strong influence of the politics of landownership 
 Hunting in government-controlled reserve and on 
community-owned land 
 Relatively stable arrangement throughout the years 
 Only actor dimension visibly changed 
 Relative match in policy interpretation between all 
actors 
 Few disputes over the benefits (except dismay 
regarding the sharing of meat) 
 Community less active in the debate 
 Politics of landownership largely stable as the 
government is dominant and owns the land where 
hunting mostly takes place 
 
6.2.3. Impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements  
The third research question dealt with the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around 
Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area 
(KKTGMA). This question is answered in Chapter 5.  
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The impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements were analysed in terms of enhancing local 
development, reducing poaching and changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife. My study 
shows that sport hunting only helped to reduce poaching in the earlier years of its reintroduction. 
Based on the analysed seizure data, the number of arrested poachers around LMNP for example 
was only low between 2001-2004. This was because of a successful combined patrol by the 
government, the sport hunting company and the associations (UWA, 2015). Also during this time, 
the local communities were still content with the benefits with a few individuals stating that they 
employed community wildlife scouts. These scouts were supposed to help monitor and report 
illegal activities e.g. poaching, charcoal burning, wire snares and encroachment et cetera on private 
land as well as generally in the community. Overall human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching 
by local communities) have not significantly decreased in either of the areas studied. Poaching is 
still regularly practiced, as is retaliatory killing, in LMNP in the hope that it will help to reduce 
wildlife numbers on private land and thus reduce incidences of animal attacks and crop damage 
and in KKTGMA for subsistence use and small-scale commercial purposes.  
  
Further, this study shows that an estimated 1,819 animals were legally hunted between 2001-2016 
in the LMNP arrangement, while an estimated 452 animals were legally hunted between 2008-
2016 in the KKTGMA arrangement. This research further shows that the LMNP policy 
arrangement generated an estimated US$ 994,000 from hunting between 2001-2016 and the 
KKTGMA policy arrangement generated an estimated US$ 372,000 between 2006-2016. The 
income was used to incentivise the local people in the two arrangements. Although the revenue 
was shared among the policy actors, the LMNP arrangement, as also elaborated in Chapter 4, 
experiences continuous disputes over the benefits amplified by the politics of landownership. In 
both cases, the associations used their share of the revenue to complement the central government 
by providing different social services and social development projects based on the needs of the 
different local communities. The social development projects included the construction of 
classroom blocks in the village schools, health care facilities, upgrading of roads and boreholes 
most of which were originally provided or supposed to be provided by the government, and most 
of which were originally constructed by the church missionary society (CMS). Local residents do, 
however, challenge the way the revenue is used, arguing that these shared community development 
benefits should be translated into direct income at household levels. They think that the central 
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government is ignoring its mandate of providing public goods to their communities because the 
government now knows that the associations are playing this role.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘new’ sport hunting was expected to change community attitudes towards 
wildlife, especially after they were incentivised. This study reveals that the local community 
attitudes towards wildlife only temporarily improved in the earlier years of sport hunting 
implementation (see also Muhimbura & Namara, 2009; UWA, 2002), also as shown by the low 
numbers of poachers between 2001-2004. This was because: 1) they received and were happy 
about the promised benefits, and 2) they thought that sport hunting would considerably reduce 
wildlife on private land in the long run. Obviously, the government introduced the ‘new’ sport 
hunting and interpreted it differently, namely as an approach to incentivise and motivate the local 
people to protect wild animals on private land against poachers, leading to greater numbers of 
wildlife numbers in the long run. However, it is premature, if not impossible, to conclude whether 
or not sport hunting has led to an increase in wildlife numbers in the two areas studied, as the 
auditor general’s report in 2011 also highlighted the incapacity of UWA to conduct regular 
censuses of wildlife numbers in Uganda (OAG, 2011; also see section 6.3). The local communities 
continued to hope that the policy would lower wildlife numbers, especially when they were 
disappointed in the way the revenues were shared – implying no change in attitudes. Moreover, 
the local residents do not think the current revenues match the costs of the neighbouring LMNP, 
thereby reinforcing the disputes over the benefits. This disgruntlement has led the local 
communities to not only increasingly change land uses to include cultivation and livestock rearing, 
but also to kill wildlife in retaliation and sometimes return to poaching for subsistence and small-
scale commercial purposes. This obviously hinders the effectiveness of the policy. These changes 
in land use threaten wildlife habitats and therefore contribute to the broader trends in biodiversity 
loss across Africa, including Uganda. In comparison, in KKTGMA the communities were less 
negative about wildlife to begin with, as they also poached for subsistence and small-scale 
commercial purposes. As such, the majority remains more concerned about their livelihoods than 
conservation. Chapters 4 and 5 show how the communities resumed poaching for subsistence and 
small-scale commercial purposes.  
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In conclusion, the continued implementation of sport hunting in Uganda has not led to a sustained 
change in local residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, even though this was one of the main goals 
of the government policy of reintroducing sport hunting. The continued conflicts over the benefits 
indicate that the local communities have remained more interested in the benefits from sport 
hunting, than considering it as an approach to conservation. Also, the socio-cultural context in 
which these arrangements have been implemented had a great impact on how local communities 
perceive these benefits. For example, the local communities in KKTGMA eat wild meat and so 
they place great value on the sharing of meat from the killed animals, while the LMNP 
communities are more interested in improving their household level livelihoods. As such, for the 
LMNP residents, sport hunting competes with alternative agricultural land uses, which are 
expected to bring higher returns to individual households. The different contexts influence the 
continued implementation of the policy in the two areas, for instance bringing about changes in 
the number of policy actors and in the rules to institutionalise dominant discourses and to enable 
the mobilisation of resources. 
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Table 6.3: Comparison of impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements 
LMNP KKTGMA 
 Human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching, 
only diminished in the earlier years of sport 
hunting reintroduction. Thus, the local residents’ 
attitudes towards wildlife have not fundamentally 
changed 
 Mainly retaliatory killing and to a small extent 
poaching for small-scale commercial purposes 
 Sport hunting benefits insufficient to compete 
with benefits from other land uses 
 The continued disputes over the benefits indicate 
that the local communities have remained more 
interested in the benefits from sport hunting than 
they are in conservation 
 A large bulk of the sport hunting income is shared 
between the association and the larger landowners 
 Sport hunting income is often used for 
conservation-unfriendly development such as 
funding social development projects, construction 
and farming 
 
 Human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching, 
only temporarily diminished in the earlier years, 
but poaching was resumed following 
discontentment with the sharing of meat  
 Mainly poaching for subsistence and small-scale 
commercial purposes 
 Sport hunting benefits, especially meat from the 
killed animals, remain insufficient to meet the 
demand of the communities 
 The continued dispute over the sharing of meat 
indicates that the communities have remained 
more interested in the benefits from sport hunting 
than they are in conservation 
 Government takes a lion’s share of the income 
 The government claims that a large bulk of the 
income from sport hunting is used for 
conservation-friendly activities such as 
monitoring illegal activities and conducting 
animal censuses, although no records exist of how 
much of this income was used for this purpose  
 
6.3. Discussion 
In chapter 1, I highlighted a number of debates on sport hunting in developing countries, and I 
introduced my thesis topic, Uganda’s sport hunting, against the backdrop of these debates. In this 
section of Chapter 6, I return to these debates. This thesis contributes to these debates in the 
following ways. 
 
First, there is a general consensus that biodiversity loss is one of the main environmental challenges 
of our time (Breitling, 2016). In order to try to preserve the remaining biodiversity, market-based 
approaches, including sport hunting, are often promoted and used across Africa (Roth & Dressler, 
2012; Sullivan, 2012). Market-based conservation approaches are often applied for two reasons: 
(1) its suggested potential to provide incentives to conserve biodiversity, and (2) its suggested 
potential to complement traditional regulatory conservation approaches (Bräuer et al., 2006). 
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In terms of incentivising the local people, Muposhi et al. (2016:11) confirmed that, in their case in 
Zimbabwe, sport hunting ‘creates incentives for conservation for especially rural communities 
sharing space with wildlife’. According to Di Minin et al. (2016) incentives from sport hunting are 
expected to change local attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa and enable them to protect wildlife 
especially when there are adequate political and governance structures. However, in the case 
studies analysed in this thesis, the local communities are more interested in the hunting benefits 
than in sport hunting as a conservation approach. These benefits are furthermore considered to be 
inadequate to result in a permanent change in local residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, which was 
the main goal of the government. Moreover, further research is still needed to fully understand the 
role of benefit sharing in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour. As such, the 
settlement of the disputes over the benefits is yet unforeseeable. Similarly, studies by Ahebwa et 
al. (2012a) and Anyango-Van Zwieten et al. (2015) caution that the durability of conservation 
benefits is a necessary precondition to guarantee the success of incentive-based conservation 
approaches and to avoid renewed animosity towards wildlife. Additionally, Breitling (2016) 
cautions that although market-based approaches may provide short-term solutions to biodiversity 
loss, they fall short of capacity to address the underlying causes, or indirect drivers, of biodiversity 
loss, such as poverty, inadequate institutions and governance, population growth and more 
distantly, values or views on a ‘good quality of life’ (see Diaz et al., 2015). Thus, current sport 
hunting practices do not address either the direct or the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss. As 
Chan et al. (2007) argue, sport hunting benefits are not a magic bullet to address conservation and 
development challenges. 
  
Equally, several scholars (e.g. Challender & Cooney, 2016; Damm, 2008; Di Minin et al., 2016; 
Muposhi et al., 2016) argue that market-based conservation approaches (e.g. sport hunting) can 
complement traditional regulatory approaches especially when governments collaborate with the 
local communities to protect wildlife. Lindsey et al. (2007) studied the hunting industry in southern 
and eastern African countries and showed that local communities and sport hunting operators can 
work as wildlife scouts to prevent poaching. However, although sport hunting seems to 
complement traditional tourism approaches in Zimbabwe (Muposhi et al., 2016), its contribution 
in Uganda is debatable. My study only partly confirms that sport hunting complements traditional 
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conservation approaches. The UWA was able to collaborate with the local communities at the start 
of the policy implementation to protect wildlife on private land and the number of arrested 
poachers was low in the earlier years of sport hunting, also because the communities expected 
benefits. However, it was only a short period of time before it became clear that there was a general 
mismatch in the interpretation of the sport hunting policy aims between the government and the 
local communities. This has continued to affect how the local residents view the policy and its 
effectiveness generally. Moreover, although the government received US$ 130,566 from the 
LMNP arrangement between 2001-2016 and US$ 281,960 from the KKTGMA arrangement 
between 2006-2016, supposedly to be used to fund conservation activities, there is a lack of clear 
records of how much of the sport hunting income is actually directly reinvested into conservation 
activities. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the extent to which sport hunting actually 
complements traditional regulatory conservation approaches in Uganda.  
 
Further, there is a discussion on the relative contribution of sport hunting versus photographic 
tourism in Africa (cf. Baldus & Cauldwel, 2004; see also Damm, 2008; Rodrigues & Force, 2004). 
As a matter of fact, some (e.g. Rodrigues & Force, 2004) argue that the latter brings many more 
incentives to conservation than sport hunting while others e.g. Booth (2017) argue that sport 
hunting brings more revenue. However, very few studies (e.g. Booth, 2017; Mbaiwa, 2018) have 
examined the relative importance of either sport hunting or photographic tourism. Nevertheless, a 
study by Naidoo et al. (2016) revealed that both practices complemented one another in protecting 
wildlife in over 77 conservancies in Namibia. These authors warn that ‘a singular focus on either 
hunting or tourism would reduce the value of wildlife as a competitive land-use option and have 
grave repercussions for the viability of community-based conservation efforts in Namibia, and 
possibly other parts of Africa’ (Naidoo et al., 2016: 628). Around LMNP, the association (which 
is located in Kiruhura district) received around US$ 54,000 as sport hunting income in 2016 
compared to around US$ 62,000 from the traditional revenue-sharing income from (photographic, 
ecotourism, wildlife viewing et cetera) tourism that was disbursed by the UWA to Kiruhura district 
in 2016 (www.newvision.co.ug; UWA, 2016). However, photographic tourism is only practiced 
within the formal protected LMNP boundaries and not on private land. This means that sport 
hunting is currently the only major source of income for the communities that can be an incentive 
to continue protecting wildlife on private land outside LMNP – although it leads to killing of 
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wildlife. The KKTGMA arrangement is so far the only approach of which the income is allegedly 
used to finance UWA’s conservation activities, such as monitoring, and conducting animal 
censuses, although no formal proof was found for this. Photographic tourism is still 
underdeveloped in this area especially following several years without UWA’s presence amidst 
widespread poaching by the local communities, which reduced wildlife numbers in the area. Thus, 
following a collaborative agreement between UWA and Lake Albert Safaris Limited in 2002 the 
area was ‘restocked’ with wildlife for sport hunting.  
 
Similarly, the debate on market-based approaches includes the view that private actors can indeed 
complement the government in not only conserving biodiversity but also in contributing to 
improving the livelihoods and wellbeing of the local residents. Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE (see 
Metcalfe, 1994), Tanzania’s Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (see Gillingham & Lee, 1999), 
and Namibia’s integrated management and governance of communal conservancies (see Baker, 
1997) indeed exemplify how non-state actors complement the traditional government in 
conservation and provision of public goods/services. However, the continued involvement of non-
state actors especially in conservation has been argued by some (e.g. Milward & Provan, 2000; 
Rhodes, 1996; 1997) to lead to what has been referred in literature as ‘hollowing out the state’ 
(Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1996) as private actors (including associations) take over the 
role of providing public goods/services. As of 2012, local landowners around LMNP started to 
challenge the use of the sport hunting income by the association to provide public goods, arguing 
that it potentially allows the government to ignore its responsibilities. On the other hand, ignoring 
the contributions of non-state actors may potentially hamper rural development in Africa as most 
governments are usually budget-constrained and non-state actors can fill this gap. 
 
Also related to the discussion on market-based conservation is the emerging idea of a convivial 
conservation approach in a quest to overcome the use of market-based conservation approaches 
associated with capitalist ideologies (Büscher, 2014). Convivial conservation approaches are 
already being discussed and experimented with in some parts of Africa, particularly South Africa. 
It is considered as a new way of thinking about nature conservation as opposed to market-based 
conservation (Büscher, 2014). Its promoters argue that we are living in the era of the 
‘Anthropocene’ and recognise that humans are responsible for the environmental challenges we 
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face today (Crutzen, 2002; see also Moore, 2017; 2018). The gist of convivial conservation is to 
encourage the idea of ‘living with nature’ (Büscher, 2014) as opposed to ‘selling nature to save it’ 
(McAfee, 1999) or, in the case of sport hunting, ‘killing nature to save it’. The idea is evolving, 
with the potential to offer possible alternative ways of looking at nature as part of human existence 
without necessarily viewing nature based on its instrumental values, as has been the case with 
market-based approaches. However, despite its emergence and prominence in other countries, this 
idea is not yet considered in Uganda. The debate in Uganda is still very much about the ecological 
and developmental impacts of sport hunting, as also demonstrated by disputes over the benefits. 
Nevertheless, this thesis provides opportunities to integrate these debates in Uganda’s discursive 
processes regarding the practice of sport hunting, as well as to rethink the future of sport hunting 
for either conservation or development. Although a convivial approach may be related to the 
currently widely applied rewilding concept, in the hope that it will lead to reclaiming and 
expanding protected areas (Büscher, 2014; see also Lorimer, 2015) in Europe and also across 
Africa, in Uganda the idea to reintroduce wildlife in KKTGMA and also the translocation of zebras 
and impalas from LMNP to Katonga wildlife reserve (UWA, 2017) was instead done for the 
benefit of sport hunting. In this case, rewilding the two areas actually perpetuates the use of market-
based conservation approaches, and does not necessarily lead to achieving the objectives of 
convivial conservation.  
 
Second, and related, sport hunting implementation in Africa and other developing countries is 
widely debated not only in regard to its purported contribution to addressing conservation and 
development challenges (see Barrett et al., 2011; Di Minin et al., 2016; Muposhi et al., 2016), but 
also specifically about the participation and empowerment of local communities in governance 
processes (cf. Lindsey et al., 2007; Muchapondwa & Stage, 2013; 2015; Noe & Kangalawe, 2015). 
Gillingham & Lee (1999) note that local empowerment is a crucial determinant of the nature of 
relationships between rural communities and state institutions for effective wildlife management. 
Moreover, Namara & Infield (1998) argue that effective collaborative management includes 
representation of the communities in decision-making. In the cases of sport hunting analysed in 
this thesis, collaborative agreements are signed by the governments (i.e. national and local), the 
private sector (private sport hunting companies) and the local communities through their 
associations. These collaborative agreements also reflect a governance setting usually 
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characterised by the involvement of non-state actors (cf. Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Indeed, this thesis 
confirms that non-state actors are actively participating in the management and decision-making. 
The local communities in the two sites not only participate in the monitoring of sport hunting 
practices alongside the government rangers, but also communicate suggestions concerning 
community benefits as well as their development needs through their representatives. However, 
this participation has not translated into empowerment of all the communities in the two sites. Only 
the LMNP residents exercised some power as they were able to sway the sport hunting debate in 
their favour and also influenced and caused changes in the rules dimension. The changed benefits-
sharing rule around LMNP did not only institutionalise the landowners among the direct 
beneficiaries but also now favours the local residents more than the government. This is witnessed 
by the fact that a large part of the hunting benefits goes to the communities.  
 
Certainly, as demonstrated in the two policy arrangements, the extent to which sport hunting helps 
to achieve the broader goals of community-based conservation (CBC) by providing incentives for 
local people and thereby changing their attitudes towards wildlife conservation varies. Despite the 
apparent relationship between sport hunting and CBC, there are tremendous trade-offs between 
development and conservation as a large part of the income from (sport hunting) tourism is often 
used for relatively conservation-unfriendly development. These trade-offs show that the use of 
sport hunting to achieve both conservation and rural development is challenging. A study by 
Berkes (2004) revealed that community development objectives are usually not consistent with 
conservation objectives. However, although a study by Gillingham & Lee (1999) around the 
Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania revealed that local people who received wildlife-related beneﬁts 
had a more positive attitude towards conservation, my study largely shows otherwise. The local 
communities’ attitudes towards wildlife particularly around LMNP only partially improved but the 
people I interviewed still see wildlife as a nuisance and are not content with the way the sport 
hunting benefits are shared.  
 
Related to the CBC discussion above, MacDonald (2010) argues that the arrival of private actors 
(who are mostly profit-motivated) in CBC arrangements can bring about over-exploitation of 
wildlife through off-the-record hunting at the expense of the local people. The case studies 
analysed in this thesis reveal that the arrival of new actors (e.g. landowners), who have continued 
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to advocate for further changes in the rules dimension and to include more animals on the annual 
hunting quota, can lead to more animals being killed. Obviously, this will potentially have a 
negative impact on the populations of the targeted species. Unfortunately, the data on the hunted 
species as well as number of arrested poachers are inconsistent and unreliable.  
 
Third, some scholars (e.g. Di Minin et al., 2016; Paulson, 2012; 2014) have presented arguments 
that sport hunters and organisations such as Safari Club International (SCI) and the International 
Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC) can play advocacy roles for a ‘sustainable 
hunting model’ (cf. Murray, 2017; Southwick, 2015). According to Paulson (2012) the ‘sustainable 
hunting model’ is promoted through the established limits on the number of animals hunted per 
species, the sale of trophies from the hunted animals to provide incentives for conservation, as well 
as allowing local people to continue traditional hunting in a regulated manner. However, whether 
or not the sport hunters in Uganda actually advocate for a ‘sustainable hunting model’ (Paulson, 
2012; 2014) and/or mobilise extra funds to protect the animals remains unclear. As such, it is 
difficult to argue for a ‘sustainable’ hunting approach in Uganda because the arrangements 
analysed in this thesis are characterised by inconsistency, inaccuracy, inadequacy, unreliability 
and inaccessibility of sport hunting data. Moreover, as sport hunters primarily kill male animals, 
critical scholars (e.g. Batavia et al., 2018; Ripple et al., 2016) argue that it could lead to disrupting 
the species’ social structures – as in some cases leaders of groups are killed. The killing of strong 
and healthy male animals as desired by sport hunters equally reduces the possibility of sustaining 
strong and healthier genes in the population (Ripple et al., 2016). My study also varies from the 
sustainable hunting discourse. While this discourse allows traditional hunting by the local people, 
in my two cases it is prohibited. In fact, sport hunting is implemented to reduce human-wildlife 
conflicts and especially hunting by the local people, referred to as ‘poaching’.  
 
Fourth, Chapters 1, 3-5 also discussed the ethical debate about sport hunting, and more broadly 
the killing of animals in the name of conservation, or ‘killing nature to save it’, inspired by animal 
rights and welfare arguments. Specifically, animal rights advocates are concerned about the rights 
of animals as sentient beings (Bekoff, 2013; Duncan, 2006) while welfare advocates are concerned 
about the general wellbeing of animals (Batavia et al., 2018; Batavia & Nelson, 2017ab; Bekoof, 
2013). However, these ongoing debates on the welfare and rights of (hunted) animals do not form 
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part of the discourses in the two areas studied, nor in national level debates in Uganda. For 
example, none of the interviewees in this study mentioned the issue of animal welfare or rights. 
So interestingly, while animal welfare and rights discourses are evolving at the global scale and in 
different regions and countries around the world, these have not yet influenced the sport hunting 
debate in Uganda, especially in the two arrangements studied. However, following the Africa 
Union’s recent adoption of an animal welfare strategy – recognising animals as sentient beings, 
and including wild animals, farm animals and animals used in research (AU, 2017) – it is expected 
that African countries, including Uganda, will institutionalise this agenda in their national policies. 
This will open up discursive spaces that will potentially influence future sport hunting policy 
decision-making.  
 
Fifth, based on the theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism (DI), Chapter 2 also 
presented a conceptual framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport 
hunting policy arrangements and their impacts (Figure 2.1). I come back to this figure on the basis 
of its application throughout this thesis. While the use of the framework (see Figure 2.1) generally 
enabled me to analyse the development and implementation of the national sport hunting policy in 
Chapter 3, it was clear that DI could not explain the evolution of the arrangements and the impacts 
following the policy implementation around LMNP and KKTGMA. For this reason, I adopted the 
concept of congruence in Chapter 4 to explain the evolution of the two arrangements over time 
and the factors responsible. As such, the concept of congruence proved useful in explaining the 
internal dynamics of the PAA dimensions and how (in)consistency between and among these 
dimensions influences the policy impacts at the local level. Chapter 5 describes the analysis of the 
impacts of the policy implementation in the two areas, using the concept of effectiveness. The 
concept of effectiveness equally proved useful to understand the policy impacts in the two areas 
and how the stakeholders perceive these impacts, as well as how the impacts influence the (re)-
design of the policy. 
 
Using this framework, I was able to show that the performative governance capacity of the two 
policy arrangements has the capacity to influence whether or not the initial policy objectives 
remain the same or get changed to accommodate local preferences and interests, which could have 
been overlooked at the start of the policy. As such, a lack of policy effectiveness in one area can 
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cause changes in the entire policy arrangement by attracting new actors, who might make new 
rules to institutionalise new discourses and to mobilise resources to achieve certain policy 
objectives.   
 
Further, my application of the framework also demonstrates that policy arrangements are affected 
by the extent to which the different policies or policy dimensions aim for the same goals. In order 
to analyse how the institutional context influences policy implementation, I deployed the PAA 
together with the concept of congruence, and found that the dynamics between the policy 
dimensions influence the policy’s capacity to achieve its intended goals in society. 
 
The analysis in this thesis largely focuses on the strategic and structural-internal congruence (see 
Chapter 2); structural external congruence was only partially looked into, as it is not explicitly 
included in the three research questions answered in this thesis. Also, it is because the national 
sport hunting policy is aimed at addressing local challenges. Although this might be seen as a 
weakness of this thesis, this study follows a previous study by Arts & Buizer (2009) that also only 
analysed the internal dynamics of the global forest policy arrangement. So, this will not be the first 
study to limit its analysis to only the internal dynamics of policy arrangements. 
 
A sixth and final discussion is on the methods and data used in this thesis. Throughout this 
research, data availability and access were a major challenge. Moreover, there was a lack of 
transparency in the data especially the data on the number of animals per species (censuses), 
numbers of hunted animals, revenue generated from the hunted animals as well as the statistics of 
poaching in the two areas. Similarly, the tourism associations (who mainly promote photographic 
tourism) and the civil society organisations also question the hunting rules and reliability of the 
animal censuses as well as the transparency of the sport hunting statistics. They continue to demand 
transparency regarding these data. However, issues of data availability, accuracy, transparency and 
difficulties in accessing data on sport hunting are not unique to this study. Booth (2017) brought 
several inconsistencies in sport hunting data sets from Tanzania to light. Similarly, Baker (1997) 
highlighted inaccuracy in sport hunting data as well as animal censuses, which are often used for 
setting annual hunting quota. Such inconsistences are largely a result of incompetence of the 
personnel responsible for carrying out surveys (OAG, 2011) and poor data storage. Sometimes no 
 
 
127 
 
data is accessible at all, as was the case with poaching data in KKTGMA, or sometimes the 
responsible persons are not willing to share these data. For this study, I largely tried to overcome 
these challenges through triangulation of the data collection methods (Jennings, 2001). I used three 
methods of data collection: literature and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and 
non-participant observation. The use of these various data sources allowed validation (Kumar, 
2012). Moreover, the auditor general’s report revealed that although the Monitoring and Research 
Policy (1999) requires that the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) consistently conducts surveys 
on the number of animals, hunted animals, revenue sharing, poaching and other related human-
wildlife conflicts, the UWA did not carry out over 47.6 per cent of the surveys that it should have 
conducted between 2008-2011 in all of Uganda’s protected areas (OAG, 2011). The report 
attributed this failure to conduct surveys on a regular basis to lack of adequate personnel and 
insufficient funding of the research unit of the UWA (OAG, 2011). The same report concluded 
that this scenario contributes to lack of data, which should be guiding sport hunting implementation 
in Uganda. As such, continuing to implement sport hunting without credible data on the number 
of animals, hunted animals, revenue generated and number of arrested poachers brings to question 
the sustainability of sport hunting in Uganda.  
 
6.4. Future directions 
The findings presented in this study generated some potential areas for future studies and insights 
for future policies. 
 
6.4.1. Recommendation for further studies 
This study has analysed the development and implementation of sport hunting around LMNP and 
KKTGMA. However, since 2006 the number protected areas where Uganda’s sport hunting is 
implemented has reached 13 different areas (see Chapter 3). As such, it is important to conduct a 
broader study to analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy in all of the 13 areas, the unique 
challenges regarding its continued implementation in Uganda and the lessons that can be learned. 
Such a study would help in not only informing any generalisation of the impacts, but also show 
local perceptions of sport hunting.  
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Similarly, a broader study of sport hunting impacts versus the impacts of photographic wildlife 
tourism in Uganda needs to be conducted, to help make policy recommendations for future focus 
on either the first and/or second market-based solution for conservation. 
 
Related, this thesis has presented different viewpoints in favour of and against the practice of sport 
hunting (see Challender & Cooney, 2016; Lindsey et al., 2016; Muposhi et al., 2016), including 
those who argue against sport hunting based on ethical concerns. Nevertheless, the animal welfare 
and rights aspects are underrepresented in the Ugandan debates on sport hunting, and actors 
representing these views should be included in these debates. Thus, there is no real ethical 
reflection on the ‘killing of nature to save it’ in areas where it is most relevant. As such, a study 
that entails a focus on the local to global views regarding the ethical practices of sport hunting 
would be useful.  
 
Foreign tourists are the only ones to hunt for sport in Uganda, paying a lot of money to hunt. 
However, the extent to which sport hunting in Uganda actually provides funding for conservation 
(monitoring, conducting animal censuses et cetera) remains scanty. Similarly, the extent to which 
the claimed ‘sustainable hunting’ advocates including organisations such as Safari Club 
International (SCI) and the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC) 
directly mobilise funds to conserve the animal species that they hunt has not yet been investigated 
in Uganda. As such a longitudinal study focusing on understanding the sport hunting tourists in 
Uganda, and other parts of Africa, including organisations that advocate for a ‘sustainable hunting’ 
model and their contribution to wildlife conservation, would be vital for wildlife managers and 
generally for the future of the hunted species. 
 
As in this study, benefit sharing has often been applied as a panacea for conservation challenges 
in Africa although it has had mixed outcomes (see Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). Further 
research is still needed to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in changing and sustaining 
local attitudes and behaviour. This could be done by conducting a comparative study of local 
communities’ attitudes and behaviour in areas where tourism benefits are shared and in areas where 
benefits are not shared or an alternative approach is being applied to help comprehensively 
understand the role of benefits in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour towards 
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conservation. This will further help to make decisions concerning the continued implementation 
of tourism benefit-sharing schemes in Africa and particularly in Uganda. 
 
Sport hunters are obviously not the only ones to hunt wildlife, local hunters (often referred to as 
‘poachers’) in Uganda do so too, although illegally. A study that investigates the motives for 
hunting by the local people and whether or not their hunting can be incorporated in the sport 
hunting or the ‘sustainable hunting’ value chain and to minimise impacts on the hunted species 
would be valuable for Uganda and Africa at large. This would possibly provide valuable 
recommendations to formally include the local hunters in hunting policies without criminalising 
them, as is the case now. 
 
Finally, this study explicitly used the concept of congruence to analyse and explain the evolution 
of the sport hunting policy arrangements. However, it did not explicitly analyse the external 
congruence aspects of these arrangements. External congruence is the extent to which an 
arrangement potentially works along with other arrangements to achieve its own and wider societal 
goals. The implication of not including this aspect in my analysis is that I am unable to establish 
the extent to which sport hunting is embedded in the broader international and national 
(institutional) context. For example, how the government’s plan to reduce poverty, through its 
policy for modernisation of agriculture, and the national environmental, forestry, wildlife, land, 
and tourism policies affect continued implementation of sport hunting – and vice versa – remains 
unclear. As such, there is need for a study that fully addresses the external congruence aspects of 
the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda to better understand how they are affected by or 
affect the wider policy environment in Uganda and beyond. 
 
6.4.2. Policy recommendations 
Sport hunting features prominently in the wildlife management approaches of many African 
countries, including Uganda. This thesis shows that the local communities studied think the shared 
community development benefits from sport hunting are insufficient to improve individual 
household-level income, nor to sustainably improve local communities’ attitudes towards wildlife, 
also as wildlife benefits are valued against other land-use benefits.  
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The fourth policy goal of reintroducing sport hunting is to provide lessons for developing 
guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting. As I have shown, the 
national hunting policy aims have remained unchanged. Change only occurred in terms of the 
animal fees, the number of animals on the annual hunting quota and hunting now covers 13 
different areas. The previous internal (UWA, 2002) and external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) 
reports that were commissioned by the UWA have only been partially used to guide the extension 
of national sport hunting policy to KKTGMA and the other areas. Although Muhimbura & Namara 
(2009) recommended transparency and accountability in further implementation of sport hunting, 
this has not really been implemented. This could be attributed to a lack of clear feedback 
mechanisms to translate local experiences into national polices. Therefore, regular monitoring and 
a nationwide sport hunting evaluation based on reliable and accurate data on sport hunting is 
urgently needed to establish the policy impacts and lessons learned in other areas. Also, there is 
need for clear mechanisms of translating local experiences into national policies guiding sport 
hunting. The UWA should recruit, train, equip and facilitate staff to be able to competently carry 
out animal census exercises including collecting data on hunted animals, revenue sharing, 
poaching and other related human-wildlife conflicts. Also, the UWA should give third parties 
easier access to their data, and should regularly organise science-policy dialogues with the wider 
public to generate and exchange information not only on data, but also on how to address 
conservation-development trade-offs. 
 
In order to encourage public interest and participation in sport hunting debates, I would 
recommend that UWA collects and evaluates data regularly, and makes these data available to the 
public in a transparent manner in order to encourage members of the public to express their views 
on how best to conserve wildlife in a manner that does not threaten the current wildlife population. 
Moreover, holding local seminars and/or workshops will enable the local communities to 
understand the aims of sport hunting including how they can improve their livelihoods without 
necessarily depending on sport hunting income. If such a discursive space is opened, it will enable 
serious discussions that take into account lessons learned (successes and failures) following the 
reintroduction of sport hunting in Uganda. This will also help ensure local participation and 
cooperation in the policy process. 
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Similarly, based on this thesis, I also recommend that research (see also previous section) should 
be conducted to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in influencing the local communities’ 
attitudes and behaviour towards wildlife. This will inform future policy decisions aimed at 
applying benefit-sharing mechanisms in the hope to sustainably improve local attitudes and 
behaviour towards wildlife in any particular protected area. 
  
Furthermore, it is unclear what the ecological impacts of sport hunting are in Uganda and 
particularly around LMNP and KKTGMA. As such, I recommend that UWA halts any further 
expansion of sport hunting and does not increase the number of animals per species on the hunting 
quota. It should first conduct regular and consistent census of the hunted animal species over the 
years vis-à-vis the available population per hunted species in Uganda. This will inform any future 
decision on whether to change, reconsider or completely ban it, or continue the practice but with 
a possibility of banning it when the ecological impacts prove disastrous to the hunted species 
population and their habitats. 
 
Finally, this thesis contributed to the important and current topic of sport hunting for conservation 
and development in Africa and globally. Following reflections on the perspectives of the market-
based conservation approach of ‘selling nature to save it’ and the existing trade-offs between 
conservation and development in southern and eastern African countries, it can be concluded that 
sport hunting, paradoxically, implies ‘killing nature in the hope to save it’ – with potentially long-
term negative effects on the wildlife population. Based on this analysis and considering that the 
UWA implements sport hunting in 13 different areas across Uganda, the UWA should halt any 
further expansion of sport hunting in Uganda, and first and foremost conduct a national evaluation 
of the policy to better understand not only its ecological impacts but also the broader policy impacts 
on livelihoods. For now, the UWA should practice sport hunting reluctantly pending the results of 
the nationwide evaluation, regular and reliable longitudinal animal census, reliable data on 
poaching and revenue generated including how and how much of this revenue is actually 
reinvested into conservation activities. The evaluation should also take into account the ethical 
considerations regarding the practice of sport hunting for both conservation and development. Last 
but not least, I recommend for UWA to investigate and implement forms of ecotourism as a way 
of raising conservation funds that can be practiced instead of sport hunting. 
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SUMMARY - KILLING NATURE TO SAVE IT? AN ANALYSIS OF TWO 
SPORT HUNTING POLICY ARRANGEMENTS IN UGANDA 
 
Sport hunting (also known as safari hunting, trophy hunting and game hunting) is described as an 
activity where a tourist pays to hunt an animal with desired physical attributes usually in the 
company of a professional hunting guide. The colonial administrators exported it to Africa in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, protecting wildlife so they and African kings and 
chiefs could then hunt it for leisure. Around the late 1970s, the reason for practicing sport hunting 
changed from ‘hunting for leisure’ to ‘hunting to achieve conservation and development’. This 
followed a changed conservation discourse from a ‘fines and fences’ approach to a ‘participation 
and participatory development’ approach. Since then, sport hunting has been implemented through 
both community-based conservation (CBC) and market-based conservation (MBC) approaches. 
Despite the mixed reactions in both academic and policy debates on sport hunting, Uganda 
reintroduced it first as a pilot around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) in 2001 and later 
extended it to Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) and 11 other 
areas. Uganda reintroduced sport hunting to achieve the following objectives: 1) to positively 
change residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially 
poaching by local communities), by 3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop 
guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting.  
 
This thesis analyses the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements 
in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development. Specifically, it analyses the 
evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA and the factors 
responsible for this evolution, and the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around 
LMNP and KKTGMA in terms of enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing 
residents’ attitudes towards wildlife. By doing so, this thesis contributes to the broader debates on 
the implementation of sport hunting in Africa in aid of conservation and development. Particularly, 
this thesis contributes to four main debates: 1) the debate on the implementation of sport hunting 
as a means to address conservation and development challenges; 2) the debate on market-based 
conservation approaches; 3) the debate on the promotion of a ‘sustainable hunting model’; and 4) 
the debate on animal rights and welfare. Despite the continued practice of sport hunting by over 
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23 African countries in support of conservation and development, I argue that sport hunting 
paradoxically implies ‘killing nature in the hope to save it’ – potentially having long-term negative 
effects on nature. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research presented in this thesis. It starts off with a historical overview 
of the practice of sport hunting globally and in Africa in particular as an approach that can be used 
to aid both conservation and development. I began my PhD project by familiarising myself with 
the different researches and debates regarding the practice especially in developing countries. This 
way, I was able to identify the existing research gaps and define the research objective of this PhD 
thesis. In order to operationalise this objective, the following research questions were formulated: 
 
1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda? 
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time and what have been 
the driving forces for this change?  
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy around Lake Mburo National Park and 
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of enhancing development, 
reducing poaching and changing residents’ attitudes towards wildlife? 
 
As the final part of the introduction, I describe the study’s general research design including the 
methodology used to gather data presented in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and conceptual framework used in this thesis. For this research, 
I drew on the theory of institutionalism, particularly discursive institutionalism (DI), regime theory 
and the governance literature to conceptualise Uganda’s sport hunting policy as a policy 
arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but implemented at the 
local level. I used the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 2006) and the concepts of 
governance capacity (see Arts et al., 2006; Dang et al., 2015), together with the concepts of 
congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) and institutional effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; 
Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) for my conceptual framework to analyse the development 
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and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts around LMNP and 
KKTGMA. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the development and the implementation of the sport hunting 
policy at the national level in Uganda and draws on examples from around LMNP. The analysis is 
based on a review of the policy documents, and on interviews with policymakers and other 
stakeholders on the sport hunting implementation at the national level and around LMNP. The 
‘new’ sport hunting Uganda was reintroduced following a global change in conservation 
discourses from a ‘fences and fines’ approach to a ‘participation and participatory development’ 
approach. Sport hunting was first reintroduced in Uganda as a pilot project in 2001 in Rurambbiira 
parish (a parish is the lowest administrative unit in Uganda), due to its proximity to Lake Mburo 
National Park. The residents of this parish had experienced more crop damage and animal attacks 
than people living in other areas, and welcomed poaching by neighbouring communities. Over 
time, the development and implementation of the national sport hunting policy in Uganda has 
attracted a myriad of stakeholders who perform different roles and have different responsibilities. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements around 
LMNP and KKTGMA over time and explains the driving forces for change. For this analysis, I 
deployed the policy arrangement approach (PAA) and its four dimensions: discourses, actors, rules 
and resources. The concept of congruence was used to explain the causes of the evolution. The 
LMNP arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement over four main periods, characterised by 
conflicts over the benefits, politics of landownership and changed local discourses, thereby 
reflecting a highly incongruent policy arrangement. Conversely, the KKTGMA arrangement 
remained highly congruent over the years with minimal or few conflicts over the benefits, other 
than dissatisfaction about the sharing of meat. This is because the national government and the 
local leaders held relatively similar views regarding wildlife protection and the politics of 
landownership were largely absent here. 
 
In Chapter 5 I analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and 
KKTGMA. For this analysis, I used the conceptual framework of institutional effectiveness (Levy 
& Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) as elaborated in chapter 2. Since Uganda’s sport hunting policy 
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lacks clear criteria or indicators for assessing its effectiveness, I adopted the three formal policy 
goals and categorised the direct impacts into four aspects: the number of hunted animals through 
sport hunting, through poaching, impacts on livelihoods, and changed community attitudes. The 
impacts were analysed in terms of enhancing local development, reducing poaching and changing 
residents’ attitudes towards wildlife. An estimate of 1,819 animals were legally hunted between 
2001-2016 in the LMNP arrangement while an estimate of 452 animals were legally hunted 
between 2008-2016 in the KKTGMA arrangement. The income generated from these hunted 
animals was used to incentivise the local people in the two areas. The association and local 
landowners were the largest beneficiaries from the practice of sport hunting around LMNP, while 
the government took a lion’s share of the income in the KKTGMA arrangement. Overall, the 
associations used their income to provide different social services (regarding e.g. education and 
health) and to fund social development projects. Nevertheless, sport hunting only helped to reduce 
poaching in the earlier years of its implementation in the two areas. In terms of changing 
community attitudes towards wildlife, my research showed that changes in local attitudes and 
behaviour were only temporary. Poaching was resumed for subsistence and small-scale 
commercial purposes, or as a way of retaliation. Moreover, in the LMNP arrangement, the 
communities continue to view wildlife as a nuisance. As such, conservation goals have not been 
achieved in the two areas because poaching is still practiced on top of legal hunting. This may 
potentially exacerbate negative effects on wildlife population.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and a discussion on how this thesis contributes to the different 
debates on sport hunting highlighted in Chapter 1. The results from the empirical Chapters 3-5 are 
used to answer the three research questions highlighted in Chapter 1, guided by the theoretical and 
conceptual framework described in Chapter 2. The first conclusion is that the policy aims have 
remained the same, with adjustments only having been made in animal fees (the amount of money 
to be paid by each sport hunter to kill a certain animal) and the annual population quotas per 
species. Overall, most of the changes have happened at the local level as elaborated in Chapter 4. 
The second conclusion is that the politics of landownership played a crucial role in the LMNP 
case, as it fuelled the conflicts over the benefits and changes in local discourses. In KKTGMA the 
politics of landownership did not really play a role, since hunting was first introduced in a 
government protected area, although it was later also introduced to community-owned land. The 
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third conclusion is that the idea to use sport hunting to reduce local poaching in aid of conservation 
goals did not work. The local communities in the two areas only temporarily stopped, but then 
resumed poaching for various reasons. Local residents around LMNP never stopped thinking of 
wildlife as a nuisance, and in KKTGMA, the residents resumed poaching because they were 
discontented with the way meat was shared. Thus, the continued implementation of sport hunting 
in Uganda did not result in a permanent change in local residents’ attitudes towards wildlife, which 
was the main goal of the government. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I also reflect on the theoretical framework underpinning this study, 
namely discursive institutionalism (DI), by showing how it enhanced the use of the Policy 
Arrangement Approach (PAA) and the concept of governance capacity together with the concepts 
of congruence and effectiveness. In reflection on the methods used in this study, I focus on issues 
of data transparency and availability, as these posed a problem for this research. In the discussion, 
I highlight several areas for further research. One of my recommendations is for the government 
to assess the nationwide impacts of the policy by precisely establishing the population trends of 
all the hunted animal species, the number of hunted animals and number of arrested poachers. In 
addition, I recommend that the sport hunting impacts be compared to the impacts of photographic 
wildlife tourism in Uganda. There is also need for a study focusing on the local to global views in 
the ethical debate on sport hunting. Further research is still needed to fully understand the role of 
benefit sharing in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour. A study that investigates 
local residents’ motives for hunting and whether or not their hunting has any relation with hunting 
by sport hunters or the ‘sustainable hunting advocates’ would be valuable for Uganda and Africa 
at large. I propose for a study to be conducted into the external congruence aspects of the sport 
hunting policy arrangements in Uganda to better understand both the indicative and performative 
governance capacity of these and other arrangements, as well as how these are affected by or affect 
the wider policy environment in Uganda and beyond. 
 
In conclusion, I make some policy recommendations based on the findings in this PhD thesis. First, 
a nationwide sport hunting evaluation is urgently needed to establish the policy impacts and 
lessons learned in other areas in Uganda. This should also provide clear mechanisms of translating 
local experiences into national policies guiding sport hunting. Another recommendation is for the 
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UWA to conduct improved and regular research, monitoring and evaluation of the policy 
implementation in Uganda to fully understand the impacts and the role of benefit sharing in terms 
of influencing local communities’ attitudes and behaviour towards wildlife. UWA should also 
organise regular public science-policy discussions, which should be informed by credible data, in 
order to encourage members of the public to express their views on how to manage wildlife. For 
now, UWA should halt any further expansion of sport hunting in Uganda, and first and foremost 
conduct a national evaluation of the policy to better understand not only its ecological impacts but 
also the wider policy impacts on livelihoods. The evaluation should also take into account ethical 
considerations regarding the practice of sport hunting for either conservation or development. 
Pending the nationwide evaluation report, UWA should practice sport hunting reluctantly. Last 
but not least, I recommend for UWA to investigate and implement forms of ecotourism as a way 
of raising conservation funds that can be practiced instead of sport hunting. 
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Samenvatting - De natuur doden om hem te redden? Een analyse van twee 
beleidsarrangementen voor plezierjacht  in Oeganda 
 
Ondanks de gemengde reacties over plezierjacht in zowel wetenschap  als beleid, heeft Oeganda 
in 2001 plezierjacht opnieuw geïntroduceerd rondom Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) en dit 
later uitgebreid naar Kabwoya en Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) en 11 
andere gebieden. Oeganda wil hiermee de volgende doelstellingen bereiken: 1) het positief 
veranderen van de houding van bewoners ten opzichte van dieren in het wild; 2) het verminderen 
van conflicten tussen mensen en dieren in het wild (door het tegengaan van lokale stroperij); 3) 
het bieden van voordelen voor de lokale bevolking; en 4) het ontwikkelen van richtlijnen en 
procedures voor de verdere implementatie van plezierjacht. 
Gebaseerd op de theorie van institutionalisme, in het bijzonder discursief institutionalisme (DI), 
regime theorie en de beleidsarrangementen benadering, analyseert dit proefschrift de ontwikkeling 
en implementatie van de herinvoering van plezierjacht in LMNP en KKTGMA en de impact 
daarvan. Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt dat waar de herintroductie rondom LMNP vier grote periodes 
van verandering doormaakte, het KKTGMA-arrangement relatief stabiel bleef met minimale 
veranderingen. 
Net als in andere landen in Afrika, kent Oeganda’s plezier jacht gemengde resultaten. Aan de ene 
kant helpt het om het levensonderhoud van mensen in beide gebieden te verbeteren. Aan de andere 
kant bleken de gemeenschappen rond LMNP alleen tijdelijk geïnteresseerd in natuurbescherming. 
Ze bleven wilde  dieren vooral als last zien en stroperij werd slechts tijdelijk tegengegaan. Als 
zodanig is in beide gebieden de houding van de lokale gemeenschappen ten opzichte van dieren in 
het wild alleen in de eerste jaren van de tenuitvoerlegging van het beleid voor plezierjacht 
veranderd. 
Een probleem bij het uitvoeren van dit onderzoek was het gebrek aan betrouwbare  gegevens over 
plezierjacht. Daarom beveel ik de Oegandese regering aan de plezierjacht en de effecten daarvan 
veel beter te monitoren. Daarnaast adviseer ik om de effecten van plezierjacht te vergelijken met 
de effecten van fotografisch wildlife-toerisme in Oeganda. 
Ondanks dat meer dan 23 Afrikaanse landen plezierjacht toestaan ter ondersteuning van 
natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling, concludeer ik dat plezierjacht paradoxaal is. Het betekent ‘doden 
van natuur in de hoop het te redden', met voor de natuur negatieve gevolgen op de lange termijn. 
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